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ABSTRACT
Safety Climate and the Use of Personal Protective Equipment by Petroleum Refinery
Workers
by Mark A. Zapp, Sr.
Purpose: The purpose of this phenomenological study was to explore the impact of peer
and supervisor influences of task risks associated with refinery workers’ use of PPE
while working in an industrial environment. The study focused on the safety climate
model to discover the perceived value workers placed on safety and Fishbein and Ajzen’s
theory of planned behavior’s roadmap for understanding their use of PPE.
Methodology: This study used phenomenological qualitative methodology to collect
responses from 16 petroleum refinery contractor workers from Los Angeles, California,
regarding the influences peers, supervisors, and task risk have on their use of PPE.
Respondents were selected through purposeful sampling. Semistructured interviews were
conducted using an interview protocol based on Zohar’s safety climate model to capture
their lived experiences.
Findings: Six major findings emerged from the data collection and analysis. Supervisors
positively influenced refinery contractor workers’ use of PPE when they were present at
the worksite and demonstrated concern for their safety. Peers support each other’s use of
PPE by providing reminders when it is not used or exercising stop work authority for
serious infractions of safety rules. Refinery task risk procedures such as Job Hazard
Analysis (JHA) positively influenced refinery contractor workers’ use of PPE because of
the potential for serious injury or disciplinary action for not using it.
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Conclusions: The conclusions indicated that task risk to workers is decreased when
supervisors provide direction at worksites and train their personnel on PPE use.
Contractor workers, as a result of their shared hazardous workplace, expect that their
peers will use PPE and will exercise stop work authority if they do not follow safety
rules. Furthermore, refinery zero tolerance policies for violating safety rules improve
worker commitment to use PPE.
Recommendations: Recommendations include the use of virtual tools to promote direct
supervisor interaction when conducting JHA’s or safety meetings. It is also
recommended that refineries and contractor companies develop training programs for
supervisors to function as safety coaches along with recognition programs for workers to
nominate their peers for positively influencing their use of PPE.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Accidents and unsafe work behavior are a manifestation in the workplace that
impacts workers and working groups. The uniqueness of time, productivity, and an
organization’s safety climate has influenced accidents and unsafe working behavior over
time (Zohar, 1980). To explain, this phenomenon dates back as early as the 1910s with
the first accident causation model, which stated that there are some people more prone to
accidents than others (Hale & Glendon, 1987). Decades later, in 1930, an interest
trending in U.S. industries was the belief that employees were accident prone. The
concern called “attention to a class of individuals who caused more accidents than others
did” (Burnham, 2009, p. 65), and industries were attempting to prevent these types of
workers from entering the workplace. Eliminating these types of accident-prone workers
was an industry’s method for keeping their workers safe and preventing accidents in the
workplace.
A significant factor relating to the process of accident proneness is that a worker’s
social environment alters an individual’s unsafe working behaviors, and “it is believed
the individual becomes accident prone” from their unstable working environment
(Paterson, 1950, p. 53). Consequently, social factors and unstable working environments
affect an individual’s work behavior and performance when emotional instabilities are
inadequate such as social affiliations with colleagues, boredom, or lack of confidence in
working peers and management (Paterson, 1950).
The theories were concurrent with the belief of government and employers that
accidents were the fault of the worker. Accordingly, Herbert Heinrich in the 1930s,
established one of the most used models of accident causation named the domino theory
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(Seo, 2005; Yorio & Moore, 2018). The domino theory measures the social working
environment, worker fault, and unsafe act together with mechanical and physical hazard,
accident, and damage or injury (Chi & Han, 2013; Raouf, 2011). Heinrich’s (1931)
domino theory changed the way organizations viewed an accident.
Until Heinrichs’s domino theory, organizations viewed workers as the cause of an
accident; after the publication of the domino theory, human factors and performance were
seen to be the cause of accidents. Thus, the extension of human factors and performance
recognized the “tie between individuals, their tools and machines, and their general work
environment” (Heinrich, Peterson, & Roos, 1980, p. 51).
Between 1910 and the end of the 1950s, organizations used the accident causation
model to illustrate how accidents occur in the workplace (Seo, 2005; Yorio & Moore,
2018). However, this changed in the 1960s when novel organizational concepts of safety
appeared. In the 1960s, organizational climate, in the 1970s, organizational culture, and
into the 1980s, organizational concepts of safety culture and safety climate emerged as
predictors of an organization’s work environment.
Organizational climate, organizational culture, and safety culture are safety
concepts that shape safety climate. For example, organizational culture is a grouping of
perceptions prevalent in relationships that reveal how the organization, supervisors, and
employees feel about their working environment. Similarly, organizational climate
involves employees’ perceptions regarding selected characteristics of their organizational
environment (Zohar, 2010). Accordingly, the components of safety culture are rooted in
the broader concepts of organizational culture and organizational climate (Hecker &
Goldenhar, 2014). Safety culture embodies the value placed on safety as one concerned
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with attitudes toward safety, norms, rules, beliefs, roles, and practices for handling
hazards and risk (Pidegon, 1991; Turner, Pidegon, Blockley, & Toft, 1989). Thus,
organizational climate, organizational culture, and safety culture are connected to safety
climate through safe work practices in the workplace adopted by personnel (Nielsen,
2014) and the values they share in relation to risks (Zohar, 2008).
Safety climate theory has been used to predict safety-related behaviors in multiple
industries (Zohar, 2010). Climates are attitudes toward safety and are shared by workers
in an organization. Safety climate’s factors, according to Zohar (1980, 2010), identified
that workers are influenced by the attitudes, values, thoughts, and working actions of
peers and supervisors that impact an individual’s perceived risk-taking in an industrial
environment. Thus, at the social threshold, individuals may be prone to unsafe working
behaviors due to their unstable social working environment at the workplace (Paterson,
1950; Zohar, 1980, 2010).
Background
Accidents and unsafe working behaviors are common in the workplace. Over
time and circumstances, accidents occur with both individuals and workgroups inside
organizations. Some organizations are more prone to catastrophic events due to the
extensive working hazards accessible in the workplace. According to the National Safety
Council (NSC, 2020b), manufacturing is ranked the third highest occupation with the
largest number of workplace injuries. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2018)
reported that 343 manufacturing workers died while at work in 2018.
A subgroup associated with manufacturing fatalities is contract workers. NSC
(2020a) described that there are 800 deaths a year in the workplace for this subgroup,
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which has shown an increase of 50% since 2011 (NSC, 2020a). Contractors are a
significant labor force in many high-risk industries. They are a group of workers who
industries contract out who are employed by a contractor’s office for additional
workforce. Contractors may perform maintenance work or work on complex
construction projects because they have specialized knowledge or skills. In contrast,
contractors may only work for short periods at a time in facilities and move from
workplace to jobsite where there is a need for increased staff.
According to Mearns and Yule (2009), contractors experience more safety
incidents, and Casey and Krauss (2013) described that contractors bring with them their
company’s set of rules, training, work experience, and working behaviors. A specific
interest in contractors is that they constitute the group of employees who are most
normally involved in and exposed to accidents within an industry (Hofmann, Jacobs, &
Landy, 1995), and are a group considered by supervisors to have less control over their
working attitudes (Conchie, Moon, & Duncan, 2013).
History of Refining
The refining of oil in the United States began in 1881, in Bradford, Pennsylvania,
with 10 barrels a day, and now that is the oldest petroleum refinery, producing 11,000
barrels of refined crude oil per day (American Refining Group, Inc., 2014). In 2019, the
newest U.S. oil refinery in Channelview, Texas, produced 35,000 barrels per day (U.S.
Energy Information Administration, 2019d).
Considerable amounts of crude oil are refined in U.S. refineries, which run 24
hours a day. In 2018, the U.S. average consumption of petroleum was 20.50 million b/d
(mm b/d) as production in 2018 averaged 17.73 (mm b/d), which was refined in U.S.
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refineries to make petroleum products (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019a).
Finished petroleum products like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel transformed American
transportation and how industrial factories operated (Painter, 2012; Whalan, 2017).
In refining, the primary petroleum products are aviation gasoline, motor gasoline,
naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, finished nonfuel products, and chemical
industry feedstock (Schneider, Vargo, Campbell, & Hall, 2011; U.S. Energy Information
Administration, n.d.; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1995).
Refining and Safety
Standards of refining and safety in the United States were first established in the
1900s by Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company. These operating principles of financial
discipline, organizational innovation, and technical leadership are still used a century
later (Pratt, 2012). Other standards of operation for industries were created by safety
agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1971 (OSHA, 2000). The
petroleum industry was also affected by the need to respond to new regulations set by the
EPA and OSHA. For example, the complexity of the petroleum refining practices, and
its association with highly hazardous chemicals (HHC) extended the industries’ safety
standards created by the EPA and OSHA to better protect the environment and reduce
risk (OSHA, 2000, 2017).
OSHA’s Process Safety Management Standard emerged in 1992 (OSHA, 2017).
The standard describes process safety management for petroleum refineries in five parts:
process safety information, process hazards analysis, operating procedures, mechanical
integrity, and management of change. This standard, according to OSHA (2000) applies

5

to manufacturing industries “that deal with any of more than 130 specific toxic and
reactive chemicals in listed quantities; it also includes flammable liquids and gases in
quantities of 10,000 pounds (4,535.9 Kg) or more” (Section 2, para. 3). An additional
standard for safety emerged in 1992, which enforced best practices through its personnel
evaluation system called the Operations Integrity Management System (OIMS; Pratt,
2012). The standard puts safety at the center of all operating procedures and since its
implementation, has reduced risks.
Refinery Worker Safety
Hierarchy of controls “protect workers from workplace hazards; help avoid
injuries, illness, and incidents; minimize or eliminate safety and health risks; and help
employers provide workers with safe and healthful working conditions” (OSHA, n.d.-b,
para. 1). Hierarchy of controls is intended to identify, evaluate, and control risks in highrisk industries.
Engineering Controls
Engineering controls change the structure of the work area to reduce exposure
using safety barriers or devices. Engineering controls are the leading hierarchy of
controls and are intended to eliminate hazards, such as inhalation exposures and noise,
from a workplace before they interact with a worker. Industrial ventilation systems limit
inhalation exposures (Furr, 1990), and soundproofing prevents noise from reaching the
worker (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health [NIOSH], 2018).
According to NIOSH (2018), when it is not possible to remove the hazard or
change the work environment through elimination, substitution, or engineering controls,
the next step to reduce a worker’s exposure is through the use of administration controls.
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Administration Controls
Administration controls implement procedures, training, audits, and inspections
that require workers to perform more safely to reduce their exposure to risks. Operating
procedures and hazard communication are safety measures that assist workers in
identifying risks and just how to manage a hazard in the workplace (OSHA, n.d.-a, 2017).
Training workers on procedures for safely operating equipment, use of personal
protective equipment (PPE), and emergency response (Morris & Cannady, 2019; OSHA,
2000, 2002; Reese, 2016) provides workers and management with a better understanding
of safety. Administrative controls manage risks to reduce risk by understanding the
purpose, principles, and practices of safety rules.
According to the hierarchy of controls, PPE and administrative controls are
frequently used with current processes where hazards are not particularly well controlled
in the workplace (NIOSH, 2015b).
Personal Protective Equipment Controls
PPE protects the user against health or safety risks in the workplace (Health and
Safety Executive, n.d.). The purpose of PPE is to reduce human exposure from the work
environment that affects the skin, lungs, eyes, hands, and feet (Seo, 2005). PPE are
flame-resistant clothing, protective eyewear, earplugs, gloves, hard hats, and work boots
(Bahadori, 2015; BP Oil Toledo Refinery, 2019).
When all engineering and administration controls fail, PPE is considered the last
defense to a variety of hazards (OSHA, 2004). The use of PPE requires training.
Training educates a worker on the types of PPE needed for the job, how to put on and
remove PPE properly, and how to care and maintain PPE (OSHA, 2004).
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Theoretical Framework: Theory of Planned Behavior
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) emerged in the 1980s to explain safety
behaviors (Phipps, Beatty, & Parker, 2015) and unintentional injuries that were accidental
in hazardous working environments (Sleet, Trifiletti, Gielen, & Simons-Morton, 2006).
TPB provides the bridge for understanding which behaviors and environmental factors
are responsible for a person’s behavior.
The TPB model observes three human factors. They are behavioral intention
(BI), subjective norms (SN), and perceived behavioral control (PBC). BI is the attitude
reflected in a person’s behavior. SN are perceived social influences that are experienced
through working groups, and PBC is the personal belief that a person has control over the
situation (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010; M. Ryan et al., 2018).
TPB is known to examine a person’s attitude toward decision-making within a
group of people and is influenced by a person’s behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, and
control beliefs. According to Ajzen and Fishbein (2000), a person’s behavioral beliefs
are attitudes toward the consequences of their behavior. Normative beliefs are
viewpoints about the behavioral expectations of a person’s workgroup, and control
beliefs are the pressure demands that may further or hinder performance of that person’s
behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000).
As a theoretical framework, TPB has been used to explain the factors influencing
unsafe behavior. For example, unsafe acts have been identified as a major factor of
industrial accidents. TPB used in industrial settings has been able to uncover the
relationship between attitude, intention, and behavior of individuals’ work performance.
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TPB Studies
Based on TPB and intentions to use respirators and reported breathing apparatus
in the Norwegian Smelter industry, Robertsen et al. (2018) examined the organizational
influences and safety climate linking an individual’s use of PPE. The study used 1,253
workers from 13 smelting plants. Overall, TPB positively influenced behavioral
intention, and the study showed that safety climate is a predictor of safe behavior in
industrial settings.
Su, Cong, and Liang’s (2019) safety climate study examined the impact of the
supervisor-worker relationship on workers’ safety violations using a modified TPB
model. The study examined 229 Chinese construction workers. The TPB model
identified that supervisors are critical for the development of safety-related group norms,
and relationships between working members may contribute to a positive safety climate.
TPB provided meaningful results for how to improve safety compliance behaviors from
the perspective of supervisor-worker relationships.
Xu, Zou, and Luo (2018) examined whether attitudinal ambivalence was a factor
in the relationship between safety attitude and safety behavior. They evaluated 228
construction workers. The TPB model identified that safety recognition, social norms,
and perceived behavioral control had considerable influence on the intentions of unsafe
acts.
Shaping the Organizational Safety Climate
Organizational culture, organizational climate, and safety culture are safety
concepts that shape the safety climate and are related by the shared objectives of each
theory. How each concept shapes safety climate is by the behaviors and attitudes of
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workers toward the “nature of relationships between safety policies, procedures, and
practices” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1518).
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture is important to relationships and how the organization,
supervisors, and employees feel or make sense of their working environment.
Organizational culture shares awareness and understanding from different individuals’
perspectives (Watkins, 2013). Organizational culture connects to safety climate through
the effects on safety behavior, the work environment, and workgroups within an
organization (B. Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2013).
Organizational Climate
Organizational climate deals with how people are experiencing the work
environment (Zohar, 2010) as well as the shared perceptions among the workforce
concerning the procedures, practices, and the kind of behaviors that are rewarded
(B. Schneider, 1990; Reichers & Schneider, 1990; Zohar & Luria, 2003). The
relationship between organizational climate and safety climate is that each concept
examines the perceptions of the value of safety in the work environment (Neal, Griffin, &
Hart, 2000), which influences their motivation toward work (S. P. Brown & Leigh,
1996).
Safety Culture
Safety culture is a construct that evolved from the broader concepts of
organizational climate and organizational culture. Safety culture embodies the value
placed on safety as one concerned with attitudes, norms, rules, beliefs, roles, and
practices for handling hazards and risk (Pidgeon, 1991; Turner et al., 1989). Safety
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culture has been associated with individual worker safety-related behavior in high-risk
industries such as manufacturing (Cooper & Phillips, 2004) and chemical processing
(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996). More so, safety culture applies an innovative approach to
looking beyond immediate engineering and mechanical failures and is exemplified in its
place in the performance of the individual employee about safety.
Safety culture and safety climate are distinct by related topics. Culture reflects
deeper values while safety climate refers to shared perceptions (Hecker & Goldenhar,
2014). Other researchers expanded and found that culture relates to safety climate as
values employees share in relation to risks (Zohar, 2008) and through their supervisory
safety practices (Nielsen, 2014).
Safety Climate
Safety climate is associated with the research of Dov Zohar (1980), who
investigated safety attitudes held by the workforce concerning facets of safety in an
Israeli manufacturing plant. He used the term safety climate to capture individuals’ and
groups’ shared perceptions of the value of safety. Over the past decades, research in the
safety climate has been explained as a social learning process (Zohar, 2002). This
phenomenon has shown how groups interact and share a commonality on how they
interpret events in the workplace (Zohar, 2010). These shared perceptions from
workgroups are social contexts, which influence the members in an organization
(Garavan & O’Brien, 2001). Thus, safety climate is associated with thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors of organizational employees (Zohar, 1980).
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Safety Climate: Identifying Influences on Hazardous Work Behavior
Zohar (1980, 2010) described that human actions, beliefs, and individuals can be
influenced by the attitudes, values, thoughts, and actions of working colleagues in the
workplace. The identifying mechanisms found in safety climates are (a) management
commitment (Zohar, 1980); (b) safety communication (Simon & Piquard, 1991);
(c) safety rules and procedures (Cox & Cheyne, 2000); (d) supportive environment for
safety (Goldberg, Dar-El, & Rubin, 1991); (e) safety management systems (Agrilla,
1999); (f) workers’ involvement to safety (Williamson, Feyer, Cairns, & Biancotti,
1997); (g) workers’ risk-taking (March & Shapira, 1992); (h) hazards in the work
environment (Gibb & Knobbs, 1995); (i) work pressure (Glendon, Stanton, & Harrison,
1994); (j) competence (Simon & Piquard, 1991); (k) safe work behavior (Thompson,
Hilton, & Witt, 1997); and (l) training (Guldenmund, 2000). Each has been seen to
influence individuals, workgroups, and the organizational safety climate.
Influence of Perceived Risks
Perceived risk and risk perception are seen equally in safety climate studies and
both are associated with an individual’s assessment of the severity of a risk. Safety
climate is associated with risk perception through workers’ perceived risk of accidents
(Hale & Glendon, 1987; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996), and perceived risk is connected to
safety climate as it interprets important safety results to accidents and injuries (Cooper &
Philips, 2004; Smith, Huang, Ho, & Chen, 2006).
Perceived risk studies have been shown to impact healthy work environments, a
worker’s risk behavior, and workplace safety behavior. An example of impacting a
healthy work environment is management’s commitment to safety and social support
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from coworkers (Rundmo, Hestad, & Ulleberg, 1998). A consequence for workers’
safety status was due to poor commitment to safety from both supervisors and coworkers.
These social factors influence negative attitudes as well as an individual’s perceived risk
toward risky working behaviors that are connected to organizational commitment and
participation by individuals to safety and are linked to components of safety climate
(Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Zohar, 1980).
In safety climate studies on the perceptions of risk and safety, Rundmo (1996)
examined 1,138 employees on 12 platforms in the offshore oil industry in Norway. The
results revealed that when the safety climate was undesirable, risk behavior impacted the
perceived risks, which influenced the status of safety work. A second safety climate
study on perceived risks by Xia, Wang, Griffin, Wu, and Liu (2017) examined 120
workers in China’s construction industry. The results found that workers’ safety
behaviors depended on their emotional perception of risk rather than considering the risk.
In safety climate studies on attitudes and risk perceptions, Rundmo (2000)
analyzed 13 manufacturing plants with 730 respondents. Risk perception, safety climate,
attitudes, and safety status showed that workers perceived personal risk to be less
concerning compared to the risk for others. In an additional safety climate study based
on safety climate, safety leadership, workload, and accident experiences, Oah, Na, and
Moon (2018) examined 376 Korean manufacturing employees. The results for risk
perception found a positive correlation between a worker’s experience of accidents and
workload, but adverse results were found between safety climate and safety leadership.
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Peer Influences
Peer influences relates to an individual’s perception of safety within a workgroup.
The association to safety climate pertains to the organizational atmosphere (Neal et al.,
2000) and to management’s commitment to safety (Zohar, 1980). Workgroups include a
supervisor, peer coworkers, and the employee. Workgroups in safety climate studies
have been seen to influence workers’ attitudes and performance, specifically toward
safety (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016; Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2004). A factor enabling
a peer’s influences is seen in safety climate studies to be connected to a peer coworkers’
link to be an agent who performs or is responsible for safety activity (Meliá, Mearns,
Silvia, & Lima, 2008). The influential underpinning that exists, which fuels a peer
coworker’s influences is an environment where there is an open and effective exchange
of information. Group members’ influences in safety climate studies are peer
relationships and work networks, types of deviant peer influences on employees; peer
coworker influence on the commitment to safety; and peer coworker influences regarding
safety violations and decision-making.
Adding to the phenomena is when group members see their organization as
lacking in safety when employees tend to bond with peer coworkers more than they do
supervisors (Sias, 2009). Nevertheless, workers who are outside of a working group,
such as contractors, bring their own sense of working behaviors, procedures, and their
company’s policies. This group of peers in safety climate studies experience more safety
incidents compared to an organization’s full-time employee (Mearns & Yule, 2009).
Working actions of other peers that influence the attitudes, values, and thoughts in the
workplace are associated with safety climate (Zohar, 1980, 2010).
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Deviant behaviors are seen in peer influence safety climate studies. Peer
influence studies showed that deviant peer behavior affected an employee’s attitude and
working actions. According to Chiaburu and Harrison (2008); Takeuchi, Yun, and Wong
(2011); and Robinson, Wang, and Kiewitz (2014), peer coworkers are an essential part of
the social environment, which defines the work environment in the workplace. The work
environment is the most influential factor affecting an employee, and peer influences
often at times require a group member to work unsafely (Teraji, 2013). Workplace
research has shown that peer coworker influences encourage safety violations, and
through individual’s observation, certain members of a working group may shape a
worker’s task performance (Chen, Takeuchi, & Shum, 2013).
Supervisor Influences
Supervisor influences are associated with workgroup members’ understanding of
management expectations, which sets the organizational mood to something that is
associated with safety climate (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). Supervisors who face work
pressures and work overload regarding management responsibilities tend to ignore safety
issues, which heightens unsafe working behaviors. In safety climate studies of
supervisor’s engagement in safety leadership, Conchie et al. (2013) recruited 69
supervisors from 10 construction projects throughout England. The results indicated that
when supervisors had too many work responsibilities, their focus on safety was reduced,
and they had less time to observe working behaviors and less time to correct unsafe work.
This was found to be true when supervisors dealt with subcontractors; supervisors felt
they had less control over subcontractors’ working attitudes.
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In contrast, a positive safety climate promotes confidence and a worker’s safety
behavior at work. Factors that support a positive safety climate are encouraging
supervisors (Yukl, 1998) and organizational support (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). The
earliest safety climate studies found that a supervisor’s commitment to safety was key for
successful safety programs (Zohar, 1980) and a enhanced group safety climate
(Guldenmund, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005).
In a group safety climate study of supervisor leadership practices on employee
safety performance, Kapp (2012) sampled 555 employees from two manufacturing
companies. The findings showed that a positive group safety climate-assisted supervisor
leadership and safety climate predicts safety behavior. A second study explored the
relationships between safety climate and safety behavior. Liu et al. (2015) examined
3,970 manufacturing workers from 42 companies in China. The findings showed that
safety climate predicted safety behavior, and safety behavior is a significant factor
connecting safety climate to work injuries.
Statement of the Research Problem
Accident causation states that there are some people more prone to accidents than
others and suggests that a worker’s social environment, tools, and machines are the
causes for unsafe working behaviors (Hale & Glendon, 1987; Heinrich et al. 1980;
Paterson, 1950). Unsafe working behaviors vary in industry; some are more prone for
catastrophe events due to the HHC such as in petroleum refining practices. Workers’
safety is vital and employees who understand risks prior to work fare better than those
who just perform the work. According to Ford and Stephens (2018), manufacturing
workers have the highest rate of injuries; they suggest that “rather than focusing solely on
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training workers to identify and respond to risks, we need a more nuanced understanding
of how communicative interactions in organizations influence employees’ perceptions of
workplace risks” (p. 505).
The issue of protecting an employee from chemical or mechanical hazards
presents itself in the literature and appears to highlight that PPE protects a worker from
exposures such as ingestion, absorption, inhalation, and physical contact. Without the
use of PPE, workers are exposed to injury or physical impairment such as cancer, kidney
disease, liver damage, respiratory illness, and hearing loss (Mostafalou & Abdollahi,
2013; Robertsen et al., 2018). PPE is a vital tool required to perform certain tasks in
petroleum refining practices. However, literature shows that there are certain situations
when workers choose not to use PPE in the workplace. For example, workers are more
inclined to break safety rules toward the use of PPE when there is a lack of safety
equipment or when workers observe their workgroup not following safety protocol
(Liang, Lin, Zhang, & Su, 2018).
Recent research shows that there is a severe absence of safety climate studies that
examine the petroleum industry and the workforce at petroleum refining plants. An
apparent gap shows that there are no studies that examine a petroleum refining worker’s
(contractors) perceived risks, peer influences, or a supervisor’s influences on the use of
PPE. According to Hofmann et al. (1995), contractors are of specific interest, because
they constitute the group of employees who are most normally involved in and exposed
to accidents within an industry. The NSC (2020) described that there are 800 deaths a
year in the workplace for this subgroup, which has shown as increasing 50% since 2011.
Contractors are a significant labor force in many high-risk industries.
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However, contractors may only work for short periods at a time in facilities and
they bring with them their company’s set of rules, training, work experience, and working
behaviors (Casey & Krauss, 2013). Contractors in safety climate literature are considered
by working groups as not part of the workgroup and have a more of a challenging time
developing relationships than those who are near their working peers (Casey,
Riseborough, & Krauss, 2015; Higgins & Kram, 2001). Similarly, contractors are a
group considered by supervisors to have less control over their working attitudes
(Conchie et al., 2013). Studying this demographic (petroleum industry) and target
population (petroleum refinery contractors) can create a better understanding of this
subgroup and the factors that assist or reduce their use of PPE while working in an
industrial environment.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to explore the impact of peer
and supervisor influences of task risks associated with refinery workers’ use of PPE
while working in an industrial environment.
Research Questions
The study was guided by one central research question and three subquestions
designed to explore peer influences, supervisor influences, and influences of task risks
impacting a refinery worker’s use of PPE.
Central Research Question
What are the lived experiences of refinery workers in an industrial environment
that impact their use of PPE?

18

Subresearch Questions
1. What influence do supervisors have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while working
in an industrial environment?
2. What influence do peers have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while working in an
industrial environment?
3. How does task risk influence a refinery worker’s use of PPE in an industrial setting?
Significance of the Problem
The significance of this study was in decreasing the safety climate gap that exists
in literature and research on the topic of this study: Safety Climate and the Use of
Personal Protective Equipment by Petroleum Refinery Workers. A recent database
search through the Journal of Safety Research, the Journal of Management in
Engineering, and other scholarly databases such as the Iowa State University Digital
Repository and Leatherby Library on “petroleum refinery workers” showed zero studies
on this population. In addition, there is a significant difference and gap between safety
climate studies in oil extraction and offshore oil rigs compared to nonexistent studies
relating to petroleum refining and refinery workers at petroleum refining plants refining
crude into finished petroleum products.
This study can serve as an opportunity to address the void among this
demographic (petroleum refining) and population (petroleum refinery workers). The
results of the study can inform and educate supporters of safety to better understand the
lived experiences of refinery workers in an industrial environment that impact their use of
PPE and why petroleum refinery workers may not use PPE such as hard hats, respirators,
ear plugs, and other hearing protection in given situations.
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Additionally, the data will assist in developing safety interventions to prevent
unintentional injuries in an industrial environment. Because “prior behavior reflects the
operation of all factors, internal and external, that controlled performance [or
nonperformance] of behavior in the past” (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000, p. 25), this study can
be used as groundwork for other researchers to follow and improve their organizations’
working behaviors and safety climate.
Definitions
The following terms are frequently used throughout this study. The definitions
are intended to provide clarity and context for this dissertation study.
Accident proneness. A theory developed by Andrew Pettigrew in 1910 states
that there are some people more prone to accidents than others (Hale & Glendon, 1987).
Administration controls. Administration controls implement procedures that
require workers to perform more safely to reduce their exposure to risk (OSHA, 2017).
Contractor. An individual is an independent contractor if the payer has the right
to control or direct only the result of the work, not what will be done and how it will be
done (Internal Revenue Service [IRS], 2017).
Crude oil. A thick, flammable, yellow-to-black mixture of gaseous, liquid, and
solid hydrocarbons that occurs naturally beneath the earth’s surface, which once treated
to make it useful becomes petroleum (Newton, 2015).
Domino theory. A theory of accident causation developed by H. W. Heinrich
(1931) that purports that all accidents are a result of a chain of events.
Engineering controls. Engineering controls change the structure of the work
area to reduce exposure using safety barriers or safety devices (NIOSH, 2015a).
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Foreperson. A male or female leader of a work crew (Raoufi & Fayek, 2018).
Influence of perceived risk. An individual’s personal judgement of risk (Aven
& Renn, 2009).
Job hazard analysis. Permits the assessment of job-related tasks, operations, and
processes to detect and correct inherent risks and hazards (Tweedy, 2014).
Organizational climate. Relates to the quality and safety of the work
environment and is associated with organizational support that employees feel they
receive from the organization (Griffin & Hart, 2000).
Organizational culture. Shared behavioral norms and values by working groups
that characterize their working environment in an organization (Glisson, 2015).
Peer influences. The nontrivial influence on colleagues’ role perceptions,
attitudes, withdrawal, and effectiveness, even in the presence of other influences
originating from the direct leader (Chiaburu & Harrison, 2008).
Petroleum refineries. A manufacturing organization that converts crude oil into
usable products for everyday life use (gas, diesel, and jet fuel; U.S. Energy Information
Administration, 2018).
Personal protective equipment. Equipment such as respirators, safety glasses,
and hearing protection that reduces human exposures from the work environment that
affects the skin, lungs, eyes, and hands (Seo, 2005).
Safety climate. The perceived value placed on safety in an organization (Zohar,
1980).
Safety culture. The way safety is addressed in the workplace by how
organizational policies and procedures are implemented (Schein, 2010).
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Safety data sheets. A document that informs workers about how to deal with
work hazards (Tweedy, 2014).
Safety management system. A method toward safety grounded assessment of
risks and the concept of management (Cacciabue, Cassani, Licata, Oddone, &
Ottomaniello, 2015).
Supervisor influences. An influence that affects worker attitudes, beliefs, and
work performance associated with management (Zohar, 1980).
Theory of planned behavior. A theoretical framework that predicts an
individual’s intention to engage in a behavior, influenced by their surroundings (Fishbein
& Ajzen, 2010).
Delimitations
The study was delimitated to 16 refinery workers in the Los Angeles County
region in California. These workers also met the following criteria (a) employed by an
employer licensed as a California Contractors State License Board Class “A” General
Engineering Contractor License, (b) 1 year or more experience working in a petroleum
refinery, and (c) 1 year of experience in their trade.
Organization of the Study
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter I presented an overview and
the significance of this study. The second chapter provides a review of literature
including the theoretical framework, history of refining, refinery worker safety controls,
accident causation theories, overview of safety climate and variables and gaps in
research. The literature review is followed by Chapter III, which presents the study
methodology and research design in addition to an explanation of data gathering
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procedures and a description of the study population and sample. The fifth chapter offers
an analysis of the data supporting the common themes, and interpretations of the findings
are presented. Chapter V consists of the conclusion, implications, and recommendations
for future studies. The study concludes with literature references and appendices.
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This section provides an overview of the appropriate literature for this study. It is
divided into six main sections. The first section discusses the historical emergence and
development of petroleum refining in the United States. The second section examines
issues related to petroleum refining standards of safety. The third section defines
engineering, administration, and personal protective equipment (PPE) safeguards within
the context of the hierarchy of controls. The fourth section considers workplace
accidents and the historical development of accident causation models. The fifth section
defines the concepts that shape safety climate and the study’s theoretical framework.
Lastly, the safety climate in the context of peer influence, supervisor influences, and
influence of task risks affecting petroleum refinery workers’ use of PPE while working in
an industrial environment are explored.
Petroleum Refining
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2019a), in 2018, the
average consumption of petroleum in the United States was 20.50 million barrels/day
(mm b/d); production in 2018 averaged 17.73 mm b/d, which was refined in U.S.
refineries to make petroleum products. Petroleum products included unfinished oils,
liquefied petroleum gases, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel,
kerosene-type jet fuel, petrochemical feedstocks, and miscellaneous products to name a
few (U.S. Energy Information Administration, n.d., para. 1). Oil throughout history has
been a critical enabler of living standards and is the preferred energy source (Sanderson,
2013) throughout the world. Petroleum products are found and extracted from naturally
occurring deposits of oil and gas. For instance, in Ojai Valley, California, there are
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places where oil seeps from the surface. The earliest mention of this phenomenon from
research seems to have been in 1629 and is commonly called Seneca Oil found in North
America (Brantly, 1971).
Treatment of crude oil occurs in petroleum refineries, which run 24 hours a day
transforming petroleum products. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (2019c)
identified petroleum refineries as changing “crude oil into petroleum products for use as
fuels for transportation, heating, paving roads, and generating electricity and as
feedstocks for making chemicals” (Section 1, para. 1). As of January 2018, there were
135 operable oil refineries in the United States (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2019d). The following section offers a brief history of petroleum refining and describes
the importance of finished petroleum products as they relate to the United States.
History of Petroleum Refining
The first U.S. oil refinery was founded in 1881, in Bradford, Pennsylvania, with a
refining capacity of 10 barrels a day. Today it is the oldest refinery processing crude oil
in the world and has a refining capacity of 11,000 barrels per day (American Refining
Group, 2014). The newest U.S. oil refinery, which is located in Channelview, Texas,
produces 35,000 barrels per day (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019d).
There has been a redesign of the U.S. economy since the use of treated petroleum
products began; the use of motor vehicles increased from 3.4 million in 1916 to 23.1
million by the end of the 1920s, decreasing the use of public transit because of the
American society’s demand for oil (Painter, 2012; Whalan, 2017). Oil consumption in
1916 surged from 1.03 million barrels to 2.58 million barrels in 1929 (Whalan, 2017).
Oil transformed U.S. transportation as well as petroleum-driven machinery in factories
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and agriculture. More so, oil and its petroleum products altered U.S. military
transportation vessels such as the submarine, aircraft, the armored tank, and in times of
war, petroleum products like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel gave the U.S. military fleets
mobility in the air, across the oceans, and on the ground (Painter, 2012; Whalan, 2017).
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 1995), “About 90
percent of the petroleum products used in the U.S. are fuels with motor gasoline
accounting for about 43 percent of the total” (p. 4). Fuels, finished nonfuel products, and
chemical industry feedstock are primary petroleum products in refineries (EPA, 1995;
Schneider et al., 2011). Changing crude oil into finished petroleum products is managed
by a plant’s workforce. The next section examines the types of workers at a petroleum
refinery plant.
Workforce
Workforce statistics show that in 2005, petroleum refineries had 61,937
employees, and in 2016, 64,934 workers primarily engaged in refining crude petroleum
into refined petroleum (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). Workforces differ in responsibilities,
work procedures, and job description codes in the petroleum refining industry (Malewitz,
McCullough, Hasson, & Olsen, 2015). For example, in the petroleum refining industry
there are two sets of workers, the facility’s full-time employees and contractors. Fulltime workers are permanent employees and contractors are a group of employees who
may only work for short periods at a time in facilities and move from workplace to
jobsite where there is a need for increased staff. In addition, there are minor distinctions
that define both a facility’s employee and an employee who is contracted out.
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Strauss (n.d.) identified a petroleum refinery worker as an employee who
manages “the equipment that converts oil into petroleum products each as fuel or heating
oil. These workers may operate pumps, regulate pipelines, or gauge the amount of oil in
tanks” (Section 1, para. 1). The IRS (2017) provided three categories—behavioral
control, financial control, and relationships—to better determine how to properly classify
a worker. Under behavioral control, an employee is given (a) instructions as to when to
work, where to work, and what tools to work with; (b) a degree of detail working
instruction; and (c) training about procedures and methods. For financial control, an
employee is either a salaried, hourly, or weekly paid worker. As for relationship, an
employee receives employee-type benefits and has permanency at the place of work
(IRS, 2017).
Contractors are a group of workers industries contract out who are employed by a
contractor’s office for additional workforce (Rebitzer, 1995). Contractors may perform
maintenance work or work on complex construction projects because they have
specialized knowledge or skills. Yet, contractors share the same responsibilities and
working procedures as a refinery plant’s full-time employee. The minor distinctions
between a contractor and a full-time employee are described by the IRS (2017), as “an
individual is an independent contractor if the payer has the right to control or direct only
the result of the work, not what will be done and how it will be done” (Section 1, para. 3).
Distinguishing a contractor from behavioral controls, the IRS stated that the degree of
working instructions is less detailed for contractors, and contractors use their own
methods whereas employees are trained by the organization. For financial control, a
contractor is more likely to incur unreimbursable expenses, is free to seek other work
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opportunities, and is paid a flat fee. As for the relationships, a contractor neither receives
employee benefits nor does a contractor have permanency at a jobsite (IRS, 2017).
An example from Phillips 66 (2020), a Los Angeles Refinery, listed its workforce
as “more than 875 employees (including on-site contractors)” (Section 5, para. 1).
Comparably, there are 5,000 registered petroleum refinery contractors out of 12,718
Southern California petroleum workers who work in 13 petroleum refineries located in
Los Angeles County, California (Occupational Safety Councils of America, n.d.). The
next section observes the five-complex system in petroleum refining, storage, and
transportation of finished petroleum products at a refinery plant.
Refining Process
The refining process occurs in an industrial petroleum plant as the conversion of
crude oil is processed and refined into petroleum products (Solomon, Carruthers, &
Waddams, 2019) such as gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, and miscellaneous products (U.S.
Energy Information Administration, n.d.). Lazurko (2019) identified a five-complex
system in petroleum refining (a) separation where crude oil is separated into gas;
(b) conversion the manipulations such as hydro, thermal, and catalytic cracking or coking
create various grades of crude oil; (c) treatment involves the removal of impurities;
(d) blending encompasses additives formulated to produce the finished product for
reasons of performance; and (e) other such as water treatments and safety mechanisms
that make the refinery efficient and safe for the environment.
Distillation or crude distillation is the physical separation process where crude
oils are desalted and introduced to steam (Elkilani, Alsahhaf, & Fahim, 2010), the
solutions and gases separate into petroleum components and eventually become finished
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product (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019a). Products such as gasoline,
diesel, and jet fuel are the most vital of petroleum fractions and compounds in
combustion. According to Newton (2015), “Nearly half (47 percent) of all crude oil is
converted in one way or another to make gasoline, with another quarter (23 percent) used
for diesel fuel and heating oil, and 10 percent for jet fuel” (p. 30).
The storage of final treated products, according to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (2019b), is that “the final products are stored temporarily in large tanks
on a tank farm near the refinery” (Section 5, para. 1). Final products are then transported
by pipelines and trains, and trucks carry the final products from the storage tanks to
gasoline and diesel fuel stations, jet fuel for airports, and military installations across the
country (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019b). The upcoming section
discusses the standards of safety and environmental laws and describes a six-part process
safety management standard about petroleum refining and safety.
Refining and Safety
Standards of safety were first established as early as the 1900s in refining by
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company. Today, “the core operating principles of financial
discipline, organizational innovation, and technical leadership, he [Rockefeller] created a
model of efficiency that remains embedded in the corporate DNA of ExxonMobil more
than a century later” (Pratt, 2012, p. 145). Expanding toward the late 20th century, the
development of operations, safety, health, and environment (SH&E) supported Exxon
and other oil companies during the developing natural disasters caused by oil spills, thus
sparking the start of the EPA and the Occupational Safety & Health Administration
(OSHA).
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The rise of environmental laws and workplace safety were inflexible and brought
new regulations, according to Pratt (2012), as “mandated the removal of lead from
gasoline, demanded compliance with improved standards of air and water quality,
increased concern of workplace safety, and required advanced planning to minimize the
environmental impact of major projects” (p. 151).
The petroleum refining industry sector has had “many fatal or catastrophic
incidents related to the release of highly hazardous chemicals (HHC)” (OSHA, 2017,
p. 3). OSHA’s (2017) Process Safety Management Standard (3918-08) emerged in 1992.
The standard describes process safety management for petroleum refineries in five parts:
process safety information, process hazards analysis, operating procedures, mechanical
integrity, and management of change.
Process safety information aids employers and employees to identify and
understand hazards posed or produced by the process (OSHA, 2017). Process hazards
analysis identifies and analyzes the significance of potential hazards associated with the
procedure and handling. Operating procedures are written actions that provide steps for
conducting a process but also for troubled situations, temporary operations, safe work
practices, and emergency shutdown. Mechanical integrity is written procedures on how
to inspect and test equipment, train, and assure quality. Management of change concerns
changes in equipment design, procedures, and facilities (OSHA, 2017). This standard,
according to OSHA (2000), applies to manufacturing industries; to name a few: gases,
natural gas liquids, and those pertaining to chemicals “that deal with any of more than
130 specific toxic and reactive chemicals in listed quantities; it also includes flammable
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liquids and gases in quantities of 10,000 pounds (4,535.9 Kg) or more” (Section 2, para.
3).
Owing to its complexity, Schneider et al. (2011) stated that the petroleum industry
has made “notable progress reducing their negative environmental, health and safety
(EHS) impacts” (p. 70). As an example, of the industry progression, Pratt (2012)
described a ground-breaking method to the management of safety called the Operations
Integrity Management System (OIMS), which enforced best practices through its
personnel evaluation system. Interventions of safety to organizations refer to taking the
right actions to achieve a desired or expected outcome. Tweedy (2014) identified that
management systems are a vital factor in reducing negative environmental, health, and
safety (EHS) impacts and improving safe working behaviors. The next section describes
refinery disasters and accidents at petroleum refining plants as reported by mass media
throughout the United States.
Refinery Accidents
Petroleum refineries can be dangerous places to work at times. For example, in
2015, there was an accident at ExxonMobil and PBF Energy Torrance city refinery.
According to a Reuters news report, an oil refinery explosion was caused by an eroded
valve. Four people were injured, and neighborhoods threatened by a release of
hydrofluoric acid. The explosion was blamed on Exxon-Mobil’s lack of safety analysis
regarding equipment’s safe operating life and safe operating limits of industrial
mechanical parts (Groom, 2015). Preceding that, in 1994 Mobil Oil refinery in Torrance,
California, erupted in a gas explosion. A news report from the Los Angeles Times
indicated that the cause was from flammable vapors that ignited. Twenty Mobil workers

31

were treated at nearby hospitals. Two treated for extensive burns to their bodies were
taken to a burn unit; one man suffered third-degree burns. The Los Angeles Times
reported that local hospitals near the refinery had treated 17 people for burns and smoke
inhalation. The explosion caused by an apparent leak in a pipeline carrying liquid
petroleum gas sent alarms ringing at the refinery (Schoch & Hubler, 1994).
In 2019, a Houston-area petroleum-plant (Deer Park) caught fire and sent smoke
into the air that rose 3,000 to 4,000 feet. According to a Houston Chronicle report,
Despart (2019) found that the cause of the fire was due to a breach in a containment wall
in one of the terminals. No one was injured, and air quality reports showed no unsafe
chemicals in the air. The fire caused city and county officials to close schools due to eye
and skin irritations (Lozano, 2019) and environmental concerns at nearby waterways,
where chemicals leaked (Despart, 2019). One more example of refining incidents
occurred 2 weeks after the Deer Park petrochemical storage facility fire in Texas. The
accident occurred at KMCO chemical plant. CBS News (2019) reported that a Texas
chemical plant that produces coolant and brake fluid products and chemicals for the
oilfield industry fell victim to a series of explosions when a tank holding chemicals
exploded. One person died, and two others were injured. The explosion and fire caused
all residents within a mile radius to be ordered to stay indoors; four schools and 30,000
students were on lockdown. The following section explores refinery worker safety in
terms of the hierarchy of controls as engineering controls, administration controls, and
personal protective equipment (PPE).
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Refinery Worker Safety
To paint a picture of the work environment at refineries is to realize that the
refining process produces large volumes of air, water, solid, and hazardous waste that
pose hazards to workers (O’Rourke & Connolly, 2003). Hazardous materials pose risks
like fires, explosions, chemical spills, heat exposure, polluted air, and carbon monoxide
exposure (O’Rourke & Connolly, 2003). Chemicals pose the highest risks; the EPA
(1995) identified that “nine of the most commonly reported toxic chemical are highly
volatile” in petroleum refining facilities (p. 49). And some refineries have many more
than 130 specific toxic and reactive chemicals including flammable liquids and gases in
quantities of 10,000 pounds (4,535.9 Kg) or more (OSHA, 2017). An effective control
that assists employers to protect workers from workplace hazards is the hierarchy of
controls.
A hierarchy of controls “protect[s] workers from workplace hazards; help[s] avoid
injuries, illness, and incidents; minimize[s] or eliminate[s] safety and health risks; and
help[s] employers provide workers with safe and healthful working conditions” (OSHA,
n.d.-b, para. 1).
A hierarchy of controls is intended to identify, evaluate, and control risks in highrisk industries. OSHA mandates that employers first use engineering controls and
administrative controls to remove or reduce hazards in the workplace, then last, the use of
PPE (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). Engineering controls,
administrative controls, and PPE are discussed regarding paths of exposures to various
risks in the following sections.
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Engineering Controls
Engineering controls change the structure of the work area to reduce exposure
using safety barriers or devices. Engineering controls are direct; they are intended to
eliminate hazards from a workplace before they interact with a worker. The Centers of
Disease Control and Prevention (NIOSH, 2015a) identified engineering controls as the
leading hierarchy of control.
In chemical refining, Furr (1990) identified four standard routes of exposures to
chemicals: ingestion, absorption, inhalation, and injection. An engineering control for
limiting exposure to inhalations would be a ventilation system. The definition of
industrial ventilation, according to the NIOSH (2015a), removes or captures airborne
admissions.
In high-risk industries, petroleum workers involved are exposed to hydrogen
sulfide. Hydrogen sulfide exposures irritate the eyes and respiratory system, and are
associated with convulsions, headaches, weakness, and upset stomach (NIOSH, 2019).
The reasons for ventilation as an engineering control are to regulate emissions, exposures,
and chemical hazards in the workplace, particularly from the breathing zone of workers
(Furr, 1990).
Hazardous noise at work affects 22 million U.S. workers, and according to
NIOSH (2018), effectiveness in reducing noise as an engineering control is to substitute
for quieter machines. Accordingly, if swapping out machinery fails to remove the noise,
a barrier placed between the worker and the harmful noise can be employed. Therefore,
an additional engineering control is soundproofing. NIOSH described sound barriers as
“constructing barriers that prevent noise from reaching the worker” (Section 2, para. 3).

34

When it is not possible to remove the hazard or change the work environment “through
elimination, substitution or engineering controls, the next step is to reduce noise exposure
through the use of administration controls” (Sections 2, para. 3).
Administration Controls
Administration controls implement procedures, training, audits, and inspections
that require workers to perform more safely to reduce their exposure to risks. An
administrative control that guides workers to work safely is operating procedures. For
example, safeguarding workers, according to OSHA (2017), finds that operating
procedures must contain reasonable measures in cases of “upset conditions, temporary
operations, safe work practices, and emergency shutdown” at refining plants (p. 14).
Safety training and education of workers is based on the need to comply with a
variety of OSHA regulations such as hazard communication, hazardous energy control,
and others. Hazard communications, according to OSHA (n.d.-a), are labels and safety
data sheets. All forms of hazard communications identify by classifying a hazardous
substance at a workplace and all communicate the risks of managing the unsafe material.
According to OSHA (2002), hazardous energy control is a standard that “outlines
measures for controlling hazardous energies—electrical, mechanical, hydraulic,
pneumatic, chemical, thermal, and other energy sources” (p. 1).
The above-mentioned examples are of safety measures that assist workers in
identifying risks and how to manage each hazard in the workplace. To sustain a safe
working environment, employers are required to train workers on procedures for safely
operating equipment, use of PPE, and emergency response (Morris & Cannady, 2019;
OSHA, 2002; Reese, 2016).

35

Training as an administrative control provides workers and management with
better understandings of safety. OSHA (2015) described better training as the knowledge
and skills needed to (a) work safely and avoid creating hazards that could place
themselves or coworkers at risk; (b) awareness and understanding of workplace hazards
and how to identify, report, and control them; and (c) specialized training, when their
work involves dangers.
Another example of administrative control is mechanical integrity procedures.
These procedures are developed to ensure that machine-driven properties are designed,
installed, and operated correctly. According to OSHA (2000), mechanical integrity
requirements apply to (a) “pressure vessels and storage tanks; piping systems (including
piping components such as values); (b) relief and vent systems and devices;
(c) emergency shutdown systems; (d) controls (including monitoring devices and sensors,
alarms, and interlocks) and (e) pumps” (Section 17, para. 1).
Administration controls are written rules implemented by employers. They are
designed to remind workers of the dangers of the workplace and to promote good
working practices. Businesses regularly view the hierarchy of controls as a significant
investment. According to Morris and Cannady (2019), investing in engineering controls,
operating controls, and PPE can save money over time and provide effective methods of
keeping employees safe. OSHA (2015) asserted that “administrative controls and PPE
are frequently used with existing processes where hazards are not particularly well
controlled” (Section 4, para. 1).
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Personal Protective Equipment
PPE is defined as “equipment that will protect the user against health or safety
risks at work” (Health and Safety Executive, n.d., para. 1). PPE is a vital instrument used
in high-risk industries such as petroleum refining and construction (Health and Safety
Executive, n.d.). The purpose of PPE is to reduce human exposure from the work
environment that affects the skin, lungs, eyes, hands, and feet (Seo, 2005). Bahadori
(2015) described PPE as flame-resistant clothing, protective eyewear, and hearing
protection earplugs. The BP Oil Toledo Refinery (2019) identified PPE as gloves, hard
hats, and work boots. These measures provide refinery workers with the ability to work
safely in the workplace.
An OSHA (2004) publication Personal Protective Equipment suggests that when
all engineering and administration practices fail, PPE is the last defense to a variety of
hazards. Furthering the findings, OSHA suggested that a hazard assessment must be
utilized “to identify physical and health hazards in the workplace” for predetermining the
level of PPE controls needed for the work (p. 6). Examples of physical hazards are
moving objects and unstable temperatures. Health hazards are exposures to harmful dust,
substances, and contamination (OSHA, 2004). Both physical and health hazards require
the use of PPE controls.
Training on PPE control provides the necessary education for workers to use it
properly. OSHA (2004) described PPE education as improving employees’ knowledge
of (a) “when PPE is necessary; (b) what PPE is necessary; (c) how to properly put on,
take off, adjust and wear the PPE; (d) the limitations of the PPE; (e) proper care,
maintenance, useful life and disposal of PPE” (p. 9).
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The hierarchy of controls explains how to protect workers, yet there is
considerable literature over the course of the last century devoted to trying to explain why
workers get injured. Grant, Salmon, Stevens, Goode, and Read (2018) stated, “With over
half a century of progress in safety science, sociotechnical systems theory and human
factors methods it seems pertinent to ask what can be learned about accident causation
from our past” (p. 100). The following section discusses accident causation and
prevention theory and industry approaches from 1911 to 1980.
Accident Causation
Accident Proneness
Historically, dated back as early as the 1910s, the first accident causation model
was accident proneness (Hale & Glendon, 1987), which states that there are some people
more prone to accidents than others. Accordingly, the first examination of industrialized
accidents was published in 1919 for the Industrial Health Research Board by Dr.
Greenwood and H. M. Woods (Chambers & Yule, 1941). In their investigation of
industrial accidents, three standard frequencies emerged from observation: (a) accidents
happened by chance; (b) every individual had the same chance to have accidents, but the
individuals who incurred an accident’s chances of having an accident a second time were
more significant than for those who had not had an accident; (c) individuals were
dissimilar in their propensity for accidents from the beginning. Furthering the findings,
“Into the Personal Qualities Entering into Accident Causation” was published in
interludes from 1926 to 1939 where “accident proneness” was shaped from these reports
(Chambers & Yule, 1941, p. 90).
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Accident proneness was introduced in 1924 in the development of deferential
tests for at-risk workers by Eric Farmer, a psychologist; in 1925, the theory of accident
proneness became the fundamental safety theory explaining accidents (Swuste,
Groeneweg, van Gulijk, Zwaard, & Lemkowitz, 2018). Burnham (2009) described in
1928, that Eric Farmer and his colleagues began work in the United States with taxi
drivers on their “proneness to motor vehicle accidents” (p. 63). In 1930, a particular
interest trending in the United States was recognizing an accident-prone employee,
“calling attention to a class of individuals who caused more accidents than others did”
with the effort to eliminate the worker before “hiring those with faulty judgment and
reaction time” (p. 65).
Thus, the individual with the most significant accident potential was described as
“decisive or even impulsive. He is apt to act on the spur of the moment. He likes
excitement and adventure; he does not like to plan and prepare for the future” (Paterson,
1950, p. 66). Accordingly, during the emergence of accident causation theories, Herbert
Heinrich, in the 1930s, “established one of the most prominent and enduring accident
prevention theories when he concluded that high severity occupational safety and health
(OSH) incidents are preceded by numerous lower severity incidents and near misses”
(Yorio & Moore, 2018, p. 838). The following section discusses Herbert Heinrich’s
(1931) five model domino theory of accident causation.
Domino Theory
Before 1931, safety in the workplace and individual working behavior had not
been thought of as a human factor. Following the course of the First Industrial
Revolution beginning in 1760-1840 and the Second Industrial Revolution from the late
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19th century into the early 20th century, the structure of the industry was fixed on mass
production, which coupled with the growth of a nation, generated unsafe working
environments predominantly harmful for a worker (Working Conditions in Factories,
2019). For that reason, the philosophy of safety in the workplace was particularly
nonexistent. There were no regulations monitoring the worker and the “lack of effective
government regulation led to unsafe and unhealthy worksites” (Working Conditions in
Factories, 2019, para. 3).
As noted, mass production and no regulation played a significant role in workers’
functioning in unsafe environments and as such they found themselves equivocally stuck
between working safely (compliance) and supporting organizational production quotas,
which meant working at a reckless unsafe pace, not giving regard to the dangers around
them (K. A. Brown, Willis, & Prussia, 2000). This was a growing attitude in
manufacturing in the late 19th century in the United States, and the start of human factor
theories that held the worker entirely responsible for an accident.
On the contrary, K. A. Brown et al. (2000) reiterated that the environment and
machine error were the causes of unsafe working behavior and accidents; after that,
human theories appeared and communicated the idea that “waiting for the right
combination of circumstances to come together,” such as an employee and their work,
will cause an accident (p. 448).
In 1931, accident causation was introduced; the most used model of accident
causation still is Heinrich’s (1931) domino theory (Seo, 2005; Yorio & Moore, 2018).
Heinrich’s study (Chi & Han, 2013; Feng, 2013; Seo, 2005; Yorio & Moore, 2018)
consisted of 75,000 case studies reporting that of all industrial accidents, 88% were
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caused by unsafe acts of an individual; unsafe conditions generated 10%, and 2% were
labeled as acts of God. There was a sequence of accidental factors such as (a) ancestry
and social environment, (b) worker fault, (c) unsafe act together with mechanical and
physical hazard, (d) accident, and (e) damage or injury (Chi & Han, 2013; Raouf, 2011).
Heinrich suggested as early as 1931 that accidents were due to unsafe working
behavior (D. Petersen, 1996) and the extension of human factors and performance, which
recognized the “tie between individuals, their tools and machines, and their general work
environment” (Heinrich et al., 1980, p. 51). This impression, according to Chi and Han
(2013), described the corresponding statement that “accidents lead to injuries and that
these accidents are caused when a worker commits unsafe acts or there are direct
mechanical or physical hazards related to the work” (p. 1027); this trended during World
War II.
During the height of World War II, smokestack industries saw higher rates of
accidents and deaths of workers (Ehistory, n.d.). Extending to the occurrences of
industrial accidents, Schuster and Rhodes (1985) identified that industries employed
Heinrich’s domino theory because it conveniently investigated events in areas that caused
individuals to have accidents. High-risk industries began shifting the responsibilities of
an accident onto the worker, and less attention was given to the unsafe working
environment and their hazardous equipment. Supporting the model that individuals cause
unsafe acts, researchers Heinrich et al. (1980) and Hale and Glendon (1987) described
that 80 to 90% of accidents are due to human error. Such a declaration has shown to be
practical through World War II and throughout industries’ mass production, which
resulted in many workers’ deaths in high-risk industries (P. B. Petersen, 1994). The next
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section examines the unsafe work environment from the 19th century through the 20th
century about high-risk industries.
The Risky Working Environment
Leland and Oboroceanu (2010) identified that during World War II, 405,399
American soldiers lost their lives, yet from 1942-1945, at the peak of the war, some
8,931,900 industrial accidents occurred. So the ratio was 1 to 8; one soldier’s death
equaled eight industrial deaths, totaling more than 6 million workers dying at work
(Ehistory, n.d.). The results of rapid expansion in the industry presented many unusual
challenges in that accidents were justifiable regardless of the consequence
(P. B. Petersen, 1994). Consequently, working with unsafe equipment and hazardous
materials caused numerous accidents especially during wartime when production had
precedence over worker safety (Swuste, Van Gulijk, Zwaard, & Oostendorp, 2014). As
such, worker injury and death were not only related to machines but to chemicals as well.
According to Mostafalou and Abdollahi (2013), chemicals in the form of
pesticides caused long-term risks to workers for cancer, kidney disease, and liver
damage. As noted, there were no regulations or safety practices until the theory of
accident causation and the domino theory emerged in the 1930s, both addressing an
individual worker as the cause of the accident. New systems of safety began to arise for
much of the 1960s, which began to address managing safety risks because the concept of
safety in the industry began viewing the worker less at fault for accidents and identified
other factors that caused the accident (Leveson, 2004, 2011).
DeJoy (1988) identified that high-risk industries have enabling factors that can
trigger an unsafe working environment. Enabling factors are “any characteristic of the
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environment or system that promotes or blocks safe behavior” (DeJoy, 1988, p. 961). A
structure that has been capable of limiting accidents and removing unsafe behaviors
emerged as a result of the need to build safety into complex space exploration operations,
and eventually adopted in the workplace was the system management system (SMS),
which appeared in the early 1980s (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).
Kaissi (2012) described that the aviation industry has been well-regarded in
industrial industries, specifically because of its improvements in safety instruments.
Accordingly, the aviation industry began looking into safety as the focus on “systems and
cultures, rather than blaming individuals for failures” (Kaissi, 2012, p. 66). Accordingly,
Cacciabue et al. (2015) identified SMS as a method toward safety grounded assessment
of risks and the concept of management. SMS applies “three steps of prevention control
and containment of consequences derived from hazardous events, non-compliance
occurrences and incidents that may occur in the life of a system and during production
process” (Cacciabue et al., 2015, p. 249).
To close, models of accident causation solely account for the chain of events that
lead to a worker’s unsafe working behavior and SMS. SMS conveys that individual
components are the causes of accidents. A component utilized to combat the source of an
accident is management’s commitment to safety (Leveson, 1995, 2011). However,
individual factors that lead to an accident in an organization are specific. Guillerm and
Demmou (2014) asserted that studies of culture and climate in an organization are the
highest factors leading to workplace accidents. The following section presents a
discussion of organizational culture, organizational climate, and safety culture as
concepts that are foundational to the research of safety climate.
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Shaping Organizational Safety Climate
Organizational culture, organizational climate, and safety culture are safety
concepts that shape safety climate. How the concepts of safety relate to safety climate
are viewed through the shared objectives of each theory. Hale (2000) identified safety
culture to be associated with organizational culture by how it impacts the level of safety
in organizations that influences attitudes and behaviors. Accordingly, the components of
safety culture are rooted in the broader concepts of organizational culture and
organizational climate (Hecker & Goldenhar, 2014). Organizational culture is a grouping
of perceptions prevalent to relationships and how the organization, supervisors, and
employees feel about their working environment. Similarly, “a key attribute of
organizational climate is that it involves employees’ perceptions regarding selected
characteristics or features of their organizational environment” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1517).
How the three concepts shape safety climate is by the behaviors and attitudes of
workers toward the “nature of relationships between safety policies, procedures, and
practices” which Zohar (2010, p. 1518) identified as the roots of safety climate
perceptions. The next sections examine organizational culture, organizational climate,
and safety culture as concepts of safety climate.
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture was introduced in the 1970s through the field of
management and organization studies. The concept of organizational culture is credited
to Andrew Pettigrew in 1979. Pettigrew (1979) identified the perceptions and processes
associated with organizational culture and categorized the concepts used today as
(a) beliefs, (b) identity, (c) rituals, and (d) myths of organizational cultures.
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Organizational culture is prevalent in relationships and in how the organization,
supervisors, and employees feel about or make sense of their working environment.
According to Watkins (2013), organizational culture is “a collaborative process of
creating shared awareness and understanding out of different individuals’ perspectives
and varied interest” (para. 9). The employer and employee each share a philosophy of
workplace risks; they both share an equivalent arena of workplace hazards and
preconceptions of organizational support.
Organizational culture connects to safety climate through the effects on safety
behavior, the work environment, and workgroups within an organization (Schneider et
al., 2013). The effects on safety behavior have been found in organizational culture
studies, which include the manager’s role in the development and maintenance of a safe
workplace and a worker’s tendency to participate in safety discussions and self-efficacy
to respond to risks.
In a study focused on the manager’s role in the development and maintenance of
organizational culture, Kane-Urrabazo (2006) described the types of cultures that exist
that facilitate a safe workplace. The study’s framework (Handy, 1993) focused on
(a) power, (b) role, (c) task, and (d) the person who contributes to the creation of a
healthy workplace. The results identified that management’s responsibility for safety and
positive workplace commitment are how an organization shapes its’ attitude, values, and
behaviors in the development and maintenance of organizational culture (Kane-Urrabazo,
2006). According to Agrilla (1999), management’s responsibility for safety is linked to
safety climate by safety management systems.
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Huff (2014) agreed that a positive workplace environment assists in forming
organizational culture, especially for those managing, especially individuals in
manufacturing or working within chemical production. Maguire and Hardy (2013)
discovered that these employees are constantly assessing and managing risks. Workers’
safety is vital, and employees who understand risks prior to work fare better than those
that just perform the work. Ford and Stephens (2018) asserted that manufacturing
workers have the highest rate of injuries. To curb this assessment, risk responsiveness
needs to be carefully aligned with the organization’s culture, climate, and administrative
capabilities. Administrative capabilities are connected to management’s commitment to
safety (Zohar, 1980), and communicative interactions are linked with safety
communication, both of which are associated with safety climate.
In an organizational culture study, Ford and Stephens (2018) surveyed 100 U.S.
oil refinery workers in workplace risk responsiveness, safety communication, and
information seeking in high-reliability organizations. The study assessed a worker’s
tendency to participate in safety discussions at work and to possess the self-efficacy to
respond to risks properly. The results suggested that workers who seek risk information
are more aware of their working dangers and reflect confidence in motivation, behavior,
and their belief to execute behaviors. Safety discussion connects to safety
communication (Simon & Piquard, 1991), and workers who seek risk information link to
a worker’s involvement in safety (Williamson et al., 1997), which is associated with
safety climate.
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In summary, organizational culture is when workers come to an agreement on
their perceptions of work and their impact of hazards and risks in their environment; at
that point, it defines organizational climate (Jones & James, 1979; Zohar, 1980).
Organizational Climate
The building blocks for understanding organizational climate were established by
Fleishman (1953) with his study of workplace attitudes linked to behavior, commitment,
and job satisfaction. Organizational climate was formally presented in the 1960s
(Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick, 1970), but little was known about it until the
1970s (Schneider, 1975). Organizational climate deals with how people are experiencing
the work environment (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995; Zohar, 2010) as well as the
shared perceptions among the workforce concerning the procedures, practices, and the
kinds of behaviors that are rewarded (Reichers & Schneider, 1990; Schneider, 1990;
Zohar & Luria, 2003).
Organizational members’ commitment to worker safety is greater when consistent
safety policies are communicated, which constitutes the core value of safety climate
(Zohar, 2003). The kinds of behaviors that are rewarded are the safety compliant and
enhancing behaviors that address a positive organizational climate (Zohar, 2000; Zohar &
Luria, 2003). In contrast, some individuals experience the work environment in negative
ways. A factor found in organizational climate studies that creates an unhealthy work
environment is adverse workgroup involvement. Workgroup involvement is associated
with organizational climate and is an element of safety climate (Cox & Cheyne, 2000).
The likelihood of one group member approaching another to work faster without
safety measures was identified in Hofmann and Stetzer’s (1996) study. For example,
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unsafe working behaviors (sanctioned work) of an individual are influenced by local
supervisors and that individual’s coworkers when production is not being met and they
are encouraged to work faster to increase production, thus affecting a worker’s
motivation to work safely and influencing an individual’s perceived value of safety in
their workgroup and organization. When workers are sanctioned on a continual basis a
low or poor safety climate is produced and is linked to safety climate by a worker’s risktaking (March & Shapira, 1992; Zohar, 2003).
Organizational climate dwindled as interest in organizational culture dominated
the 1980s only to come back strong in the 1990s (Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009; Schneider
et al., 2013). In the 1980s, organizational climate struggled with the “levels-of-analysis
issue” and organizational culture at the time captured “the richness of the organizational
environment in ways that climate research had not” (Schneider et al., 2013, p. 363). The
relationship between organizational climate and safety climate is that each evaluates the
nature of an organization on the aspects of safety. Moreover, safety climate is seen as a
specific form of organizational climate that is grounded on workers’ evaluation of their
experiences of safety in the workplace (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016).
There are minor distinctions that separate organizational climate and safety
climate. Organizational climate leans toward an individual’s perception of the working
environment (Neal et al., 2000), which impacts a person’s motivation toward work
(Brown & Leigh, 1996), while safety climate varies by an individual’s perception of
management’s values, organizational practices, communication, and employee
involvement in workplace safety (DeJoy, 1998; Neal et al., 2000; Zohar, 1980), which at
some point are shared among the workgroup.
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The next section examines safety culture, which is a construct that evolved from
the broader concepts of organizational climate and organizational culture. Safety culture
embodies the value placed on safety as one concerned with attitudes toward safety,
norms, rules, beliefs, roles, and practices for handling hazards and risk (Pidegon, 1991;
Turner et al., 1989).
Safety Culture
Descriptions of safety culture were shaped worldwide after the devastating
Chernobyl Nuclear explosion in the mid-1980s (Pidgeon, 1991). The concept of safety
culture was advanced by two organizations: the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and OECD Nuclear Agency; each agency investigated the Chernobyl disaster and
found that poor safety culture was a factor in causing the explosion (Cox & Flin, 1998).
Safety culture started in high-risk industries in the United Kingdom, then later influenced
trades and their organizations in the United States (Hecker & Goldenhar, 2014).
Safety culture has been associated with individual worker safety-related behavior
in high-risk industries such as manufacturing (Cooper & Phillips, 2004), and chemical
processing (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996). As has been reported, safety culture has been a
predictor for accident rates and injuries among offshore oil and gas companies (Mearns,
Whitaker, & Flin, 2003). Moreover, safety culture applies an innovative approach about
looking beyond immediate engineering and mechanical failures and exemplifies in its
place the safety of the individual employee. Safety culture’s innovative approaches have
been seen in studies that explore a worker’s perception of safety, risk-taking, and the
health and safety of employees.
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Studies of safety culture in an organization have examined the perceptions of
safety among the worker, supervisor, and all members of a working group (Zohar, 1980).
Safety perceptions form behaviors that are learned facets of safety culture. Cultural
perceptions of safety are placed at the diverse levels of working peers and management,
according to Goh, Brown, and Spickett (2010). Safety culture is a mixture of several
stimuli in the workplace that affect a person or group’s working behavior and attitudes
about work. Additionally, safety culture in research plays a substantial role in
encouraging people to behave safely as seen in risk-taking studies in industries.
Nordlof, Wiitavaara, Winblad, Wijk, and Westerling (2015) investigated and
described safety culture and risk-taking in Sweden at a large steel-manufacturing
company by exploring workers’ experiences and perceptions of safety risks. The study’s
connection to safety climate relates to a worker’s willingness to take risks (March &
Shapira, 1992), a worker’s experience and knowledge (Simon & Piquard, 1991), and the
hazards that pose a risk in the workplace (Gibb & Knobbs, 1995) are associated with
safety climate. Nordlof et al. examined the highly related risk factors often associated
with a dangerous work environment, which, based on earlier studies of steel
manufacturing, have focused “on behavior, attitudes, climate, or culture, with results
indicating that culture can form a basis for unsafe attitudes and behavior” (p. 127).
In a case study on improving safety culture, Nielson (2014) examined internal
health and safety organizations (HSO) and health and safety committees’ (HSC)
influences on an organization safety performance. HSO are safety groups made up of
employee-elected safety agents who promote safety awareness in a workplace, train
employees on safety-related issues, and advise administration on laws and regulations
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regarding safety in the organization. HSCs are a subgroup made up of higher
management, employee safety representatives, and local supervisors. HSCs allow
organizations to collaborate with workers on health and safety matters. The purpose of
Nielsen’s study was to find whether HSOs can improve safety culture.
Nielsen’s (2014) study was conducted at a Danish industrial plant with 248
workers including five supervisors. Questionnaires were given to both local level
workers and the five supervisors; the questionnaire was designed using Schein’s (2010)
understanding of organizational culture to model safety culture. The results showed that
when interventions on safety were utilized by the HSO, workers were more aware of
safety and were involved more with safety issues. An organization’s commitment to
health and safety “can be readily exhibited in workers’ eyes by the organizational status
of both safety officer and safety committee something which is associated with safety
climate” (Zohar, 1980, p. 101).
In conclusion, according to Hecker and Goldenhar (2014), “Culture reflects
deeper values and assumptions while climate refers to shared perceptions among a
relatively homogeneous group” (p. 14). Zohar (2008) expounded that shared perceptions
with respect to procedures, policies, and working practices link safety climate to culture
as values employees share in relation to risks. As for Nielsen (2014), the link between
safety climate and culture is through supervisory safety practices.
The following section describes safety climate through its development on the
value of safety, shared group perceptions of the working environment, and the use of the
theory of planned behavior (TPB) as an extension of safety climate framework.
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Safety Climate
Safety climate is associated with researcher Dov Zohar (1980), who investigated
safety attitudes held by the workforce concerning facets of safety in an Israeli
manufacturing plant. He used the term safety climate to capture individual’s and group’s
shared perceptions of the value of safety. Moreover, when attention is focused on an
individual’s work safety performance within an industrial setting, that describes safety
climate (Zohar, 1980, 2010).
Safety climate in much of the research is described as how workers perceive their
work environment, a fact which is associated with an individual’s working actions and
safety attitudes. Accordingly, Zohar (1980, 2010) identified that workers are influenced
by the attitudes, values, thoughts, and working actions of others in the workplace. Thus,
over the past decades, research on safety climate has been explained as a social learning
process (Zohar, 2002). Studies showed that group members who interact more with each
other share commonality of work more than with other workgroups. According to Zohar
(2010), “In other words, the meaning of things and the interpretation of events arise from
the interplay between one’s own perceptions and those of others in the same situation”
(p. 1519). Thus, to explain how workers are influenced in the workplace, a theoretical
foundation was found that identifies attitudes, behaviors, and the behavioral intent of
workers.
The TPB is a theoretical foundation for the discussion of safety climate as it
identifies attitudes toward a behavior and the behavioral intent of individual actions in the
workplace. Safety climate and the TPB groundwork are associated by their safety-
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specific framework and both are predictors of unsafe working behavior (Cheyne, Tomas,
Cox, & Oliver, 1999; Xu, Zou, & Luo, 2018).
Fogarty and Shaw (2003, 2010) asserted that TPB represents models generated by
some safety climate studies. In view of that, TPB “appears well-suited to the explanation
of the link between climate and particular types of workplace behaviors that are
intentional but unsafe” (Fogarty & Shaw, 2010, p. 1456). Furthermore, “the safety
climate research, in turn, suggests ways in which the TPB model can itself be refined”
(Fogarty & Shaw, 2003, p. 5). The next section briefly explains Ajzen’s (1991) TPB as it
relates to safety climate.
Theoretical Framework: Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior
In the 1970s, the theory of reasoned action (TRA) emerged as a general theory to
explain and predict behavior across several disciplines (Fishbein, 1975). Developed by
Martin Fishbein in the 1960s, TRA focuses on the connection between an individual’s
intent and behavior through the role of influence as a measure between intention and
behavior (Hahn & Popan, 2018). The TRA model considers two types of beliefs: those
beliefs that people have about how others judge them on their working actions (or
nonworking actions), a particular behavior, at the same time performing a working action
safely or in an unsafe manner based on what they think others would want them to do.
According to Sarver (1983), this sequence “leading from beliefs to a specific behavior is
described as a rational process, one based on the assumption that people use the
information available to them in a reasonable manner to arrive at their decisions”
(p. 155). A strength of TRA is that it provides a framework for differentiating and
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recognizing the reasons or beliefs that motivate a behavior of interest for each population
(Montaño & Kasprzyk, 2002, 2008).
In the 1980s, TPB resonated as an extension of TRA. Unlike TRA, which
explains and predicts behavior across several trades, TPB added a descriptive norm to the
normative component. The TPB framework includes perceived behavioral control
(PBC), in which individuals’ perceptions of their ability to perform a given behavior can,
together with intention, be used to predict behavior (Ajzen, 1991, 2011). TPB is the most
widely used psychological model explaining safety behaviors in hazardous working
environments (Phipps et al., 2015), and is one of the most frequently used theoretical
models for unintentional injury prevention referring to injuries that were accidental (Sleet
et al., 2006). TPB provides the bridge for understanding which behaviors and
environmental factors are responsible for a person’s behavior.
The TPB model observes three human factors, they are behavioral intention (BI),
subjective norms (SN), and PBC. BI is the attitude reflected in a person’s behavior,
whereas SNs are perceived social influences that are experienced through working
groups. PBC is the personal belief that people have control over their situation (Fishbein
& Ajzen, 2010; M. Ryan et al., 2018).
TPB is known to examine an individual’s attitude toward decision-making.
Attitude refers to an individual’s beliefs of behavior (Velde et al., 2015), which is
weighted by the evaluation of perceived risks according to each working action (Ajzen,
2005). Decision-making refers to a decision made by a group of people. Factors that
influence decision-making, according to Ajzen and Fishbein (2000), are behavioral
beliefs, normative beliefs, and control beliefs. Behavioral beliefs are attitudes about the
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consequences of the behavior. Normative beliefs are viewpoints about the behavioral
expectations of others; and control beliefs are about the presence of demands that may
further or hinder performance of behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000; Ajzen & Sheikh,
2013). Subsequent TPB studies have supported this by stating that human behavior can
be predicted by individuals’ attitudes, SN, and PBC (Yaskova & Zaitseva, 2017).
Unsafe acts have been identified as a major factor in industrial accidents. TPB
has been used to explain the factors influencing unsafe behavior, by establishing the
relationship between attitude, intention, and behavior. The next section explores TPB in
studies of safety climate in respect to PPE, safety behavior, safety attitude, and the impact
of supervisor-worker relationships.
TPB Studies
A study on organizational influence and safety climate linking an individual’s use
of PPE in a Norwegian Smelter Industry was examined. Robertsen et al.’s (2018) study
was based on TPB and intentions to use respirators and reported breathing apparatus in
the industry. Questionnaires were given to 1,253 workers from 13 smelting plants. A
short scale for safety climate and a work experience measurement scale was used.
The results showed a slight increase in employees’ positive attitudes toward
wearing respirators; this was due to several factoring limitations to issues with comfort
and practicalities (aspects of a situation that involve the actual doing). SNs were seen to
be a strong factor in workers’ behaviors in wearing respirators, and safety climate played
a significant part in promoting the use of respirators. Lastly, contributors with positive
intentions reported higher use of wearing a respirator. Overall, TPB positively influenced
behavioral intention in an industrial environment (Robertsen et al., 2018).
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Su et al.’s (2019) safety climate study examined the impact of the supervisorworker relationship on workers’ safety violations using a modified TPB model.
Empirical data were collected from 229 Chinese construction workers in China using a
questionnaire. The study found that an individual’s unsafe working actions were
associated with the social environment, especially in the exchanges with their
supervisors. Consequently, personal working behaviors were affected by group norms on
safety behaviors.
This study validated past safety climate studies by reinforcing the notion that
supervisors are critical for the development of safety-related group norms. From this
standpoint, high-quality relationships between working members may contribute to a
positive safety climate, thus reducing an individual’s intention to unsafe working
behavior (Maichum, Parichatnon, & Peng, 2016).
Xu et al. (2018) examined whether attitudinal ambivalence was a factor in the
relationship between safety attitude and safety behavior. Their study was guided using
TPB. TPB predicts safety-related behavior, and the linkage between that and safety
climate is associated with unsafe behavior. The study evaluated 228 construction
workers in China using a questionnaire (Xu et al., 2018). The attitudinal ambivalence in
this study refers to mixed beliefs and attitudes toward the social network pressure of peer
workers. The results showed that ambivalent attitude was a crucial factor of unsafe
behavior. And that “safety recognition, social norms, and perceived behavioral control
had significant influence on intentions of unsafe acts” (Xu et al., 2018, p. 7).
Unsafe acts and causes of accidents have often been attributed to safety climate
(Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Reason, 1990; Zohar, 1980). According to Garavan and
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O’Brien (2001), a number of “qualitative studies of safety in the workplace have
identified safety climate as a key organizational factor that influences individual
employee safety behavior and performance” (p. 164). Appropriately, when addressing
safety climate, Zohar (1980) was the earliest researcher to suggest that there is a
relationship between specific measures of safety performance and safety climate. Safety
climate is associated with thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of organizational employees.
Garavan and O’Brien (2001) stated that social contexts are what influence safety climate
and members of an organization.
Safety climate has been studied in many industries and certain outcomes have
been documented; one standard is that a safe place of work depends deeply on the
choices employees make on the job (Keren, Mills, Freeman, & Shelly, 2009). The
following sections examine a worker’s impact in the workplace and discuss the variables
of perceived risks, peer influences, and supervisor influences as elements within the
safety climate paradigm.
Safety Climate Influences in the Workplace
Zohar (1980, 2010) described that human actions, beliefs, and individuals can be
influenced by the attitudes, values, thoughts, and actions of working colleagues in the
workplace. Consequently, workers are influenced through their associations with
working peers, supervisors, and their own philosophies learned out of lived experiences
while at work.
For example, safety climate research identified that an organization can create
several climates. Climates are attitudes toward safety and are shared by workers in an
organization. Shared perceptions of safety climate refer to the meaning of safety, and the
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overall values, opinions, and actions of workers have been shown to influence safety in
high-risk organizations. When the values consist of safety and an individual’s work
performance in an industrial setting, that signifies safety climate (Zohar, 1980, 2010).
Moreover, when workers share perceptions of safety, that defines the overall meaning of
safety climate (Zohar, 1980, 2011).
Zohar’s (1980) earliest study of safety climate described climate as follows:
“Climate has to be supplemented by an appropriate adjective indicating which type of
climate it is” (p. 96). Accordingly, safety climate mechanisms should include workers’
evaluating “the relative priority of safety” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1518), concerning their risks,
and social impacts that influence safety climate. Table 1 identifies safety climate
mechanisms that influence individuals, workgroups, and the organizational safety
climate.
Table 1
Safety Climate Mechanisms
Mechanism

Reference

Management commitment

Zohar (1980)

Supportive environment for safety

Goldberg, Dar-El, & Rubin (1991)

Competence

Simon & Piquard (1991)

Safety communication

Simon & Piquard (1991)

Worker’s risk-taking

March & Shapira (1992)

Work pressure

Glendon, Stanton, & Harrison (1994)

Hazards in the workplace

Gibb & Knobbs (1995)

Safe work behavior

Thompson, Hilton, & Witt (1997)

Workers involvement into safety

Williamson, Feyer, Cairns, & Biancotti (1997)

Safety management system

Agrilla (1999)

Safety rules and procedures

Cox & Cheyne (2000)

Training

Guldenmund (2000)
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The social impacts relating to safety climate connect to an individual’s work
environment. Within this work environment, Zohar (1980) identified that a supervisor’s
influences impact an individual and in time the working group when the supervisor’s
commitment to safety is deficient. This creates an unhealthy work environment, which
influences work behavior equally for a worker and their workgroup. The association to
safety climate is linked to management commitment (Zohar, 1980) and safety
management systems mechanisms (Agrilla, 1999). Management’s commitment is a
central element of safety climate (Zohar, 1980) and safety management systems are key
to a supervisor’s relationship with workers and how they perform safely in terms of
creating a positive safety climate (Mohamed, 2002).
A consequence, seen in safety climate studies in high-risk industries when a
group’s safety climate is seen as harmful, is that influences from peers are shown to
impact an individual’s safety risks due to the nature of the job (Nordlof et al., 2015).
Peer influences are shown in safety climate studies to influence unsafe working
behaviors. Thus, the link to safety climate is associated with a supportive environment
for safety (Goldberg et al., 1991) and a worker’s involvement with safety mechanisms
(Williamson et al., 1997). A supportive environment for safety refers to a group’s trust,
confidence, and relationships with coworkers (Goldberg et al., 1991). A worker’s
involvement to safety (Williamson et al., 1997) is not just management’s involvement in
safety activities, it extends and encourages participation of the workforce.
The following sections examine the mechanisms of safety climate such as
perceived risks, peer influences, and supervisor influences on a worker’s performance
and safety in industrial environments.
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Influence of Perceived Risks
Studies on perceived risks and risk perception emerged in 1990s (Reason, 1990).
Risk perceptions are beliefs about harm or the probability of a loss (Darker, 2013).
Perceived risks are an individual’s assessment of an illness or probability of an injury
relating to performing a certain risky behavior or task (Gidron, 2013; Oah et al., 2018).
Perceived risk is connected to safety climate as it interprets important safety results of
accidents and injuries (Cooper & Philips, 2004; Smith et al., 2006).
Safety climate studies of risks were influenced by high-risk industries that needed
to create more efficient ways to meet safer and healthier work environments (Renn &
Rohrmann, 2000). Healthy work environments are among the most valuable assets of
individuals, working groups, and organizations. Healthy work environments are
imperative to safety climate and are described “as a summary of molar perceptions that
employees share about their work environment” (Zohar, 1980, p. 96). Unhealthy work
environments are the most significant causes of accidents at work (Cioni & Savioli,
2016).
An example shown in perceived risks studies that affects a healthy work
environment is management’s commitment to safety, and social support from coworkers
on safety can be “perceived as a threat to the individual and perceived risk” (Rundmo et
al., 1998, p. 76). For example, organizational and social factors are a consequence for
workers’ safety status due to poor commitment from both the supervisors and coworkers.
This created more negative attitudes toward safety and contributed “to perceived risk,
risk behaviour and the probability of accidents and injuries” (Rundmo et al., p. 85).
According to Zohar (1980), and Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991), risks are connected to
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organizational commitment and participation by individuals to safety and are linked to
components of safety climate.
A safety climate study about the association between risk perception and safety
was conducted by Rundmo (1996). The study included 1,138 employees on 12 platforms
in the offshore oil industry in Norway. Rundmo asserted that perceived risk exerts an
influence on risk behavior:
The extent to which the personnel ignore safety regulations in order to get the job
done, carry out activities which are forbidden, perform their work duties correctly,
use of personal protective equipment, and break procedures to carry out jobs
quickly. (p. 200)
In this study, risk behavior was seen to directly influence performance of tasks and had a
direct effect on a worker’s perceived risk (Rundmo, 1996). Risk behavior and perceived
risk connects to safety climate by the behaviors and attitudes of workers toward the
“nature of relationships between safety policies, procedures, and practices” (Zohar, 2010,
p. 1518).
Xia et al. (2017) examined a worker’s perceived risks and their effect on
workplace safety behavior while performing construction work. The study connected
perceived risks to a worker’s involvement in threats and hazards (Williamson et al.,
1997), and the commitment of management to safety (Zohar, 1980), which were
associated with safety climate. The sample population for the study was 120 workers in
China’s construction industry. Safety climate was measured by participating workers and
line supervisors using a Work Safety Scale (WSS), which is a questionnaire intended to
evaluate the attitude of employees toward workplace safety (Xia et al., 2017).
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Xia et al. (2017) found that workers’ task performance depended on their
emotional perception of risk rather than considering the risk. Workers “tend to perceive
risk in a direct and emotional way, and this direct risk perception will influence their
actions and safety behavior” (Xia et al., 2017, p. 235). Additionally, workers’ safety
behavior relied on emotional risk perception and was measured by a supervisor’s
commitment to safety.
The following paragraphs describe the connection between perceived risks and
risk perception and then discuss risk perception studies on the factors relating to risk
perception and noncompliance. Lastly, the influence of safety climate, safety leadership,
workload, and accident experiences on risk perception is examined.
Mearns and Flin (1999) asserted that the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of an
employee about risk and safety best describe safety climate. In this respect, perceived
risk can influence working attitudes toward safety management, procedures, and rules,
and is linked to an employee’s risk perception (Mohamed, Ali, & Tam, 2009). Factors
relating to workers’ risk perception have been linked to noncompliance with safety
requirements such as training, and PPE while performing tasks.
In a safety climate study that examined attitudes and risk perception, Rundmo
(2000) used a sample of 13 manufacturing plants with 730 respondents using a
questionnaire. The link to safety climate was associated with noncompliance with safety
controls such as PPE and training (Guldenmund, 2000; Rundmo, 2000). The researcher
analyzed the relationships between safety attitudes, safety climate, and the cognitive and
affective component of risk perception relating to risk behavior when completing work.
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Risk perception, safety climate, attitudes, and safety status showed that workers
perceived their personal risk to be less than the risk for others. A higher number of
workers found management and supervisors’ commitment and involvement to safety at
work as not particularly fitting, and half of the respondents agreed that violating rules and
taking chances was accepted in their work environment. Thus, the greatest predictor of
behavior was workers’ acceptability of rule violations when completing tasks (Rundmo,
2000).
The strongest predictor of rule violations was management in their priority of
production versus safety. Acceptability of rule violations was associated with safety and
accident prevention, which was related to employee deaths. Last, the cognitive
component of risk perception was tied to the dimensions of worker safety attitudes,
something which was linked to deaths (Rundmo, 2000).
In a risk perception study based on the influence of safety climate, safety
leadership, workload, and accident experiences, Oah et al. (2018) contacted 100
randomly selected manufacturing factories. Among them, 376 Korean manufacturing
employees provided data for the study. The workload, safety leadership, and workers’
attitudes toward safety on the job were found to have a significant connection between
the safety climate of the organization and a worker’s perceived risk.
The results for risk perception found a positive correlation between a worker’s
experience of accidents and workload, but adverse results were found between safety
climate and safety leadership. In addition, risk perception between a supervisor’s safety
leadership and the organizational safety climate adversely influenced the perceived risk
of an industrial accident (Oah et al., 2018).
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The next section examines peer coworkers’ influence in the workplace and its
effects on employees. According to Robinson et al. (2014), safety studies in peer
influences have shown to have an effect on individual employees’ attitudes, working
actions, and an organization’s safety climate.
Peer Influences
In safety climate studies, the term coworker is used interchangeably (a) as peer,
one that has the same standing as another; and (b) as a peer coworker, something which is
differentiating from an employee. These differences describe a peer coworker as having
some influence over a workgroup as non-management-involved personnel. Yet, the exact
same peer coworkers are expected to follow management agendas, thus giving some
indication of authority over the workgroup (Meliá et al., 2008).
Consequently, the definition of peer influences in this study relates to an
individual’s perception of the importance of safety within workgroups. The association
to safety climate regarding the study’s definition of peer influences relates to the
organizational atmosphere (Neal et al., 2000) and to management’s commitment to safety
(Zohar, 1980). The organizational atmosphere is shared between workgroups and is seen
in safety studies to influence an individual’s work behavior, attitudes, and performance,
specifically toward safety as described in the following sections.
The work environment is the most common element shared among a workgroup
and is exceedingly influential to an individual’s work behavior. For example, studies
showed that a workgroup’s discretion influences workers’ attitudes and performance,
specifically toward safety (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016; Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria,
2004). The link to safety climate is associated with a worker’s performance (Zohar,
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1980), safety behavior, and the work environment within the organization (Schneider et
al., 2013).
The working environment and management practices of the workplace influence a
group’s safety climate (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009). The connection to
safety climate at the group level refers to the role of supervisor (Zohar, 2000; Zohar &
Luria, 2005). A peer coworker’s connection to supervision and the role of mentoring
employees “can be analyzed from the point of view of the agent that performs or is
responsible for safety activity or issue involved” (Meliá et al., 2008, p. 950). Therefore,
peer coworker influences in safety climate studies have been recognized as top
management, supervisors, coworkers, and the employee.
The maturing literature of peer coworker influence has been recognized by
seminal authors of safety climate (Guldenmund, 2007; Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria,
2005) by how policies and procedures are manipulated as well as by the circumstances in
which the particular groups work. According to Meliá et al. (2008), “The majority of
safety climate dimensions identified in the literature refer to the safety manifestations of
these entities through their responsibilities, actions, attitudes or conditions” (p. 951).
Every one of these entities has been described in safety climate studies as to exist in an
environment where there is an open and effective exchange of information.
Peer Influence Research
Safety studies regarding responsibilities, actions, attitudes, and the overall
perceptions of safety in the workplace have mentioned group member influences. Group
member influences examined in the following sections are peer relationships and work
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networks (Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011), types of deviant peer influences on
employees (Robinson et al., 2014).
When workers perceive an unhealthy work environment (Sias & Jablin, 1995), the
relationships of organizational members do tend to increase when there are difficulties
with management or climates in the workplace. Over time, shared perceptions are
formed on organizational safety and safety issues, something that is linked to safety
climate (Neal & Griffin, 2004; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Employees associate more with
peer coworkers and feel more comfortable seeking information or social support (Sollitto
& Myers, 2015) than they do supervisors (Sias, 2009). This relationship has shown to
influence individuals and workgroups alike; however, what of those workers who are not
considered part of a workgroup?
Peer relationships and work networks are significantly important for employee
development. However, workers who are external influences have a more challenging
time developing relationships than those who are near their working peers (Casey et al.,
2015; Higgins & Kram, 2001). According to Nahrgang et al. (2011), external factors are
elements that influence workers to work unsafely and have accidents. That being so,
Casey and Krauss (2013) identified a subgroup of workers (contractors) who brought
with them their company’s set of rules, training, work experience, and working
behaviors. Contractors, as part of a workgroup, experience more safety incidents when
compared to an organization’s full-time employees (Mearns & Yule, 2009). These
factors are often part of the social environment, which disrupts workgroups norms and
safety climate. The working actions of others who influence the attitudes, values, and
thoughts in the workplace are associated with safety climate (Zohar, 1980, 2010).
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Deviant peer influences found in safety climate studies in which peer coworkers
affect an employee’s attitudes and behaviors are (a) direct impact, whereby an employee
is bullied or controlled by peer coworkers; (b) vicarious impact, whereby an employee is
impacted by their observations or information sharing from peer coworkers’ deviant
behaviors; and (c) ambient impact, whereby an employee is impacted by working in an
environment that peer coworkers find to be unsafe (Robinson et al., 2014). That being
said, peer coworkers are not only an essential part of the social environment but can
define the environment at work (Chiaburu & Harrison, 2008; Takeuchi et al., 2011).
Therefore, deviant peer coworker influences are associated with safety climate by their
responsibilities as an “agent” of safety climate actions (Meliá et al., 2008).
Unsafe working performance was found in safety climate studies to be associated
with workers’ acceptance into their workgroup. According to Mullen (2004), for workers
to be accepted into their working group they had to follow workgroup norms set by
veteran workers. This outcome showed that workers would choose to work unsafely in a
given situation to be accepted into their workgroup. Consequently, the possibilities of
accident and injury increases when the commitment to safety by peer coworkers is
neglected. This phenomenon is linked through a group’s safety climate, and research
shows that coworkers have the highest association to accidents and injuries (Christian et
al., 2009). An example, according to Teraji (2013), of peer coworkers’ influence “often
require people to sacrifice for the group” (p. 5), often, selecting to work unsafely.
Workplace research has shown that peer coworker influences encourage safety
violations and through an individual’s observation, unsafe working behaviors are learned.
Chen et al. (2013) identified that certain members of a working group may shape
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workers’ safety behaviors. Other than peer coworker influences, supervisors’ influences
play a significant role in employees’ safety behaviors. The following section examines
how supervisors influence a safety climate mechanism.
Supervisor Influences
A supervisor is a person who has charge of a workplace or authority over a
working group (Miedema, 2015). However, a more comprehensive definition found in
safety climate studies is associated with work group members’ understanding of
management expectations, something which is observed through the daily observations
and interactions at the workplace. When workers view a supervisor as competent, a
leader can establish a group’s safety climate, thus a supervisor influences the
organizational mood, something that is associated with safety climate (Griffin &
Curcuruto, 2016). Kapp (2012) stated, “When the supervisor displays a consistent
pattern of action supporting safety, it promotes a shared perception among the group
members of the importance of safety, and safety enhancing behaviors are increased”
(p. 1121).
Across a range of different industries, social support has been shown to affect a
worker’s safety and in turn the organization’s safety climate (Dollard & Bakker, 2010;
Nahrgang et al., 2011). Social support regarding management is local supervisors at a
workplace. Supervisors who face work pressures and work overload regarding
management responsibilities tend to ignore safety issues, which heightens unsafe working
behaviors.
In a study of supervisors’ engagement in safety leadership, Conchie et al. (2013)
recruited 69 supervisors from 10 construction projects throughout England. The study
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examined safety leadership on role overload, workforce characteristics, production
pressure, challenging demands, and social support, which are associated with safety
climate (Mohamed, 2002). The results on role overload showed that when supervisors
had too many work responsibilities, their focus on safety was reduced. Production
pressure showed supervisors to have less time to observe working behaviors and even
less time to correct unsafe work. Challenging demands were found to be with
subcontractors; supervisors felt they had less control over subcontractors’ working
attitudes. This was also found in workforce characteristics where supervisors described
subcontractors as resistant to safety and safety leadership. Finally, supervisor’s role
responsibilities were perceived to hinder safety leadership when they were faced with
work overload (Conchie et al., 2013).
In contrast, Dingsdag, Biggs, and Sheahan (2008) argued that supervisors in
construction industries had stronger influence over coworkers in regard to worker safety
attitudes. The study’s link is safety outcomes, safety motivation (Mohamed, 2002), rules
(Cox & Cheyne, 2000), and organizational health and safety (Dedobbeleer & Beland,
1991), which is associated with safety climate. The findings suggested that supervisors
had a better understanding of rules and regulations. More so, supervisors had stronger
communication and interpersonal skills to enforce and monitor safety in the workplace.
A supervisor’s ability to encourage safety in their organization promoted workers’
confidence in work safety behaviors, safety compliance, and was associated with a
positive safety climate.
A positive safety climate promotes confidence and a worker’s safety behavior at
work. Factors that influence a worker’s perception are attitudes, beliefs, and the people
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they most associate with. For example, in past studies supervisor-to-employee
relationships have shown that when workers believe that their manager is concerned
about their safety and welfare, the organizational climate and safety climate improves
(Yukl, 1998). This is true in manufacturing facilities, according to Hofmann and
Morgeson’s (1999) findings that employees who have organizational support and
supportive supervisors are more likely to report safety concerns and work more safely.
Zohar (1980) asserted that industries that have a supervisor’s commitment are
successful in integrating safety programs. Thus, safety programs that are promoted
through an organization’s leadership practices enhance group safety climate and are
associated with safety climate by the visible attributes of organizational safety as
experienced by workers (Guldenmund, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005).
In safety climate studies, the attributes are seen as supervisor leadership practices
on employee safety performance, management commitment to safety, safety supervision,
coworker support, safety training (Kapp, 2012), and safety behaviors (Liu et al., 2015),
which are examined in the following sections.
In a group safety climate study of supervisor leadership practices on employee
safety performance, Kapp (2012) sampled 555 hourly employees. The association with
safety climate is linked to a group’s safety climate (Glendon & Litherland, 2001). The
findings showed that a positive group safety climate assisted supervisor leadership. In
contrast, the same positive safety climate did not influence an employee safety
participation or leadership practices. Nevertheless, a strong group safety climate was
associated with employee safety compliance and improved working behaviors. A higher
number of employees were found to be more compliant with safety when their supervisor
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placed high value on safety. In contrast, employees who felt their supervisor did not
value safety had placed a lower value on safety and were associated with a poor safety
climate (Kapp, 2012).
The previous sections discussed perceived risks, peer influence, and supervisor
influence on safety climate mechanisms. Although much is written about these three
topics, there are no available sources of information regarding PPE use by refinery
workers, especially contractors. The next section discusses the research gap.
Gaps in Safety Climate Research
As stated by Zohar (2014), safety climate needs to be addressed between industryspecific features, management orientations to safety, and safety systems by how it
develops overtime. Intrinsically, these principles can also be considered the missing
pieces in literature or of a study. According to Patton (2015), areas in research that have
not yet been explored or are underexplored are described as gaps in literature. For
example, a gap in research could be a population, sample (size, type, location), or other
research variables including the working environment.
An apparent gap in the safety climate literature shows that there are no studies
that examine a petroleum refining worker’s (contractors) perceived risks, peer influences,
or a supervisor’s influences.
According to the Iowa State University Digital Repository and Leatherby
Libraries, there are no studies relating to petroleum refinery workers and perceived risks,
peer influences, or supervisors’ influences on the use of PPE. Table 2 illustrates the
search inquiries applied for petroleum refinery workers.
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Table 2
Search Inquires on Petroleum Refinery Workers
Iowa State University
Digital Repository
findings

Leatherby Libraries
findings

0

0

Petroleum refinery workers and perceived
risks.

0

0

Petroleum refinery workers and peer-to-peer
influence.

0

0

Petroleum refinery workers and supervisor
influences

0

0

Safety climate studies on petroleum refinery
workers and perceived risks.

0

0

Safety climate studies on petroleum refinery
workers and peer-to-peer influences.

0

0

Safety climate studies on petroleum refinery
workers and supervisor influences.

0

0

Petroleum refinery workers task risks on
PPE.

0

0

Peer-to-peer influence on petroleum refinery
workers use of PPE.

0

0

Supervisor influences on petroleum refinery
workers use of PPE.

Search term

As for the gap in population and sample (size, type, location) examined, there are
no studies that evaluate petroleum refining workers (contractors) as a service provider.
According to Hofmann et al. (1995), contractors are of specific interest because they
constitute the group of employees who are most normally involved in and exposed to
accidents within an industry. Several researchers of safety climate (Cooper, 2000;
Reason, 1998) described this group (contractors) as a subculture in an organization. A
subculture “is a term that can be used interchangeably to refer to a sub-group of people
(i.e., department, workgroup)” (Cooper, 2000, p. 122).
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For the gap in a subculture, according to Findley, Smith, Gorski, and O’Neil
(2007), “additional research is needed to develop safety climate models, to validate safety
climate measurement tools, to better understand the impact of group differences in safety
climate and to translate the group differences into responsible safety measures” (p. 887).
There are no studies on group differences between employees and contractors that impact
safety climate in the petroleum industry. Furthermore, there are no qualitative studies on
subculture (employee, contractor, subcontractor) group differences on the causes that
impact a refinery worker’s use of PPE at a petroleum refinery. Table 3 shows the search
findings for petroleum refinery workers (contractors).
Table 3
Search Inquires on Petroleum Refinery Workers (Contractors)
Iowa State University
Digital Repository
findings

Leatherby Libraries
findings

0

0

Petroleum refinery contractors and
perceived risks.

0

0

Petroleum refinery contractors and peer-topeer influence.

0

0

Petroleum refinery contractors and
supervisor influences.

0

0

Safety climate studies on petroleum refinery
contractors and perceived risks.

0

0

Safety climate studies on petroleum refinery
contractors and peer-to-peer influences.

0

0

Safety climate studies on petroleum refinery
contractors and supervisor influences.

0

0

Petroleum refinery contractors task risks on
PPE.

0

0

Peer-to-peer influences on petroleum
refinery contractors use of PPE.

0

0

Supervisor influences on petroleum refinery
contractors use of PPE.
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Search term

The following gaps in safety climate literature focus on the working environment.
While there are many safety climate studies that have focused on working environments
in which workers and their supervisor interact throughout the day within the same work
location, Lee et al. (2014) described that “little research has been done to examine how a
company’s safety climate influences lone workers” (p. 138). This is significant since the
working groups at refining plants at times work alone and safety depends for some on
their own safety decision-making. There are no studies in a petroleum refining plant that
examine how a company’s safety climate influences refinery workers (contactors) as lone
workers. Likewise, there are no qualitative studies that impact a petroleum industry
worker’s (contractors) use of PPE as a lone worker in a petroleum refining plant.
As for other variables, there are no specific safety climate studies in petroleum
manufacturing that examine a petroleum industry worker’s (contractors) impact on
donning PPE as a lone worker or working within a group. Furthermore, there are no
studies that explore the impact of safety-related behaviors on petroleum industry
workers’ (contractors) use of PPE where petroleum is manufactured into gas, jet fuel, and
diesel. Cooper (2000) described that “very little research has attempted to validate an
organization’s safety climate results against members’ actual ongoing safety-related
behavior(s)” (p. 126).
Another gap in safety climate research is that there are no qualitative studies that
identify specific work influences impacting refinery workers’ (contractors) use of PPE
while working at a petroleum industry refinery or terminal. One qualitative study in the
Norwegian petroleum industry was found. The aim of the safety climate study was to
better understand the effects of offshore subcontractors’ knowledge of the rules and
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procedures that regulate their work. The workforce in the study dealt with oil extraction
while working on offshore rigs and had no association with refining crude oil into
finished petroleum products. PPE was mentioned, but the study did not reference the
causes that impact a subcontractor’s use on offshore rigs (Dahl, 2013).
Comparably, there are no safety climate studies that examine an organizational
context with its norms and values influencing petroleum industry workers’ (contractors)
perception of risk and decisions. Dedobbeleer and Beland (1998) described that
“attention should be given to the context in which individuals take risks and negotiate to
avoid risk” (p. 80). Equally, there are no safety climate studies that examine a petroleum
refinery worker’s (contractors) perception of risk and decisions “in which individuals
take risks and negotiate to avoid risk” that impact the use of PPE working in a petroleum
refining plant (p. 80).
Cavazza and Serpe (2009) identified a safety climate gap on sanctioned behaviors
and the use of PPE asserting that “future studies could employ observed and self-reported
measures of violation/compliance and also different kinds of safety behaviors (e.g.,
employees’ participation in safety activities)” (p. 281). There are no qualitative studies
on sanctioned work behaviors of refinery workers (contractors) that impact their use of
PPE at a petroleum refining plant.
Lastly, there are no safety climate studies on petroleum industry workers’
(contractors) emotional judgment of perceived risk and risk perception of workplace
safety behavior at a petroleum refinery. Similarly, there are no qualitative studies on
refinery workers’ (contractors) petroleum refinery about emotional judgment impacting
their use of PPE on the ways workers perceived risk, and the mechanisms through which
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different risk perceptions influence safety behavior. Xia et al. (2017) identified that
“future research can explore how emotional risk perception fits into a larger nomological
network,” and “address how rational calculations and emotional judgment of risk will
interact with one another, and what combined effect can they produce on safety behavior”
(p. 241).
Summary
This review of literature presented the historical overview of petroleum refining,
refining safety, accident causation theories, concepts of safety climate, and a theoretical
framework for the study’s variables. These areas assisted in the overview for this study
of lived experiences of refinery workers (contractor) in an industrial environment impact
on the use of PPE.
Several studies have focused on factors that impact safety behaviors within
industry. As such, the aim of this research was to enhance the understanding of safety
behavior shaping mechanisms by focusing on the effects of key safety climate influences
of peer influence, supervisor influence, and task risks by using TPB impacting the use of
PPE.
Despite several attempts to locate information on this topic, a literature gap still
exists for refinery workers (contractors) at petroleum manufacturing plants. So, the goal
of this study is to assist safety-contentiousness professionals in creating a supportive
work environment. A supportive safe working environment in research has been shown
to reduce unsafe working behaviors because it can improve workers’ safety compliance,
safety performance, and safety communication daily.
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Synthesis Matrix
A synthesis matrix (see Appendix A) was used by the researcher to organize
variables presented in the review of literature. The synthesis matrix shows data on the
variable and cites the authors. The synthesis matrix is a strategy used by researchers to
show agreement between various research studies and authors concerning variables being
studied. The synthesis matrix contributes to the validity of study variables.
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY
Overview
Qualitative research studies show how groups of people or an individual make
sense of what is being studied by obtaining their thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes.
McMillan and Schumacher (2010) stated, “Qualitative research is an accepted
methodology for many important questions, with significant contributions to both theory
and practice. It begins with assumptions, a worldview, into the meaning individuals or
groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (p. 320).
Accordingly, this chapter describes the research methodology and procedures
used to conduct the study. The purpose statement and research questions are presented
followed by a description of the qualitative research methodology, study population, and
sample. Next, the study’s qualitative instrumentation, validity, validation strategies, and
reliability are discussed. Following this, a description of the data collection and data
analysis method used to conduct the research study are provided with the chapter
concluding with study limitations and a chapter summary.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to explore the impact of peer
and supervisor influences of task risks associated with refinery workers’ use of personal
protective equipment (PPE) while working in an industrial environment.
Research Questions
The study was guided by one central research question and three subquestions
designed to explore peer influences, supervisor influences, and influences of task risks
impacting a refinery worker’s use of PPE.
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Central Research Question
What are the lived experiences of refinery workers in an industrial environment
that impact their use of PPE?
Subresearch Questions
1. What influence do supervisors have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while working
in an industrial environment?
2. What influence do peers have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while working in an
industrial environment?
3. How does task risk influence a refinery worker’s use of PPE in an industrial setting?
Research Design
Qualitative research is a frame of research that is focused on telling the story of
the sampled population. Creswell (2007) stated that the objective of qualitative research
is to examine a research problem resulting in a comprehensive understanding of the
problem. To communicate the story of an individual, it is essential for the researcher to
thoroughly understand the problem being explored. This understanding is acquired
through the analysis of interviews, observations, and artifacts (Creswell, 2007). As
analysis of interviews, observations, and artifacts progress, the purpose and research
questions may change because of the emergent nature of storytelling. These changes are
necessary to accurately describe the experiences of the members of the research sample.
This study utilized a phenomenological research design to gather an
understanding of the lived experiences of refinery workers working in an industrial
environment that impacted their use of PPE. The benefits of a phenomenological
approach are that it focuses “on exploring how human beings make sense of experience
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and transform experience into consciousness, both individually and as shared meaning”
who have “directly experienced the phenomenon of interest” (Patton, 2015, p. 115).
Thus, phenomenological research design enables researchers to “develop a deep and
holistic description and understanding of the phenomenon of day-to-day activities, which
may be routine, taken for granted and yet complex and situational, as lived by the
participants themselves instead of what is observed by investigators” (Neo, Edward, &
Mills, 2013, p. 21).
This research study investigated the impact of peer influences, supervisor
influences, and the influences of task risks associated with a refinery worker’s use of PPE
while working in an industrial environment. A phenomenological study “assumes and
explores multiple realities that are relevant, meaningful, understandable, and able to
produce useful results that are valid, reliable, and believable” (Patton, 2015, p. 77).
Population
A population is a group of individuals or events from which a sample is drawn
(McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). When studying people, “programs, organizations, or
communities, the population of interest can be fairly readily determined” (Patton, 2015,
p. 289). The population for this study consisted of all petroleum refinery workers
throughout the United States working in petroleum refineries. This population of
petroleum refinery workers itself is a phenomenon. For example, in the petroleum
industry, there are two sets of workers: employees and contractors.
Strauss (n.d.) defined a petroleum worker as an employee who manages “the
equipment that converts oil into petroleum products each as fuel or heating oil. These
workers may operate pumps, regulate pipelines, or gauge the amount of oil in tanks”
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(Section 1, para. 1). As for a contractor, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS, 2017),
asserted that the “general rule is that an individual is an independent contractor if the
payer has the right to control or direct only the result of the work, not what will be done
and how it will be done” (Section 1, para. 3). Thus, petroleum company employees and
contractors make up the petroleum industry’s population in the United States.
The population for the U.S. petroleum industry in 2018 was 149,142 workers
(National Association of State Energy Officials, 2019). Nationally, according to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (2019d), there are 135 operable oil refineries in the
United States. In California, there are 15 oil refineries of which 13 refineries are in
densely populated areas of Los Angeles County with the remaining refineries located in
the eastern San Francisco Bay Area (California Environmental Protection Agency, 2017).
Published data exist nationally for the petroleum industry in California. These
data reveal that for the 15 petroleum refinery sites in California, there are approximately
978 petroleum refinery workers at each refinery totaling 14,670 workers statewide. For
the 13 refineries located in Los Angeles County in California, there are 12,718 petroleum
refinery workers (Marathon, 2019; Philips 66, 2020; Valero, 2020).
Target Population
According to Patton (2015), “A complete target population involves everyone
within a group of interest” (p. 285); people who are involved in a particular event are
preferred when “research focuses on criteria that are related to and appropriate for the
research problem and design” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010, p. 327). The target
population for this study was 5,000 refinery contractors from the 12,718 Southern
California petroleum workers working in 13 petroleum refineries located in Los Angeles
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County, California (Occupational Safety Councils of America, n.d.). Table 4 contains the
details of the Southern California refineries.
Table 4
13 Southern California Oil Refineries
Southern California Oil refineries

Locations

World Oil Refining
Valero Wilmington Refinery
Marathon
Shell Oil Products
Marathon Los Angeles Refinery
Phillips 66
Marathon Pipelines Terminal
Marathon Refinery
Torrance Refining Company
Los Angeles Refinery Carson
Chevron Products Company
Paramount Petroleum
Valero

South Gate, CA
Long Beach, CA
Long Beach, CA
Long Beach, CA
Wilmington, CA
Carson, CA
Long Beach, CA
Carson, CA
Torrance, CA
Carson, CA
El Segundo, CA
Paramount, CA
Wilmington, CA

Sample
A sample is a group of participants in a study selected from the population that
the researcher intends to generalize. Patten (2014) identified that “when it is impractical
to study an entire population, researchers draw a sample, study it, and infer that what is
true of the sample is probably also true of the population” (p. 53). McMillan and
Schumacher (2010) stated that there are “guidelines for qualitative sample size” (p. 328).
Sample size in a phenomenological study needs fewer participants. Patton (2015)
stated that “studies range from 6 to 10 persons, small samples that are truly in-depth have
provided many of the most important breakthroughs in our understanding of the
phenomenon under study” (p. 313). The sample size for this study consisted of 16
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refinery contractors drawn from eight Los Angeles County petroleum refining contractor
companies whose employees worked in the 13 petroleum refinery plants in California.
Purposeful Sampling
A purposeful sampling of refinery workers (contractors) who “by their nature and
substance will illuminate that inquiry question being investigated” (Patton, 2015, p. 265)
were recruited. Purposeful sampling implies that a set of criteria were used to select this
group of individuals who were likely to be knowledgeable and informative about the
phenomenon of interest (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010).
This researcher began this process by reaching out to safety professionals in
Southern California. He developed an invitational notification letter and mailed it to
eight petroleum safety professionals whose company personnel worked in the 13 Los
Angeles County refineries requesting assistance to find two research participants from
each refinery to volunteer to participate in this study (see Appendix B). The invitational
letter described the study, the criteria participants needed to meet to participate in the
study, and requested that their workers be willing to be contacted by phone for
interviews. Participants were required to meet the following criteria to participate in this
study: (a) employed by an employer with a California Contractors State License Board
Class “A” General Engineering Contractor License, (b) had 1 year or more experience
working in a petroleum refinery, and (c) had 1 year of experience in their trade
(Contractors State License Board, 2015; Occupational Safety Councils of America, n.d.).
Volunteers who met the criteria received the following items in person via their
onsite facilities safety professional prior to the phone interview: an invitation letter (see
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Appendix C), informed consent form (see Appendix D), interview protocol (see
Appendix E), and the audio consent form of the study (see Appendix F).
Instrumentation
Patton (2015) identified that in qualitative research the researcher serves as the
main instrument of inquiry and analysis. McMillan and Schumacher (2010) identified
that the researcher may inspect artifacts, observe behaviors, or conduct interviews to
understand the participant’s perspective on lived experiences. Moreover, the researcher
serves as the main instrument, and it is understood that there may be experimenter effect,
which is described as “both the deliberate and unintentional influences that the researcher
has on the subjects” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010, p. 113).
These influences, such as the experimenter effect, include treating subjects
differently, being reassuring to one participant but not another, exhibiting different
attitudes, and speaking in different tones of voice (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The
second factor of bias is subject effects, which refers to a change in behavior initiated by
the participants themselves in response to the research situation. McMillan and
Schumacher (2010) stated, “Participants may want to present themselves to have positive
self-presentation, social desirability, or a belief that certain responses are expected, which
may affect results” (p. 114).
In this study, the researcher was the primary instrument utilized in conducting the
data collection. Using the researcher as an instrument of the qualitative design has been
described as a significant weakness and as source of bias (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Patton (2015) identified that qualitative researchers must cautiously reflect on, address,
and report any known sources of study bias, which was the method used to control such
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bias in this study, for example considering past experiences from work that may cause
bias in the process of research.
The data were collected through open-ended questions and in-depth
semistructured interviews to understand the holistic view of the participants. Patton
(2015) noted that in the interview process, the researcher when interviewing must be able
to engage and draw experiences from the participants. The researcher’s industrial
background, prior law enforcement, and interpersonal competence served to engage
participants during interviews and in the analysis process (Patton, 2015). This was
accomplished by establishing a connection with workers early on, being respectful,
sensitive, listening to participants without judgment, and being responsive throughout the
process (Patton, 2015). Furthermore, the researcher understood the role of working in
high-risk industries. The researcher has worked with highly hazardous chemicals, both
known and unknown, as a railroad conductor, a first responder, and in the construction
industry for 20 years.
According to Patten (2014), researcher instrumentation consists of questionnaires,
protocols, or interview schedules. This study used an interview protocol, which was the
most suitable form of instrumentation for gathering the study’s data (see Appendix E).
The interview questions and responses were conducted over the phone and digitally
recorded. The following sections describe the interview protocol design, the field test,
and the methods used for validity and reliability.
Interview Protocol
The interview protocol for this study was designed based on Dov Zohar’s (1980)
safety climate model, which was recommended to be used for discovering the perceived
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value placed on safety in industrial organizations. This integrative model was also
combined with Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior’s (TPB) roadmap for
understanding which behaviors and environmental factors are responsible for a person’s
safety behavior (Phipps et al., 2015; Sleet et al., 2006). The reason for merging both
theoretical foundations is that safety climate and the TPB groundwork are associated by
their safety-specific framework and both are predictors of unsafe working behavior
(Cheyne et al., 1999; Xu et al., 2018).
The management of the protocol started with demographic questions asked to
establish rapport and was a nonthreatening way to begin the interviews (F. Ryan,
Coughlan, & Cronin, 2009). Following the demographic questions were the study’s
interview questions. The study’s theoretical framework of the TPB directed safety
climate as it “appears well-suited to the explanation of the link between climate and
particular types of workplace behaviors” (Fogarty & Shaw, 2010, p. 1456). Furthermore,
“the safety climate research, in turn, suggests ways in which the TPB model can itself be
refined” (Fogarty & Shaw, 2003, p. 5). Having said that, the interview questions were
modified to address the study’s safety climate variables of influences of perceived risk,
supervisor influences, and peer influences. Table 5 provides a view into how this
interview protocol was structured based on the theoretical recommendations. Appendix
G contains extended details about the interview protocol design and for comparison of
the safety climate factors and citations that relate to the questions to a modified Fishbein
and Ajzen’s (2010) TPB framework.
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Table 5
Interview Protocol Framework
Theory of planned
behavior

Safety climate variables
Supervisor
Influence of perceived risk
influences

Peer influences

Behavioral intention

Attitude toward a behavior is the degree to which performance of the
behavior is positively or negatively valued.

Subjective norm

The perceived social pressures to engage or not to engage in a behavior.

Perceived
behavioral control

The perceived presence of factors that may facilitate or impede
performance of a behavior.

During this study, all participants were asked the same questions to maintain
consistency (Patton, 2015). Having the same question used by the researcher for all
participants during a qualitative study is a fundamental component for reliability and
validity (Patton, 2015). In addition, the interview protocol helped the researcher to be
systematic and comprehensive based on the limited time available (Patton, 2015). This
approach allowed the researcher to follow a consistent protocol during the interview
process. The alignment between the interview questions and the theoretical framework is
displayed in Table 6. A fundamental component behind reliability and validity in a
qualitative study is having the same questions used for all participants (Patton, 2015).
Follow-up or probing questions were used to make participant responses clear and to seek
out a deeper understanding of their lived experiences. According to Patton (2015),
“Probes are used to deepen the response to a question, increase the richness and depth of
responses, and give cues to the interview about the level of response that is desired”
(p. 465).
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Table 6
Interview Question Alignment Table
Influence
of
perceived
risk

Questions

Research
questions
addressed

Supervisor
influences

1

1

X

Behavioral intention

2

2

X

Subjective norm

3

3

X

Behavioral intention/
subjective norm

4

4

x

Subjective norm

5

5

x

Perceived behavioral control/
subjective norm

6

6

x

Attitude/subjective norm

7

7

x

Behavioral intention/subjective
norm/perceived behavioral
control

8

8

x

Behavioral intention/perceived
behavioral control

9

9

x

Behavioral intention/subjective
norm/perceived behavioral
control

10

10

x

Perceived behavioral control

Peer
influences

Relationship to theory of
planned behavior

Note. Each of the questions in the interview protocol aligned both to a modified research question
and the theoretical framework.

Validity
Salkind (2010) described validity as “an integrated, evaluative judgement of the
degree to which empirical evidence and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and
appropriateness of inferences and actions based on test scores or other modes of
assessment” (p. 1589). McMillan and Schumacher (2010) defined validity as “the degree
of congruence between the explanations of the phenomena and the realities of the world”
(p. 330). To address the validity in this study, the interviews were digitally recorded on
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two devices to provide accurate and complete records. Interview notes were taken to
cross-reference the data from the recordings.
Participant language (English) was established so that participants understood the
questions being asked. Accordingly, questions were scanned to ensure that ambiguous
language was not used. To ensure that there was no ambiguous language and that all
questions were understood, the instrument was field tested. Upon completing the
interviews, the digitally recorded interviews were professionally transcribed.
Field Test
A field test was conducted to see if it would meet the study criteria that would
provide results consistent with the intent of each phone interview. During the field test,
an observer and a participant who met the study criteria were utilized for the phone
interview. An observer’s job is to listen and make recommendations for improvement or
adjustment to the interview process. The study’s observer was able to listen over the
phone, hear the participant’s speech tone, and see how the participant communicated
experiences, opinions, and thoughts on the situation being discussed. The observer
improved the instrument process by relating how the respondent reacted to the interview
questions. Interrater reliability was also utilized in the field test, “wherein all participants
are asked the same questions, in the same order” (Patton, 2015, p. 667). After the
conclusion of the interview, the participant was given an interviewee feedback and
response form to gather their perspective of the interview protocol (see Appendix H).
Similarly, the observer was given an interview feedback and reflections form to gather
their perspective of the interview process (see Appendix I). Patten (2014) noted that

89

during the evaluation of data, validity is significant because of its contextual value to the
reliability of the results.
Reliability
When a researcher conducts a study, an instrument is selected that has validity
and reliability (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). According to McMillan and
Schumacher (2010), “Reliability is the consistency of measurement—the extent to which
the results are similar over different forms of the same instrument or occasions of data
collection” (p. 179). In this study, endorsing reliability and consistency, a script
including details such as confidentiality of the interviewee, explaining the purpose of the
interviewee, answering questions or concerns, probing questions to determine rapport,
and follow-up questions for clarification was used.
Data Collection
The qualitative inquiry included two categories of collection interviews and
artifacts (Patten, 2014; Patton, 2015). Data collection from this study used open-ended
questions and semistructured interviews to gain the most knowledge from the
participants. Englander (2012) described interviews as the main source of the collection
in qualitative studies. Patton (2015) identified qualitative interviews as “open-ended
questions and probes yields in-depth response about people’s experiences, perceptions,
opinions, feelings, and knowledge” (p. 14).
The data collected through participants’ interviews were exact accounts of lived
experiences that were transcribed, interpreted, and analyzed (Patton, 2015). Artifacts
such as PPE training documents, PPE matrix, and job hazard analysis for tasks performed
were collected. Patton (2015) said that “they served as a practical situated
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exemplification of the participant’s descriptions of their work” and artifacts aid to
triangulate the data collection and analysis (p. 491). The intent of this study was to
address the lived experiences of refinery workers in an industrial environment that
impacted their use of PPE. To align with the intent of the study, the interview process
addressed the purpose and the research questions of this study.
Once he had received permission from the Brandman University Institutional
Review Board (BUIRB; see Appendix J) and after completion of coursework to meet the
criteria set by the National Institutes of Health (see Appendix K), the researcher held 16
one-on-one isolated interviews over the phone with refinery workers (contractors) from
eight refining contractor companies located in Southern California.
Interviews
In this study, interviews were conducted utilizing open-ended questions through
semistructured interviews relating to the research questions. These questions were
administered to ascertain the influences that peers, supervisors, and perceived risk have
on petroleum refinery workers’ (contractors) use of personal work protective equipment.
The interviews for this study were conducted via phone and were scheduled one
at a time as participants were found. At each commitment, the researcher was contacted
by phone for participation and received by mail the participant’s signed informed consent
and audio release forms. Accordingly, each packet with the letter of invitation (see
Appendix C) explaining the purpose for the study, informed consent (see Appendix D),
and audio release form (see Appendix F) was given to the participants by their safety
professional.
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At the beginning of the interview, the researcher gave a quick introduction about
himself; he followed that by reviewing the consent form, the purpose of the study, and
informing the interviewee that he could leave the interview process at any time. This
process allowed for the nature of confidentiality; once the interviewees reviewed those
documents and signed the consent form, each interviewee was given their participant
code. Once interviews began, the conversations were digitally recorded. After the
interviews, various methods were used to maintain the integrity of the data. All
information was secured and stored under lock and password protection at the
researcher’s residence. Participants remained anonymous and at the completion of this
study, all information was deleted and destroyed. Written consent forms with signatures
or any type of participant information were shredded at the end of the study.
Interviews were 30 minutes in length. During the interviews, a semistructured
approach was used; semistructured questions were asked. There were no multiple choice
answers. The questions were open-ended and allowed for individual responses, which
helped the researcher with the discovery of the participant’s story (McMillan &
Schumacher, 2010).
Data Analysis
Once all 16 of the interviews were completed, the data were analyzed and
compiled into a table listing the 10 interview questions with 16 professional refinery
workers’ responses to each question. This allowed the researcher to find the
commonalities to be studied. Analyzing data, according to McMillan and Schumacher
(2010), (a) categorizes the data and (b) finds the patterns connected to the categories.
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Each interview question was linked to the safety climate model and the theoretical
framework to align with each of research questions. Shaping the data in such a way
allowed for emerging themes, patterns, and unity among the data. Together the
professionally transcribed data from interviews, including the researcher notes taken in
the interviews, were managed into a working document. They were then uploaded into
the professional software program NVivo for coding qualitative data, analysis, and for
development of frequency tables. Intercoder reliability was also utilized, which is where
another independent coder examines and verifies the coding of the content of interest
from a script.
To sustain confidentiality and safekeeping of the data, the researcher secured and
supervised the use of all research data, digital recordings, and other documents.
Transcripts, digital recordings, and other systems that can identify any participant in the
study will be destroyed after 2 years.
Limitations
The limitations of a study are negative factors that affect a study and hinder it
from reaching its purpose (Roberts, 2010). Limitations tend to be those things over
which the researcher has no control. Each specialized refinery worker was asked to
recommend expert refinery workers, so a limitation of the study could was how refinery
workers were determined to be proficient in their field of work. Participant bias was
another limitation, and this included the researcher’s personal bias.
Participation in the study was consensual and voluntary; therefore, participation
rates was also a limitation. Additionally, this study was limited by the participants’
storytelling experiences. The researcher assumed that all participants provided truthful
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answers to the interview questions. However, the researcher had no control over
participants’ responses during interviews. Lastly, father time presented a limitation.
Qualitative research is time consuming. Data collection and analysis are time consuming.
Summary
The chapter provided an overview of the qualitative methodology with
phenomenological inquiry used for this study. The research design, population and
sample, instrumentation, data collection, and analysis procedures were discussed in this
chapter and the limitations of the study were also offered. Chapter IV contains an
analysis of the data and reveals the findings of the study. Finally, Chapter V categorizes
the findings, conclusions, implications for actions, and recommendations for future
research.
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CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH, DATA COLLECTION, AND FINDINGS
Chapter IV begins with a brief introduction providing the reader with a frame of
reference and understanding of the material to be covered in this chapter. The
introduction includes the major categories of the chapter and serves as a simplified
overview of chapter content. The purpose, research questions, methodology, data
collection procedures, and population and sample are summarized prior to the
presentation of data.
Overview
Accidents and unsafe work behavior are a manifestation in the workplace that
impacts workers and working groups. The uniqueness of time, productivity, and an
organization’s safety climate have influenced accidents and unsafe work behavior over
time (Zohar, 1980). Some organizations are more prone to catastrophic events due to the
extensive working hazards accessible in the workplace. A subgroup associated with
workplace fatalities and workplace injuries is contract workers. The National Safety
Council (NSC, 2020a) described that there are 800 deaths a year in the workplace for this
subgroup, which has increased by 50% since 2011.
Contractors are a significant labor force in petroleum refining and are required to
use personal protective equipment (PPE) in the performance of tasks such as maintenance
and construction (OSHA, 2017). A number of safety climate theory studies have focused
on offshore oil rigs and oil extraction as they relate to dealing with contract workers;
however, there is no research available about petroleum contractors’ experiences with
PPE use in refineries (Ford & Stephens, 2018; Rundmo, 1996). As a result, this study
focused on understanding the lived experiences of petroleum refining contractors with
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respect to PPE use and supervisor and peer influences and their perceived risk associated
with working in an industrial environment. Sixteen interviews with petroleum refining
contractors were conducted to answer the research questions of this study. This chapter
began with a brief overview of the research, which is followed by the purpose statement,
research questions, the research methodology used, population and sample, and the
presentation of the data. The themes of the study and the research question findings are
presented at the end of the chapter.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to explore the impact of peer
and supervisor influences of task risks associated with refinery workers’ use of PPE
while working in an industrial environment.
Research Questions
The study was guided by one central research question and three subquestions
designed to explore peer influences, supervisor influences, and influences of task risks
impacting a refinery worker’s use of PPE.
Central Research Question
What are the lived experiences of refinery workers in an industrial environment
that impact their use of PPE?
Subresearch Questions
1. What influence do supervisors have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while working
in an industrial environment?
2. What influence do peers have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while working in an
industrial environment?
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3. How does task risk influence a refinery worker’s use of PPE in an industrial setting?
Research Methods and Data Collection Procedures
This qualitative study utilized phenomenological inquiry to gather an
understanding of lived experiences of refinery workers (contractors) working in an
industrial environment that impact their use of PPE. The data collection for this research
was accomplished through in-depth interviews. To maintain consistency with all
participant volunteers, an interview protocol was designed with modified questions based
on Dov Zohar’s (1980) safety climate model and Fishbein and Ajzen’s (2010) theory of
planned behavior (TPB). The interview protocol included semistructured, open-ended
questions to allow participant volunteers to provide thorough accounts of their lived
experiences.
The study’s interview protocol, research questions, and research design were
approved by the Brandman University Institutional Review Board (BUIRB) on July 17,
2020 (see Appendix G). The informed consent was shared prior to interviews to protect
the identity of participant volunteers. Additionally, participant volunteers allowed the
researcher through their informed consent to audio record the interview for analysis
purposes. All participant volunteers’ personal information was removed from
transcriptions. Participants were asked at the conclusion of each interview if they wanted
to review their transcriptions when complete and all waived review.
The qualitative study used an inductive analysis process to synthesize the data
into meaningful codes, categories, and themes (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010).
Initially reviewing each transcription in a search for themes and patterns produced codes
that were used to assign significant segments or statements (McMillan & Schumacher,
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2010). Data were reviewed several times by the researcher to ensure accuracy of all
segments, codes, categories, themes, subthemes, and trends (Patton, 2015). For this
study, 321 segments were identified from the data, from which 287 codes were organized
into 22 categories. Once the analysis process was completed, the researcher verified that
there was alignment between the categories and the theoretical framework. From this
process, six themes emerged from the data collected.
Population
The population of this qualitative study consisted of male petroleum industry
refining contractors located in the United States. The population for the U.S. petroleum
industry in 2018 was 149,142 workers (National Association of State Energy Officials,
2019). Nationally, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2019d),
there are 135 operable oil refineries in the United States. To reduce this population into a
manageable group, the target population became petroleum refining contractors who
work at 13 refineries in Los Angeles County, California (California EPA, 2017).
Volunteer participants were allowed to participate in this study if they were (a) employed
by an employer licensed as a California Contractors State License Board Class “A”
General Engineering Contractor, (b) had 1 year or more experience working in a
petroleum refinery, and (c) had 1 year of experience in their trade (Contractors State
License Board, 2015; Occupational Safety Councils of America, n.d.).
Sample
The sample population included all male volunteers from a variety of trades who,
at the time of this study, were actively working as a petroleum contractor at a refinery.
This grouping provided the responses to the central research question and subresearch
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questions: “What are the lived experiences of refinery workers in an industrial
environment that impact their use of PPE.” As a method to reach this population, the
researcher used purposeful sampling by specifically selecting petroleum refining
contractors (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The researcher initiated this method by
reaching out to safety professionals in Southern California. An invitational notification
letter was developed and mailed to eight petroleum safety professionals whose company
personnel worked in the 13 Los Angeles County refineries requesting assistance to find
two research participants per refinery as volunteers (see Appendix B).
Demographic Data
Demographic data were collected from all 16 volunteer participants at the
beginning of the interviews to connect with petroleum refining contractors. From this
classification, the demographic data collected were for (a) job classification,
(b) membership in a union, (c) years of experience in the trade, (d) years of experience in
present company, and (e) types of hazards one is exposed to that require PPE. Table 7
shows each volunteer’s job classification and rank. There were 13 different job
classifications and from these data, there were four forepersons and 12 employees.
All petroleum refining contractor participants were asked in their interviews if
they were represented by a union. Hecker and Goldenhar (2014), in their examination of
safety climate, asserted that different union workers tend to follow safety policies and
procedures more than their nonunion counterparts. Although this qualitative study was
not designed to examine the influence of union membership, it was considered when
analyzing the lived experience of each worker individually. The results of this question
are shown in Table 8. The total participant count shows that six of the 16 participants
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had a membership in a union. From the six volunteers with union memberships, two
were forepersons and four were employees. The remaining 10 volunteers—two
forepersons and eight employees—did not have union memberships.
Table 7
Participant Demographic: Job Classification
Interviewee number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Job classifications interviewed

Other description

Electrician
Carpenter
Mechanic
Industrial painters and sandblasting
Industrial painters and sandblasting
Electrician
Corrosion technician (lone worker)
Field inspector
Project manger
Confined space rescue
(Lone worker)
Environmental technician
Heavy equipment operator
Journeyman scaffolder
Environmental Technician tank cleaning
and hydro-blasting
Electrician
Nuclear technician

11
12
13
14
15
16

Employee
Employee
Employee
Employee
Employee
Foreperson
Employee
Foreperson
Foreperson/consultant
Employee
Employee
Employee
Foreperson
Employee
Employee
Employee

Table 8
Participant Demographic: Membership in a Union
Membership
Union membership
No union membership

Number of
participants

Foreperson

Employee

6

2

4

10

2

8

All petroleum refining contractor participants were asked in their interviews about
their age, years of experience in their trade, and years of experience with their company
to ensure that the workers met the criteria for participation in the study, which was 1 year
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of trade experience and 1 year with their present employer. In safety climate studies, the
age, years of experience in a trade, and the years of experience in a company may shape
workers’ safety behaviors and workgroup norms (Chen et al., 2013; Mullen, 2004).
Table 9 shows the years of experience by trade, years of experience with present
contractor company, and contractor’s age for each of the 16 volunteers.
Table 9
Participant Demographic: Years of Experience by Trade, Years of Experience With Present
Contractor Company, and Contractor’s Age
Interviewee
number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Years of experience in
trade

Years of experience
present company

20
9
14
1
3
32
15
10
17
4
8
12
16
15
14
2.6

5
1
4
1
3
2.5
2
10
3
5
8
3
1
15
14
2.6

Age
44
30
35
25
24
52
38
37
51
30
32
32
43
44
32
26

Volunteers were asked to describe the types of hazards they were exposed to that
required the use of upgraded PPE beyond the basic PPE required for entry and relocating
to different jobs inside the refinery. The basic or commonly used PPE across all different
trades in refineries includes hard hats, safety glasses, ear plugs, flame resistant clothing,
and steel-toed boots. Table 10 displays the different types of PPE volunteers used for
tasks that required upgraded PPE to be compliance with refinery policies for work.
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Table 10
Volunteer Demographic: Types of Hazards Exposed
Trade
Electricians

Industrial painters and
sandblasting

Confined space rescue
(lone worker)

Types of hazards exposed
Dropping hazards
Cut hazards
Fire hazards
H2S Hazardous gases
Flying hazards
Electrical hazards
Vapors
Paint fumes
Dust
Loud noise
Machinery, equipment, sharp
objects
• Confined space hazards
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Corrosion technician
(lone worker)
Heavy equipment
operator

• Cut outs

Mechanic

• Crude oil

Nuclear technician

• Varied work environment

Carpenter

•
•
•
•
•
•

Journeyman scaffolder
Field inspector

• Acid spills
• Crude and diesel spills

Flash flares
H2S leaks
Falling objects
Dust
Noise
Heavy equipment and
materials
• Confined space maintenance

Project manger

• Basic task
• Abatement job
• Heavy hazard cleans up

Environmental technician
tank cleaning and
hydro-blasting

• Chemical and materials
hazards
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•
•
•
•

PPE
Cut proof or resistant gloves
Personal gas monitors
Face shields
LEL monitors

• Half face respirators
• P-100 full face respirators
• Earmuffs
• Recue gear
• Self-contained breathing
apparatus
• Goggles, face shield, respirator
• Poly-Tyvek with a full-face
respirator
• Poly-Tyvek and PVC gloves
• Instead of leather gloves you
need latex gloves
• Tinted or non-tinted protective
glasses
• Cut proof or padded cut prof
gloves
• H2S monitor

• Impact gloves
• Fresh air or supplied air
• Rain gear, rubber boots, and
rubber gloves
• Long sleeve shirts, reflective
vest
• Respirators with full or half
masks
• Supplied air respirators
• Fresh air breathing apparatus,
slicker suit, PVC boots, PVC
gloves, and spray socks

Artifacts
The qualitative inquiry included two categories of collection: interviews and
artifacts (Patten, 2014; Patton, 2015). Artifacts such as training documents, field
documents, and permits were collected. Patton (2015) stated, “They served as a practical
situated exemplification of the participant’s descriptions of their work” (p. 491), and
artifacts aid to triangulate the data collection and analysis. Artifacts were utilized as a
strategy to evaluate validity through the collection of information (Patton, 2015). In this
study, the researcher compared artifacts to the participants’ perspectives in order to use
multiple, rather than single, viewpoints to examine their lived experiences. Table 11
shows the artifacts that were collected in this study and includes a description of each
form.
Table 11
Artifacts
Artifact form

Description of artifact

Artifact #1 COVID-19 Precaution

An organizational precaution screening and workplace
policy document. Supervisors use this document to screen
workers prior to work for COVID (see Appendix L).

Artifact #2 Job Hazard Analysis Form

Task risk forms assist in decision-making on risk avoidance
or decreasing a risk. This form is a three-part questionnaire
that asked (a) what are you task steps, (b) hazards, and (c)
safeguards or protective measures (see Appendix M).

Artifact #3 Site Safety plan

A safe work form is a field document that describes specific
tasks with the safety measures such as PPE (see Appendix
N).

Artifact #4 Safety Data Sheet

Safety data sheets are informative documents which assist
in minimizing or eliminating the risks associated with the
use of hazardous chemicals. Safety data sheets inform
workers of how to deal with hazards (see Appendix O).

Artifact #5 Training for Contractors Form

Training documents includes a list of requirements
contractors must have before working in a refinery.
Training contractors include emphasis on the specific safety
and health hazards, procedures, and safe practices
applicable to the employee’s job tasks (see Appendix P).
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Throughout this Chapter IV, job hazard analysis and safety data sheet are
mentioned by participants. Their comments are a direct reference to the artifacts listed in
Table 11.
Presentation of the Data by Research Question
The following section of the chapter introduces the data analysis results with the
study’s themes that were discovered. Every one of the findings was based on the
research questions introduced in the prior chapter, which were the results of the
participants’ responses. The presentation of these findings includes six themes based on
the overall study followed by the results from the individual subresearch questions.
Subresearch Question 1
What influence do supervisors have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while
working in an industrial environment?
Theme 1: Supervisor influence. All 16 refinery contractors interviewed
provided a total of 65 references to supervisor influence. This was the second most
referenced theme in the study. The theme was categorized by two factors: observing
leadership qualities and supervisor behaviors.
The analysis of responses to Subresearch Question 1 resulted in the development
of Theme 1: Supervisor influence. The responses for supervisor influence are presented
in Table 12 with their respective themes, codes, artifacts, and frequencies.
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Table 12
Analysis of Responses for Supervisor Influence

Interview
sources

Frequency

Artifact
sources

Total for all supervisor influence codes

16

65

5

Supervisor sets the example by using PPE and
other safe behavior

16

5

1

Supervisor inspires workers to use PPE

16

3

1

Supervisors at different levels of management
communicate different requirements to workers

16

16

0

Supervisors check and correct workers’ use of PPE

16

8

2

Supervisor participates with workers in safety
meetings

16

8

2

Theme
Supervisor
influence

Code

Observing leadership qualities. One of the groupings that emerged from
supervisor leadership characteristics in the field was observing leadership qualities.
Participants referred to leadership qualities as observing or not observing safety
behaviors demonstrated by supervision. Participant 14, an environmental technician tank
cleaning and hydro-blasting contractor with 15 years of work experience stated, “Our
supervisor’s use of PPE will be the same category PPE that we’d be using. His isn’t
going to be no different just because he’s a supervisor.” Participant 3, a mechanic,
described in detail his observations of leadership qualities in the following statement:
My supervisor always wears his steel toe boots, hard hat, safety glasses, ear plugs,
and has his gloves with him, shirt tucked in, so yeah, he’s always got his PPE. He
always has extra PPE, extra ear plugs in his truck, extra gloves, and extra safety
glasses.
From a foreperson perspective in the field, Participant 8, a field inspector, said it
is important to lead by example as explained more in the following statement:
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I’m the supervisor, so it just depends on what we’re doing today. So, if I have to
go inside of a tank to inspect something and there are guys in there and they’re all
wearing respirators, I will go under the same PPE as them. I have to utilize the
same protections along with them.
A similar response was given by Participant 9, a project manager foreperson who
stated the following:
When I’m the supervisor on a job site, my PPE will reflect exactly what my techs
are wearing such as Tyvek suits or fire-resistant clothing (FRC) or respirators. I
do the same for the purpose of being an onsite supervisor. If something were to
happen, I want to be able to react appropriately with the same protection.
Other participants had different observations of their person of authority.
Participant 1, an electrician, asserted, “Most of the time supervision makes us use them.”
Participant 4, an industrial painter and sandblasting contractor, stated, “If a supervisor [is]
using a PPE that we’re not using, we ask them about it.”
Leadership inspiration. Another leadership characteristic that many participants
referred to was having the ability to inspire the use of PPE. Participant 1, an electrician,
mentioned being motivated by a person of authority in the following statement:
Just being around the people who have been at that company longer than I have,
and watching them, and watching their steps, and watching how they actually go
by the book on every single detail, it just motivates you to do the same. You
don’t want to cut any corners especially when you see people that are your bosses
doing and taking the time to actually do the stuff right, you know, it just motivates
you to do the same and to be just as safe.
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In addition, Participant 4, an industrial painter and sandblasting contractor, with 1
year of experience articulated the value of effective inspiration while working in a safety
motivated environment; he stated, “Yes, definitely. Since I just started in the industry a
year ago, the supervisor knows a lot more than me, obviously. So, I trust him and his
words.” In contrast, one participant conveyed a mixed statement on motivation.
Participant 6, an electrician foreperson, said the following:
Do they motivate you if you’re not wearing it. You’re going to be written up in
which case, you will be removed from the job if it’s a bad enough infraction. So,
to me, when I tell people to wear it, I don’t ever want to call somebody or their
family and express to them that their loved family member got hurt. So, it’s an
incentive for them to wear it as well and protect their family.
Supervisor behaviors. All 16 participants mentioned experiencing supervisor
behaviors from different levels of supervision. Participant 1, an electrician, described
this in his statement: “So like as far as supervisors. We have so much different levels, I
guess, you could call it, of supervisors. I have a direct supervisor, but then also like the
operators would be considered our supervisors as well.” To the participants, supervisor
behaviors meant the way supervisors act or conduct themselves through safety auditing of
PPE use. The refinery contractors described their individual experiences with PPE use
through safety inspections and safety meetings. A factor in this section that affected
refinery contractors’ use of PPE was the different levels of supervision in the field.
Safety inspections by supervision. The most ordinary form of safety inspections
was in-field assessments. This was mentioned by eight participants. Participant 3, a
mechanic, discussed safety inspections in the following way:
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Supervisor comes out to the field. He might tell us what we are going to be
working on—a piece pump or a gas pump or whatever we’re working with. He
will go to the job site throughout the day and make sure we have our PPE and
before we even start the project, he’ll provide us with the PPE or let us know
where to get the PPE that we need.
Participant 11, an environmental technician, described inspections from a point of
view of a foreperson as he stated in the following:
So, either I’ll come out or my supervisor above me. He will come out into the
field when we’re on a job and note that everyone is wearing their PPE correctly.
And makes sure they have the right PPE for the task that they’re doing and makes
sure they’re actually doing it correctly and in a safe way.
Other participants also described experiencing inspections in diverse ways such as
filling out a check list, being asked about their PPE, and having their PPE physically
checked prior to working. For example, Participant 10, who was a confined space rescue
contractor, stated that “before our shift starts, we have a check-off list that we go through
that list and we check off every gear that we possess in regard to conducting a rescue.”
Participant 16, a nuclear technician, added that they are questioned by their supervisor
regarding inspections: “So my supervisor oftentimes will, you know, ask and clarify, you
know, based on the job and, kind of, spot check us and audit us that way.” Two
participants experienced being physically checked daily by a person of authority.
Participant 2, who is a carpenter, described his experiences with a person other than a
supervisor physically checking his PPE in the following statement:
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He looks for tears and wears of our fire-resistant clothing. He makes sure our
shoes [that] they have steel toe and they’re not ripped. The steel toe is not
exposed. He makes sure our gloves are not ripped, that they’re in good working
condition. He checks our glasses for scratches. He checks if we have clear or day
or night glasses and they’re in good working condition, and ANSI-approved. He
checks our hard hats, makes sure they’re up to date.
Participant 13, a journeyman scaffolder foreperson, agreed with physically
checking PPE on a daily basis. He stated, “He checks everybody one by one before any
job.”
Safety meetings with supervision or others. During the interviews, eight of the
participants described having safety meetings with their supervisor or some other person
of authority or safety meetings with someone other than a direct supervisor such as a
foreperson, safety professional, or project inspector from the refinery or terminal.
Participant 15, an electrician, stated, “Every morning we have safety meetings (with my
supervisor) where we go over the job description, also we go over what PPE we’re
required to use while we’re working in those conditions.” In the case of Participant 4, an
industrial painter and sandblasting contractor, safety meetings meant going over potential
hazards and having extra PPE was also important as he explained:
Every morning, we have a safety meeting [with my supervisor]. We go over all
of the hazards, all of the potential hazards, and ways to mitigate those hazards.
He reminds us which PPE we’re going to need that day and reminds us it’s better
to have extra PPE than not enough. He always goes above and beyond.

109

One participant described experiencing safety meetings where their supervisor
asks them about their safety equipment. For example, Participant 7, a corrosion
technician, stated, “So we got weekly meetings and monthly meetings. So, he asked me
about our stuff. If our equipment is still safe, if it’s up to date, and then he asked me if
we need anything else.” During the interviews, two of the participants voluntarily
described having safety meetings with someone other than a direct supervisor.
Participant 1, an electrician, mentioned his experience with safety meetings and a person
of authority other than his direct supervisor in the following statement:
We typically have a PIC, which is a project inspector in charge. And they’ll daily
go through like a little safety, you know, like a tailgate meeting where we’ll talk
about what we’re going to do that day and then we’ll identify hazards that we are
going to be involved with the work.
Participant 14, who is an environmental technician tank cleaning and hydroblasting contractor, described his experiences with his company’s safety professional; he
stated,
Our supervisor gets involved in determining with the safety department that is on
site on which type of PPE will be determined to be used for that job at that present
time along with our safety department on our side.
Theme 2: Supervisors’ worksite visibility. There were 46 references to
supervisors’ worksite visibility from refinery contractors. This total number of responses
made it the third most referenced theme in the study. Supervisors’ worksite visibility was
referenced by the participants as any advice or information, teachings or education given
by someone of authority on the use of PPE. The total responses from this theme were
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grouped into two classifications: supervision supporting use of PPE and organizational
safety education. Each of the groupings listed in the summary is presented in further
detail in the following sections based on the participants’ experiences.
The analysis of responses for Theme 2: Supervisor worksite visibility are
presented in Table 13 with their respective themes, codes, frequencies, and artifacts. This
common theme was based on the data results from Subresearch Question 1.
Table 13
Analysis of Responses for Supervisors’ Worksite Visibility
Code

Interview
sources

Frequency

Artifact
Sources

Total for all supervisor influence codes

16

46

5

Supervisor supports the use of PPE

16

16

0

Supervisor provides PPE instruction
based on work experience

16

4

1

Supervisor identifies work hazards
before work

16

2

1

Supervisor shares safety
responsibilities with others

16

5

0

Supervisor has limited role in PPE
training

16

15

1

Supervisor limited role in site specific
PPE training

16

8

1

Supervisors provide hands on PPE
training

16

8

1

Theme
Supervisors’
worksite
visibility

Supervision supporting use of PPE. All 16 participants mentioned experiencing
receiving advice or information by someone of authority on the use of PPE. To the
participants, supervision supplying the appropriate PPE meant having the proper PPE
before a task. The refinery contractors described their experiences with supervision
through the information provided at work, double checking work hazards, and facility or
company standards.
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Information provided at work. The most ordinary form of information provided
at work by someone of authority was their work experience. This type of information
provided active awareness from a person of authority through communicating their work
experience to a workgroup or individual on their knowledge of their own understanding
of the work to be done. Participant 10, a confined space rescue contractor, discussed his
first experiences with an unknown work hazard in the following way:
I would say I have not experienced going on a job where they were getting lead
abatement. There were a certain kind of nonbreathing face masks that were in the
truck. I was unsure exactly which mask to use so my supervisor provided [me]
with a more sophisticated model, which allowed me to get pretty much closer and
do my job a little bit better.
Participant 11, an environmental technician, described the following unique way
he was approached by a supervisor during a task:
We were washing a tank and I was using my regular cut-resistant gloves, and he
had told me to change out of those so they wouldn’t get saturated with either
water or gasoline that we were dealing with and told me to put on neoprene
gloves [to] make sure that it keeps it off my hand and soaking into the glove.
Other participants described as a foreperson were observed instructing on PPE
and safety equipment needed for work. For example, Participant 13 who is a journeyman
scaffolder foreperson, related how he instructs a work crew; he stated,
If we’re going to work on scaffolding, and we’re going to work on heights, we
know that we have to wear, we use a harness and lanyard, and we have to wear oil
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PPE, and we have to wear tool liners in our tools to make sure nothing would fall
for the task that we’re going to perform.
Participant 6, an electrician foreperson, described the hazards of dust particles in
his following statement:
Depending on what you are doing. Say you are drilling into concrete, there is
silica in the air from the concrete dust, and that will mess up your lungs. So, you
have to wear one type of respirator for that, face filter, mask filter, but then if
you’re getting anywhere near potential fumes, say H 2 S or CO or something like
that, then you have to wear a different, kind of filter and mask to protect your
lungs as well.
Double-checking work hazards. Participant 14, an environmental technician tank
cleaning and hydro-blasting contractor, said that his supervisor does not depend on site
facility specifics. He stated, “[The] supervisor takes a sample of whatever is in the tank
to bring to our facility to have a sample run to determine if we are going to be exposed to
anything greater than what they are saying it is.” In the case of Participant 3, a mechanic,
double-checking work hazards had to do more with a person of authority teaching good
habits and he affirmed this position through the following remarks:
One that comes into mind is anytime we are breaking flanges, our work crew
supervisor makes sure that we are wearing a face shield. Sometimes, even though
we drain a certain section of pipe, we know it is empty it is always a good habit to
have a face shield.
Facility or contractor company standards. During the interviews, three of the
participants described having received information from the refinery where they were
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working or from their present contractor company on the appropriate PPE for a task.
When Participant 1, an electrician, was asked in what ways he received advice or
information on the appropriate PPE to use for a task, he said the following:
According to Refinery C, which is the refinery, according to their standards, there
are certain suits we have to use depending on the voltage. So, depending on the
voltage, I’ll call my boss, and he’ll get me the right suit to wear to deenergize to
go into the buckets.
Participant 2, who is a carpenter, has company requirements on glove use for a
task. He said, “It’s always a requirement. In any situation we do, it is the glove we have
to use. It is our policy from the company. No matter what, those Level 5 gloves are the
ones we have to use.”
Other forms of safety resources. During the interviews, two participants
mentioned that they were given information or advice on the use of PPE by their
contractor company. Participant 11, an environmental technician, said, “We use our
safety guide through our company to figure out with what tasks we’re doing and what
kind, what’s the best kind of PPE to use for that task.” Participant 15, an electrician,
agreed, “We do have procedures from our company that we abide by. I would say he
always goes off those.” Other participants mentioned that they were given advice or
information through the refinery’s safety department. Participant 6 said, “So the main
head and the main safety person would give us information on that if we’re not sure of
what to wear.”
Participant 10 described his situation with a safety representative by saying, “As
far as making contact with the safety representative, I believe I was equipped with the N-
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95 and that was upgraded to P-100, which is a little more sophisticated.” In addition,
three participants also agreed that their supervisor uses organizational content.
Participant 4, an industrial painter and sandblasting contractor, said, “We also go over the
safety data sheet. For example, when we were blasting, we looked at which kind of grit
we were using. He told us to use the filters with that.” Participant 12, a heavy equipment
operator asserted, “We came into a chemical spill, so he had to check the safety data
sheets to check what type of PPE we needed to wear to be on the site.”
Organizational safety education. During the interviews, 15 participants
mentioned that they experienced organizational safety education by a supervisor or from
a person of authority through site-specific training or hands-on training in the field. Only
one participant did not reference any organizational safety education during the
interview. To participants, organizational safety education was described by the
participants as any training received on safety equipment. The refinery contractors
described their individual experiences with organizational safety education through two
themes: site-specific instruction and hands-on instruction in the field.
Site-specific instruction. This section offered eight participant responses to sitespecific instruction. Site-specific instruction was referred by participants as an
organization’s approach to educating refinery contractors on the use of PPE and the types
of PPE required for each task. Participant 1, an electrician, affirmed this position through
the following remarks:
I have taken NFPA 10, OSHA 10, OSHA 30, and NFPA. I have taken lead
abatement classes, lead awareness classes, and confined space classes. I have
taken trenching safety classes. I have taken scaffold safety classes, aerial lifts,
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and scissor platform operating classes to be certified to use those. I have also
taken RSO classes, which stands for refinery safety orientation, we must take the
sight-specific classes for terminals or refineries that we work at.
Participant 8, a field inspector foreperson, described that all contractors are
required to have in-house training when working at refineries. His statement described a
person of authority’s philosophy at a refinery; he said the following:
So, [as] a part of our requirement working on these terminals we’re required to
have every contractor take in-house training. We will go through the proper
training depending on the task that they’re doing and then they will go through all
the proper training on PPE that’s required.
According to Participant 12, a heavy equipment operator, “Every year, we get fittested and trained, donning our PPE.” Participant 4, an industrial painter and
sandblasting contractor, described his experiences in organizational safety education from
1 year of experience working in the refinery: “After we got hired, we went through, I
think, one or two days of just training over all of the different equipment we were going
to be using, including PPE, when to use it.” Other participants described their
experiences as watching videos or taking classes. For example, Participant 16, a nuclear
technician, made the following statement:
So, we are required to watch site-specific videos that basically go over the
requirements of PPE and why they are necessary. So, each site has a specific
training video. Normally 30 to 60 minutes long where it goes over specific
hazards of the job and why each piece of PPE is required for said job.
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Similarly, Participant 13, a journeyman scaffolder foreperson, described the
following:
For training, we give classes. They will show us how to wear the harnesses the
right way. How to inspect the harness before each use every day, how to check
the tools, and then they show us some videos. Then they show us in person too.
One participant experienced site-specific instruction from the facility’s safety
department. Participant 11, an environmental technician, stated, “We also do annual
training with our safety guy to let us know what’s the best time of PPE to use in the
situation that you are dealing with out in the field or even out our shop.”
Hands-on instruction. Eight participants mentioned having hands-on instruction
with a person of authority. Participants 3, 5, and 14 described that a person of authority’s
hands-on approach educated them on their use of PPE based on the training they
received. Participant 14, an environmental technician tank cleaning and hydro-blasting
contractor, affirmed this position through the following remarks:
We have got vigorous training. We go through training all year long on how to
don and put on and take off our PPE. Supervisors will also re-educate us on PPE
use because the supervisor will also sometimes do the work with us, not just sit
there and supervise. He will be in there with us supervising, showing us, and
educating us on the proper use of PPE and why we are using what we’re using.
In addition, Participant 3, a mechanic, also experienced hands-on training as he
mentioned in the following statement:
For training, they tell us and then they show us how to use it first. The they will
tell us to make sure it fits right for us. Also, they will send us to take classes to

117

make sure that we are using our PPE correctly. So, we can make sure once we go
out into the field, we have the right knowledge for our PPE.
Participants 6, 9, and 13 described hands-on instruction from a foreperson’s point
of view. Participant 9, a project manager foreperson, said,
We let them know specifically what our task is and the PPE that we will be
wearing to be in that certain exclusion zone. And so, as a supervisor, and plus,
you know, going through it myself, you know, you learn to adapt to the task at
hand.
According to Participant 6, an electrician foreperson,
Every week we have tailgate meetings which is basically just a safety meeting and
we go over different things from the proper harness to wear to, like I say, the eye
shields to FRC or flame-resistant clothing because even that has different ratings
on the area, you’re going to be working in. So, we have meetings about every
week and touch at least one subject if not a couple of them.
Subresearch Question 2
What influence do peers have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while working in
an industrial environment?
Theme 3: Peer influence. A total of 37 references were made to prior
experiences with peer support systems. This theme was mentioned by all 16 refinery
contractors during the interview process. Participants referred to these supportive
structures as positive or negative encouragement for PPE use at work. The theme, peer
influence, was broken down into two categories: the level of encouragement and the level
of discouragement.
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The analysis of responses to Subresearch Question 2 resulted in the development
of Theme 3: Peer influence. The responses for peer influence are presented in Table 14
with their respective themes, codes, artifacts, and frequencies.
Table 14
Analysis of Responses for Peer Influence
Theme
Peer influence

Interview
sources

Frequency

Artifact
sources

Total for all peer influence codes

16

37

5

Peers give reminders and encourage safe
working habits and use of PPE.

16

12

1

Peers support use of new forms of PPE

16

2

1

Peers encourage PPE through teamwork

16

2

1

Peers discourage PPE use when it became a
hazard

16

3

0

Peers discourage PPE use to work faster

16

1

0

Peers discourage PPE use due to COVID

16

1

0

Participants do not discourage the use of PPE
by others

16

4

1

Code

Level of encouragement. Level of encouragement was described by participants
as a supportive circle of contractors they work with at the refinery. These were
contractors whom participants mentioned informed and supported their use of PPE for
every task. Twelve of the participants mentioned that their coworkers’ level of
encouragement was a daily routine of reminding one another of their safety equipment
and encouraging safe working habits.
Encouraging safe work habits. Participant 4, an industrial painter and
sandblasting contractor, reinforced this in the following statement:
Yeah, every day. We’re always reminding each other to put on our gloves.
Maybe if it’s getting loud, put on their ear protection. We’re always reminding,
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looking out for one another. If someone is not wearing the safety glasses, maybe
they just took it off for a little bit, and then forgot, they didn’t put it back on, we
remind them to put back on.
Encouraging other trades on PPE. Participant 14, an environmental technician
tank cleaning and hydro-blasting contractor, mentioned not only encouraging his work
crew, but that he also encourages other trades on proper PPE for whatever task they are
doing as he asserted in the following statement:
All the time. When we’re out in the field we’re all looking out for each other.
Our number one goal is to make sure that not only the crew is wearing the proper
PPE for a task, but we’re even observing other individuals around us to check if
they’re using the proper PPE for whatever task they’re doing. If we see anybody
trying to manage anything without gloves or we know they’re around our area
[where] we’re working, we encourage them to try to wear the same. For example,
if we are creating any type of hazardous [situation] in our immediate work area
and we’re wearing respiratory protection we encourage others to wear the same.
We all look out for each other.
Encouraging new forms of PPE use. Other participants have experienced
encouragement with a task when issues arise with the use of masks due to COVID-19.
Participant 16, a nuclear technician, described how wearing a mandated mask makes it
difficult at times to complete work. Participant 16 said that even with the new guidelines
of wearing a mask, his coworkers still support working properly. He established this
scenario in the following statement:

120

I’ll give you an example. So, let’s just say I’m working on a piece of electronic
equipment, and my glasses start to fog up because even more so now I am
required to wear a mask. What will happen is I will have to remove my safety
glasses for a split moment, and once I’ve completed that task, that part of the task
there have been times where my colleague has had to remind me and said, “Hey,
don’t forget your glasses. Put them back over your eyes.”
Participant 6, an electrician foreperson, explained in a unique way how coworkers
are encouraging health and safety through PPE use during COVID-19 while working in
close quarters. He described his supportive actions of encouragement with coworkers in
the following statement:
I say, the person I’m working with right now, does not want to catch, for instance,
COVID. So, we’re wearing the N-95 masks, and he has a family member who is
immune compromised. So, he encourages me to wear it around him, and he
wears it around me so make sure that we don’t get each other sick. Nobody wants
to bring anything home, you know, and he doesn’t want to have to, well, live with
the fact of seeing somebody get serious[ly] hurt on a job either. Neither do I.
Encouraging PPE through teamwork. Other participants mentioned how
coworkers encourage each other in other ways. Participants 9 and 12 described how
coworkers encouraged them to wear PPE during hazardous spills. Participant 12, a heavy
equipment operator, described a time when he did not want to wear safety equipment and
a coworker encouraged him to do so. He explained the situation in the following
statement:
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Yeah, one time, we had a little small spill. I didn’t want to dress up, but it was
more of a hazard because of the smell. So, he’s like, let’s change into our proper
PPE Tyvek, half-face. Because over the years smelling H2S or benzene will start
messing you up over the years.
Participant 9, a project manager, described coworker encouragement as teamwork
and being on the same page with hazards. He detailed this in the following:
We had one incident where we came across some hazardous material mixed in
with soil, and we all came together to upgrade our PPE. We went from a halfface to a full-face respirator. We put a little more duct tape on the openings of our
gloves to Tyvek. But, once we realized a hazard on the field, everybody upgraded
their PPE accordingly.
Level of discouragement. Level of discouragement was described by participants
as a loss of confidence in their peers because they did not support their use of PPE for
every task. There were 15 responses and one participant who had no response.
Discouraging PPE when it becomes a hazard. Participants 9, 11, and 12
mentioned being discouraged at some point in their careers. Participant 9, a project
manager, weighed in on being discouraged from wearing PPE for a task when it becomes
its own hazard. He addressed this in the following statement:
The only time that’s ever happened is when PPE actually becomes its own hazard.
We see that when we’re into a situation where the Tyvek or the fire-resistant
clothing (FRC) becomes layered, and the heat outside starts to increase. The
question is okay, do we stop work, or do we adjust PPE. Because the hazards it
creates becomes greater and makes a less safe work environment.
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Discouraging PPE to work quicker. Participant 11, an environmental technician,
described in a unique way his experiences with discouragement from coworkers on PPE
use to get the job done quicker. Participant 11 said,
Yeah, I mean, there’s been times where we’ll be out in the field and they’ll be oh,
let’s do it this way. It’s quicker, but then I think back to, is it the safest way of
doing it or the safest PPE that you could be using? There’s been numerous times
of that.
During the interviews, one participant voluntarily described coworkers’
discouragement with PPE due to COVID-19. Participant 1, an electrician, mentioned this
type of discouragement as “an additional aspect of our PPE is wearing a mask.” He
affirmed this in the following:
You know what, not until this whole COVID thing happened. And the reason
why I’m say this is because now part of our PPE is masks. So, if we’re working,
you know, within 6 feet of somebody, now an additional aspect of our PPE is
wearing a mask. Not until then, I never had anybody tell me, “hey, take off your
hard hat or hey, take off your safety glasses.” But when this first started, I was
probably one of the first ones to actually wear a mask even before it was required.
I was like already getting ready for this back in the early part of the year even
before we had cases here. I was already talking about it with others, and then I
was one the first ones who started wearing a mask in offices and stuff like that.
And I think that was the first time I actually felt somebody was, kind of, like, hey,
why are you wearing a mask? Are you sick?
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Never experiencing discouragement. Participants 3, 8, 15, and 16 mentioned
never experiencing any discouragement on PPE from a coworker. Participant 3, a
mechanic, stated, “I don’t think I’ve ever been discouraged on PPE, no, no. I’ve never
had any kind of any coworker tell me to take off my safety glasses or none of that, no.”
Participant 16, a nuclear technician, said, “No, honestly, I can’t. I honestly can’t think of
a situation.” Other participants said they would not allow discouragement on PPE use.
Participant 8, a field inspector, said he would not allow anyone to discourage the use of
PPE. He affirmed this in the following statement:
You know that one is probably never. Because I wouldn’t allow it, you know, we
look after each other right here. I’ve never encountered somebody that’s going to
discourage me saying, “Hey, you don’t need that,” because most of the time we’re
rather good with that stuff.
One worker mentioned during interviews that he works alone and has never
experienced a coworkers’ discouragement with PPE use. Participant 7, a corrosion
technician, described himself as a lone worker who has not experienced a coworker
discouraging his use of PPE. He addressed this in the following statement:
It’s just me in my truck with my tools with my protection. He’s in his truck with
his tools and his protection. So, he’s got all his PPE and I got my PPE in my
truck, and he’s got his own. Most of the time by myself working by myself.
Theme 4: Peer stop work authority. Of the 16 participants interviewed, all
made references to peer stop work authority for a total of 25 responses. Participants
referred to peer stop work authority as an obligation to stop unsafe behaviors with PPE
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use or recognizing unsafe conditions related to a task. This theme had two categories:
PPE for the task and unsafe working environment.
The analysis of responses for Theme 4: Peer stop work authority is presented in
Table 15 with their respective themes, codes, frequencies, and artifacts. This common
theme was based on the data results from Subresearch Question 2.
Table 15
Analysis of Responses for Peer Stop Work Authority
Theme
Peer stop work
authority

Interview
sources

Frequency

Artifact
sources

Total for all peer influence codes

16

25

5

Peers use stop work authority

16

16

1

Peers exercise stop work authority
for improper PPE use

16

4

2

Code

PPE for the task. One of the groupings that emerged from peer stop work
authority was specific to unsafe behaviors with PPE used for a task. This meant
communicating effectively with other contractors to correct the PPE being used for that
task.
Improper PPE use. Participant 11, an environmental technician, described a time
when working around another trade that was using the wrong respirators stopped work.
He affirmed this in the following statement:
It wasn’t a coworker. It was actually another contractor that we were working
alongside with. But they had called a stop work because they were just using
regular respirators and the job. She should have been using fresh air respirator.
Because the volume of vapor coming out the tank when they were trying to clean
was so high that their cartridges were actually getting flooded with the vapors in
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like every 5 minutes. So, they finally called a stop work, and brought fresh air
bottles out.
Participant 8, a field inspector foreperson, described the following scenario when
he walked up to a hot work zone and stopped work because not everyone was wearing the
appropriate PPE for the task:
So, a couple of years ago we walked up to a job where they were abrasive
blasting, and at the time, we had a rule in place if one guy in the tank is under
supplied air, that everybody should have the same PPE. So, there was a couple of
guys under the blast holes that only had supplied air, and then two other guys that
were helping holding the hose and sweeping up after them didn’t have the
supplied air. We stopped the job, we called them out, we spoke to them.
Working with improper PPE. Participant 14, an environmental technician tank
cleaning and hydro-blasting contractor, described stopping work not because of unproper
PPE or unsafe working conditions but to upgrade PPE to feel more comfortable; he said,
It was determined that we were only required to wear a full-face respirator with
combo cartridges, and we decided to upgrade because of an older compliance to a
higher respirator for our protection. We’re always allowed to upgrade. We just
can’t downgrade. So, we could always say, “Hey we feel more comfortable being
in this respirator,” without it being an issue.
Participant 13, a journeyman scaffolder foreperson, described the PPE culture
around peer stop work authority with contractors; he stated the following:
When a coworker sees something unsafe, when you see something unsafe, you
have the authority to stop any job at all times. For example, if you’re going to do
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a task, you’re not wearing the safety glasses or you’re wearing your safety glasses
down your nose and you’re not wearing the gloves or a hard hat, people they
forget the hard hat or they put the glasses down, that’s when you got to stop them
and say, “Hey you forgot your glasses or your hard hat.”
Subresearch Question 3
How does task risk influence a refinery worker’s use of PPE in an industrial
setting?
Theme 5: Refinery task risk influence on PPE selection. The 16 refinery
contractors interviewed provided a total of 83 references for effective organizational
strategies used in refineries to facilitate PPE selection. This made it the most referenced
theme in the study. Effective organizational strategies were referenced by the
participants as anything that they experienced with refinery practices that were used to
identify hazards or written documents that provided step-by-step procedures to mitigate
hazards. The biggest factors that refinery contractors depended on were inspections to
identify hazards in their workplace. The responses from this theme were divided into two
categories: identifying hazards for a task and procedures for PPE use.
The analysis of responses to Subresearch Question 3 resulted in the development
of Theme 5: Refinery task risk influence on PPE selection. The responses for refinery
task risk influence on PPE selection are presented in Table 16 with their respective
themes, codes, artifacts, and frequencies.
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Table 16
Analysis of Responses for Refinery Task Risk Influence on PPE Selection
Theme
Refinery task risk
influence on PPE
selection

Interview
sources

Frequency

Artifact
sources

Total for all task risk influence codes

16

83

5

Job hazard analysis and inspection used to
identify hazards

16

4

1

Safety permits used to determine and document
task risks

16

16

1

Safety data sheets and other documents used to
select appropriate PPE for a task

16

6

3

Refinery procedures for PPE use followed by
contractors.

16

15

1

Refinery PPE policies for entry followed by
contractors

16

14

1

Code

Identifying hazards for a task. All participants mentioned a variety of
organizational strategies that have been useful in identifying work hazards. Identifying
hazards for a task were referred to by participants as approaches that they would take to
identify potential hazards or risks on the job. Participants described their process of
identifying hazards for a task by visual inspections and permits.
Visual inspections. Participant 10, a confined space rescue contractor, described
that understanding a work area and its surroundings has helped him identify hazards he
may encounter through walking the job prior to work. He provided this statement:
Identify hazards by doing a scene size up is what I like to refer to. I will walk up
to the tank. I’ll do a 360 looking for initial hazards, trips and falls, any
configuration, or any confined space that I need to be aware of and I also make
entry inside the tank before the crew goes inside. That way if I do need to go
inside, I am a little familiar of what I am stepping into as far as making that
rescue. It is a lot of visual inspections, but it is also a little hands on.
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Other participants mentioned different methods they took to identify hazards.
Participant 1, an electrician, mentioned using air monitoring equipment to identify
hazardous gases and vapors, such as flammables and hydrogen sulfide, when conducting
inspections as described in the following scenario:
So even if we have to bring our trucks into that area to work off the back of the
truck, we park away from it, walk in with the monitor to make sure that it’s safe
and that there are no flammable gasses in the air that can be ignited. We also
have our personal monitors in case something does change, and you are not close
to the other monitors, your personal monitor will go off.
Several participants mentioned other types of inspections in which they as a group
were made aware of hazards. Participant 13, a journeyman scaffolder foreperson,
described that safety meetings were a way to mitigate the hazard; he stated,
Walk all the job, that way you can mitigate the hazard. That’s why you do a
safety meeting with the supervisor and all the coworkers. They all got to
participate to be on the same page that way everybody knows all the hazards and
what kind of PPE we need to perform the task.
Participant 4, an industrial painter and sandblasting contractor with 1 year of
experience in his trade, described the importance of a safety meeting after a visual
inspection, such as walkthroughs, to better understand and mitigate those hazards. He
affirmed this in the following way:
Going back to the safety meeting that we have in the morning. We go over the
scope of work, and then we discuss the potential hazards that could harm us
throughout the job. And we discuss it and see how we can mitigate those hazards.
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Permit job hazard analysis. All 16 participants mentioned using some form of
safety permits. Permits were referred to by participants as a paper listing of questions in
the form of a checklist requiring contractors to put in writing the risks of the job and the
steps in which to mitigate each hazard found at the site. Participants mentioned the use
of job hazard analysis (JHA), job safety analysis (JSA), job loss analysis (JLA), and
safety data sheets (SDS). According to Participant 2, a carpenter contractor, “In each
different refinery, it’s JSA, job safety analysis. Or JHA, job hazard analysis. Or JLA.”
In a refinery permit, each basic step of the job is to identify potential hazards and to
recommend the safest way to do the job.
Listing the hazards to select the appropriate PPE. Participant 14, an
environmental technician tank cleaning and hydro-blasting contractor, described job
safety analysis as part of the permit for safety in the following statement:
You write down your most hazardous steps in sequence on what you’re going to
perform and then you got to write in what hazards can occur from you performing
that task and how you’re going to mitigate them before any task could be
completed or started. That is what you are trying to follow on that paper form
those steps and sequences throughout the day to keep from anybody going outside
that task.
Participant 13, a journeyman scaffolder foreperson, agreed that job safety analysis
forms are written procedures of the hazards of the task; he stated, “It is to prevent work
accidents to breakdown the job into steps, to identify all the hazards, to minimize all the
hazards before the job is performs so the job is done safely.” Participant 16, a nuclear
technician, described utilizing a safety checklist to determine what type of PPE to use for
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potential hazards and the scenarios that could occur. He supported this in the following
statement:
So, I have what is called a job hazard analysis form which is a check list that has
several different potential scenarios or hazards. I go through it before a job. I
will go through, and I will analyze the job step by step and then through that
process, I will determine what specific type of gloves should we use and what
specific type of rope we need for the task.
Participants 2, 11, and 13 agreed that hazard analysis forms provide direction for
selecting PPE needed to accomplish a task safely. Participant 11, an environmental
technician contractor, stated, “It gives you your tasks that you’re going to do, what PPE
you need. The hazards that you could face.” During the interviews, one participant
voluntarily described using his company’s job hazard analysis. Participant 9, a project
manager, stated, “You know, bottom line whether the refineries have a different job
hazard analysis, I don’t want any I my guys getting hurt. Company 1, we have our own
job safety analysis that we do for every project.”
Procedures for PPE use. Fifteen participants mentioned procedures for PPE use.
Only one participant did not make reference to procedures for PPE use. Procedures for
PPE use were referred to by participants as requirements at each refinery. Participants
mentioned the use of PPE needed for a task and PPE required to enter a refinery.
PPE needed for a task. Participant 14’s, an environmental technician tank
cleaning and hydro-blasting contractor, use of PPE in his trade for a task is detailed in the
following statement:
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Our PPE since we work with water or chemicals would be fire resistance clothing
(FRC) raingear, whatever type of respiratory protection, and face shield. When
hydro-blasting, shin guards, possibly a safety harness because you may be on a
scaffold while performing a task.
Participant 6, an electrician foreperson, described his type of work and PPE
needed; he stated, “Working electrical panels because we’re electricians, you know, if
there is an arc potential, you have to wear your arc suit.” Participant 8, a field inspector
foreperson, communicated his observations that required extra protection for a task. The
additional hazards that occurred, and the extra protection needed to complete a task, are
discussed in the following statement:
To perform a task, whether it was welding or something, we upgrade that PPE.
We’ll put in the double hearing protection if we’re grinding, add the face shield,
and respirator underneath. A proper eye shield, darkening lens to avoid any ark
flash and a welding vest with thicker gloves.
Refinery entry. Fourteen participants mentioned wearing PPE when entering a
refinery. Participant 1, an electrician, described in the following statement that there are
set protocols before anyone can enter a refinery:
There are set protocols of PPE that you have to wear before you come onto the
property. At the refinery at all times, you have to wear fire resistant clothing
(FRC), has to be a long sleeve shirt. You always have to have cut resistant gloves
on your person. You always have to have a hard hat on. You always have to
have safety glasses on, and you always have to have steel toe boots, and hearing
protection in your ears.
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Ten participants agreed with the basic PPE required to enter a refinery.
Participant 3, a mechanic, best described what all 10 participants similarly stated; he said,
“PPE to get into a refinery is safety glasses, hard hat, steel toe boots, fire clothing, safety
glasses, you’ve got your gloves on you, you’ve got your monitor.” During the
interviews, eight participants voluntarily described that some refineries required more
PPE than others. Participant 8, a field inspector foreperson, described that the basic PPE
is the same; however, some refineries require more PPE as he stated in the following
statement:
In some cases, yes. What the normal would be is hard hat, safety glasses, hearing
protection, the fire-resistant clothing (FRC), and steel toe boots. But I have gone
to a facility, and I don’t know if it’s changed since then, but I think it was
Refinery B where I’ve seen people in a regular T-shirt outside and it was odd, but
it was very minimal. Yeah, so it can vary from facility to facility.
Participant 9, a project manager foreperson, described his experiences with PPE
and the different requirements from a refinery; he affirmed this in the following
statement:
The basic PPE is the same. The only real difference I’ve seen is that Refinery A
mandates a certain glove. It’s cut resistant, pinch resistant, it’s a very thick
leather glove a rubber grommet on the outside. It’s very bulky. But besides that,
most refineries have the same requirements.
Participant 14, an environmental technician tank cleaning and hydro-blasting
contractor, stated, “Some of them require you to have gloves and then some of them
don’t require you to have gloves so there’s certain places that require you to carry gloves
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on you at all times or goggles on you.” Participant 1, an electrician, described different
properties at a refinery, such as their terminal tank farm requirements, in this following
statement:
Refinery B, they’re not really a refinery, but they have tank farms, and they move
gas. But, when you go around their terminals, for example, their truck racks and
their tank farms, you could go in a short sleeve T-shirt. That was something that
was really odd to me because I worked there before, but it felt so odd and I didn’t
feel right wearing a short sleeve T-shirt, so we still wore the long sleeve fire
resistant clothing (FRC).
In contrast, Participant 12, a heavy equipment operator, compared the differences
between large refineries over smaller refineries when he stated, “Actually, in the big
refineries, they require more goggles to carry on your hard hat, and face shields, and all
that. The other smaller facilities, you just wear safety glasses and hard hats.”
Theme 6: PPE enforcement. Of the 16 participants interviewed, all made
references to PPE enforcement for a total of 26 responses. Participants referred to PPE
enforcement as standards imposed to make entry into the refinery. From this theme,
responses were organized into two categories: organizational standards and social
standards.
The analysis of responses for Theme 6: PPE Enforcement are presented in Table
17 with their respective themes, codes, frequencies, and artifacts. This common theme
was based on the data results from Subresearch Question 3.
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Table 17
Analysis of Responses for Task Risk Influence
Interview
sources

Frequency

Artifact
sources

Total for all task risk influence codes

16

26

5

PPE enforcement inside the refinery

16

16

3

Refinery personnel, safety professional,
and forepersons enforce PPE use

16

8

2

PPE enforcement through social norms
of company and extended peers

16

4

3

Theme
PPE
enforcement

Code

Organizational standards. One of the groupings that emerged from PPE
enforcement was organizational standards. Participants referred to organizational
standards as the site-specific PPE needed for entry into a refinery. Participants told
various stories from their experiences with PPE enforced for entry and the PPE policies
they must follow while at a refinery. Participant 2, a carpenter, stated, “It’s extremely
strict. It’s especially important to have your PPE on, just in case something happens.”
Refinery entry standards. Participant 5, an industrial painter and sandblasting
contractor, described a refinery as having posted signs put in place reminding those
entering the refinery about wearing PPE. He affirmed this through the following
statement:
Before we enter, there are signs, and it reminds us to make sure we have the type
of PPE that’s required for entry. If we don’t have something, you know, they’ll
probably tell us all to come back when we have the proper PPE. If we’re not
wearing a hard hat, steel toe boots, fireproof clothing, or safety glasses then we’re
not allowed to go in.
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Participant 7, who was a corrosion technician, described his PPE experiences with
refinery entry as personal safety and also as a requirement from his company due to
COVID-19. He stated this in the following:
You have to use it because it’s for our own safety. They enforce it because you
have to use it. Like right now, even with in [a] pandemic, if you go to the refinery
or any facility right now you have to wear a mask. For our company, you have to
have a mask or otherwise they don’t let you work. It’s for our own safety, you
know, not to get infected or infect somebody else if you are infected. You don’t
know even know.
Participant 8, a field inspector foreperson, explained a step-by-step procedure
used to check PPE prior to entry. He addressed this in the following statement:
So how it’s enforced. Before anybody comes into a work site or PPE line, they
stay outside in the parking lot. Then we do our job safety analysis (JSA) and our
tailgating. We mention again before we cross the PPE lines to have all our correct
basic PPE just to get into the back area or the containment area, and then when we
get to our work areas, we add the additional PPE.
During interviews, two participants voluntarily mentioned that there were
differences between refineries’ PPE enforcement prior to entry. Participant 11, an
environmental technician, stated, “Some they require hearing protection as a basic part of
PPE.” Whereas Participant 16, a nuclear technician, said, “Some facilities require other
types of PPE or other parts of PPE that not all facilities do.”
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Safety professionals. Another type of PPE enforcement experienced by refinery
contractors was with onsite safety professionals. Participant 15, an electrician, explained
in a unique way how PPE is enforced by a safety professional:
Oh, yeah, if you’re not wearing the proper PPE, there are safety guys walking
around that will definitely tell you to put it on or go out. I’ve seen guys that have
facial hair they’ll get kicked out because you have to be clean shaved. So, there is
definitely people walking around enforcing safety, and they’re not afraid to let
you know that you have to put it on.
Participant 10, a confined space rescue contractor, stated, “Pretty much the safety
representative that usually comes around who audits our safety gear.” Similarly,
Participant 3, a mechanic, said, “It’s enforced by the safety coordinator.”
Project inspector in charge. Participants 9, 10, and 16 shared their experiences
with PPE enforcement from a project inspector in charge (PIC). Participant 9, a project
manager, stated, “Oh, it’s mandated. Just as if, you know, a supervisor sees an employee
not with the proper PPE, we correct it on sight.” Participant 10, a confined space rescue
contractor, described PPE enforcement in a unique way as being questioned by a PIC
about their task and personal inspections for customers. He discussed this in the
following statement:
The PIC will ask us questions as far as what we’re staging. I’ve been to some
refineries where you don’t really want to hear it, but they like to see it for
themselves so we will do a second inspection in front of them just to make the
customer feel better and it’s never a bad thing to double check your equipment.
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Participant 6, an electrician foreperson, described PPE enforcement as verbal
warnings, written infractions, or removal from the refinery; he asserted this in the
following:
Perhaps you have your mask on, but it’s not, say, over your nose. They’ll give
you a simple warning, but after that, they’ll write you up basically. [In] which
case you have a verbal and a written notice to comply and at that point in time, if
you don’t, then they will remove you from the job not to come back again ever.
Social standards. The subject of PPE enforcement also included social standards.
Social standards to refinery contractors refers to an organization’s culture, the way things
are done within the group of refinery contractors. Participant 1, an electrician, described
this:
It’s enforced by everyone. So not only the safety guy can call you out. Like, you
could be the CEO of the company. If you come on any job site, and you don’t
have a hard hat on, I’m going to stop you from even walking around. I’m going
to say, you have to wear a hard hat. You know, there is no exceptions, and it
doesn’t matter who you are. If you’re in the refinery, you have to wear it.
Similarly, Participant 16, a nuclear technician, affirmed that the responsibility of
PPE enforcement is on everybody; he said,
Yes, so there are unit operators walking throughout the units. In which point if
they notice somebody is not wearing their required PPE, it’s kind of up to the
operator or even us as peers or contractors to alert that person or remind them.
Participant 11, an environmental technician, referred to PPE enforcement as a
joint effort between supervision and contractors through safety teams; he stated, “I would
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say by the safety teams at either the refineries or tank farms. That’s how it’s enforced or
even by coworkers or other contractor that’s you’re working around will usually help you
out.” Participant 3, a mechanic, described in detail a refinery contractor’s culture on PPE
enforcement in a refinery as follows:
You never want to see somebody get hurt. If you see somebody not wearing their
PPE and you don’t say anything and later on, he ends up getting hurt, losing a
finger, or getting a cut. You always want to leave work the way you came in with
all your digits and healthy. It’s basically on all of us to make sure there we’re
wearing our PPE.
Central Question
What are the lived experiences of refinery workers in an industrial environment
that impact their use of PPE?
Safety climate, according to Zohar (1980, 2010), identifies that workers are
influenced by the attitudes, values, thoughts, and working actions of peers and
supervisors that impact an individual’s perceived risk-taking in an industrial
environment. The 16 participants in this study described their company’s policies,
procedures, and training, which enabled them to assess task risk. In addition, they
provided insight on their supervisor and coworkers’ (peer) influences affecting their use
of PPE in refinery settings.
The participants in this study reported that supervisors have little influence with
regard to training and supervising the use of PPE in the refinery setting. Training is more
often conducted online by safety personnel or on the job by forepersons as described by
Participant 8, a field inspector:

139

So, [as] a part of our requirement working on these terminals we’re required to
have every contractor take in-house training. We will go through the proper
training depending on the task that they’re doing and then they will go through all
the proper training on PPE that’s required.
It was reported by a number of participants (eight of the 16) that forepersons are
more likely than their supervisors to direct work and see to it that PPE is being used by
workers on a daily basis. Although supervisors are not directly supervising or training on
the use of PPE, they are a presence in the field advising workers on the use of PPE or
making sure that it is available for use.
Peer workers or company coworkers have a strong influence on participants’ use
of PPE. They point out that PPE needs to be used or stop work authority invoked when it
is not being used or used incorrectly, as Participant 8 reported:
We walked up to a job where they were abrasive blasting. We had a rule in place
if one guy in the tank is under supplied air, that everybody should have the same
PPE. So, there were a couple of guys holding the hose and sweeping up and
didn’t have the supplied air. We stopped the job, we called them out, and
corrected their PPE.
Task risk influence was addressed by participants noting that for their specialized
work their companies have policies, procedures, and safety rules governing the use of
PPE for hazardous work involving high voltage electricity, radiation, entry into confined
spaces, or working at elected heights on scaffolding. However, once participants enter a
refinery they are immediately required to adhere to and use site-specific PPE and JHA
documents found in Table 11 Artifact 2 (see Appendix M) in addition to attending a 20-
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hour course required in the state of California found in Table 11 Artifact 5 (see Appendix
P).
In summary, the lived experience of the participants’ use of PPE in refinery
settings is primarily influenced by task risk processes of the refineries in which they
work. These processes, according to participants, are also enforced by refinery operators
and safety personnel as Participant 16 described:
So, there are unit refinery operators walking throughout the units. In which point
if they notice somebody is not wearing their required PPE, it’s kind of up to the
operator or even us as peers or contractors to alert that person or remind them.
Participants also reported that their peer groups extend to peers working for other
contractors or in other trades they work closely with and may be influenced positively or
negatively when it comes to PPE use as described by Participant 14:
When we’re out in the field we’re all looking out for each other. Our number one
goal is to make sure that not only the crew is wearing the proper PPE for a task,
but we’re even observing other individuals around us to check if they’re using the
proper PPE for whatever task they’re doing.
The participants of this study made it clear that they and their supervisors, peers,
or extended peers are all under the task risk influence of the refineries they work in. In
sharing their lived experiences on the use of PPE in refinery settings, the participants
supported commonly held perceptions of safety climate as it relates to the company unit
level of analysis while offering added insight into its application among multiple
organizations.
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Summary
Chapter IV started with the presentation of the purpose statement, research
questions, and the methodology used for the study. The demographic data collected
during the interviews were also provided in this chapter. The six themes identified by all
16 participants throughout all research questions were represented with descriptive
details. Six themes were found in this study (a) supervisor influence, (b) supervisors’
worksite visibility, (c) peer Influence, (d) peer stop work authority, (e) refinery task risk
influence on PPE selection, and (f) PPE enforcement.
The individual experiences of refinery contractors were many, but all participants
stated having some positive or negative experiences when working at a refinery.
Subresearch Question 1 focused on a supervisor’s influences on a worker’s use of PPE.
The supervisor influences that met the criteria related to Subresearch Question 1 were
(a) observing leadership qualities, (b) supervisor behaviors, and (c) supervision
supporting the use of PPE. All 16 participants responded and expressed having different
levels of supervision from each qualifying criterion. More so, they conveyed that
spending more time with a person of authority, such as a foreperson, was the most
common responses in all areas. A surprise finding was that participants did not receive
organizational safety education (training) from their supervisors.
Subresearch Question 2 focused on peers’ influences on a worker’s use of PPE.
All peer influences that met the criteria related to Subresearch Question 2 were peer
support and peer stop work authority. Many participants responded having similar
experiences with peers supporting the use of PPE while all felt obligated to stop work on
unsafe behaviors with PPE use or recognizing unsafe conditions related to a task. A
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surprise finding was that 15 of the 16 participants did not experience any type of
discouragement from peer coworkers to not use PPE for any task. Another surprise
finding was that the use of mandated face masks was supported throughout workgroups
due to COVID-19.
Subresearch Question 3 focused on task risk influences on workers’ use of PPE.
All task risk influences that met the criteria related to Subresearch Question 3 were
procedures for PPE use, identifying hazards for a task, and PPE enforcement. All 16
participants responded similarly to identifying hazards with some sort of supervision.
Likewise, all 16 participants answered being responsible for PPE enforcement. This was
unanimous among 14 contractors (employees) and 4 contractor forepersons. A surprise
finding for procedures for PPE use was that 14 of the 16 participants agreed with
following refinery policies for PPE use; however, two participants were lone workers
who worked mainly on the outside of the refineries. An additional finding was that all
participants enforce mandated mask coverings as part of enforcement; they are incredibly
supportive in the health and safety of one another.
Chapter V completes this study with a summary of the study purpose, research
questions, methods, population, and sample, followed by the major findings, unexpected
findings, and conclusions, implications for action, and recommendations for further
research. This chapter ends with closing remarks and reflections.
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CHAPTER V: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
This study describes the experiences of refinery contractor workers and their use
of personal protective equipment (PPE), as well as focuses on (a) supervisor influences,
(b) peer influences, and (c) task risk influences, which impact their decision-making on
using PPE. This chapter consists of the purpose, research questions, methods,
population, sample, and major findings and concludes with remarks and reflections about
the study.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to explore the impact of peer
and supervisor influences of task risks associated with refinery workers’ use of PPE
while working in an industrial environment.
Research Questions
The study was guided by one central research question and three subquestions
designed to explore peer influences, supervisor influences, and influences of task risks
impacting a refinery worker’s use of PPE.
Central Research Question
What are the lived experiences of refinery workers in an industrial environment
that impact their use of PPE?
Subresearch Questions
1. What influence do supervisors have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while working
in an industrial environment?
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2. What influence do peers have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while working in an
industrial environment?
3. How does task risk influence a refinery worker’s use of PPE in an industrial setting?
Methodology
This qualitative study utilized phenomenological inquiry to gather an
understanding of lived experiences of refinery workers (contractors) working in an
industrial environment that impacted their use of PPE. The data collection for this
research was accomplished through in-depth interviews. In order to maintain consistency
with all participant volunteers, an interview protocol was designed with modified
questions based on Dov Zohar’s (1980) safety climate model and Fishbein and Ajzen’s
(2010) theory of planned behavior (TPB). The interview protocol included
semistructured, open-ended questions to allow participant volunteers to provide thorough
accounts of their lived experiences.
The study’s interview protocol, research questions, and research design were
approved by the Brandman University Institutional Review Board (BUIRB) on July 17,
2020 (see Appendix G). The informed consent was shared prior to the interviews to
protect the identity of participant volunteers. Additionally, participant volunteers,
through their informed consent, allowed the researcher to audio record the interview for
analysis purposes. All participant volunteers’ personal information was removed from
transcriptions. Participants were asked at the conclusion of each interview if they wanted
to review their transcriptions when complete, and all waived review.
This qualitative study used an inductive analysis process to synthesize the data
into meaningful codes, categories, and themes (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010).
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Initially reviewing each transcription in search of themes and patterns produced codes
that were used to assign significant segments or statements (McMillan & Schumacher,
2010). Data were reviewed several times by the researcher to ensure for accuracy of all
segments, codes, categories, themes, subthemes, and trends (Patton, 2015). For this
study, 320 segments were identified from the data, and from these, 287 codes were
organized into 22 categories. Once the analysis process was completed, the researcher
verified that there was alignment between the categories and the theoretical framework.
From this process, six themes emerged from the data collected.
Population and Sample
The population of this qualitative study consisted of male petroleum industry
refining contractors located in the United States. The population for the U.S. petroleum
industry in 2018 was 149,142 workers (National Association of State Energy Officials,
2019). Nationally, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2019d),
there are 135 operable oil refineries in the United States. To reduce this population into a
manageable group, the target population became petroleum refining contractors who are
part of the 13 refineries in densely populated areas of Los Angeles County, California
(CalEPA, 2017). Volunteer participants were allowed to participate in this study if they
were (a) employed by an employer licensed as a California Contractors State License
Board Class “A” General Engineering Contractor, (b) had 1 year or more experience
working in a petroleum refinery, and (c) had 1 year of experience in their trade
(Contractors State License Board, 2015; Occupational Safety Councils of America, n.d.).
The sample population included all male volunteers from a variety of trades who,
at the time of this study, were actively working as a petroleum contractor at a refinery.
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This grouping provided the responses to the central research question and subresearch
questions as to “What are the lived experiences of refinery workers in an industrial
environment that impact their use of PPE.” As a method to reach this population, the
researcher used purposeful sampling by specifically selecting petroleum refining
contractors (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The researcher initiated this method by
reaching out to safety professionals in Southern California. An invitational notification
letter was developed and mailed to eight petroleum safety professionals whose company
personnel worked in the 13 Los Angeles County refineries requesting assistance to find
two research participants from each company as volunteers (see Appendix B).
Major Findings
The purpose of this research study was to explore and describe the lived
experiences of refinery contractors in an industrial environment that impacted their use of
PPE. The major findings were the result of the relationships between the research themes
and the literature presented in Chapter II. The following major findings are introduced
and arranged based on the overall research questions; each research question is also
addressed individually as organized in Chapter IV. All of the findings in this study
correspond with the research questions.
Subresearch Question 1
What influence do supervisors have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while
working in an industrial environment?
Finding 1: Supervisors have a positive influence on refinery contractor
workers use of PPE. Sixteen refinery contractor participants stated that they
experienced helpful guidance on PPE use from a supervisor. Refinery contractor
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participants mentioned that supportive supervision tends to take safety matters personally
when their workers’ safety is in question. In the following example, Participant 14
described a time when a supervisor made sure workers were not being exposed to
anything greater than suggested by facility safety personnel:
Our supervisor gets involved with our onsite safety department to determine
which type of PPE will be used for a job. They’ll come together and figure out
what is the best and highest protective PPE for us to wear. Our supervisor not
only will rely on the words [of] the onsite safety department, but he will also take
a sample of whatever is in the tank and a test it to determine if we are going to be
exposed to anything greater than what they are saying it is.
Supporting safety theories. Safety climate research states that when supervisors
demonstrate an interest in their workers’ safety, it serves to improve their employees’
adherence to safety requirements (Garavan & O’Brien, 2001). There is a similar finding
within TPB. According to TPB, a positive supervisor-worker relationship influences safe
worker behaviors and encourages the use of safety systems among individuals and work
groups (Su et al., 2019).
Finding 2: Supervisors do not play a significant role in providing PPE
training to refinery contractor workers. Sixteen refinery contractor participants cited
being trained in PPE use in diverse ways other than being trained by their supervisor. For
example, eight of the 16 participants said they were trained in PPE use in classrooms and
safety training videos. The other eight of the 16 refinery contractor participants described
being trained by their safety department. Participant 16 illustrates PPE training the
classroom and watching videos:
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We’re required to watch site-specific videos that basically go over the
requirements of PPE and why they’re necessary. So, each site has a specific
training video, normally 30 to 60 minutes long where it goes over specific hazards
of the job and why each piece of PPE is required for said job.
Participant 11 described being trained by his site safety department, “We do
annual training with our safety guy to let us know what’s the best type of PPE to use in a
situation that you are dealing with out in the field.”
Supporting safety theories. Safety climate research described that when
supervisors did not provide direct safety training to their personnel, it resulted in a variety
of methods being used by staff members (Coyle et al., 1995). In related research
conducted by Mearns et al. (2003), training provided by safety professionals resulted in
improved safety performance.
Subresearch Question 2
What influence do peers have on a refinery worker’s use of PPE while working in
an industrial environment?
Finding 3: Peer support has a positive influence on refinery contractor
workers’ use of PPE in refinery settings. Twelve of the 16 participants reported that
their peers or coworkers had a positive influence on their use of PPE in refinery settings.
Positive support and influence were strengthened by all participants sharing the same
hazardous working environment and issues when working with PPE. Participant 16
affirmed this:
I’m working on a piece of electronic equipment, and my glasses start to fog up
because I am now required to wear a mask since COVID. What will happen is I
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will have to remove my safety glasses for a split moment to complete my task.
As a result, there’s been times where my colleague has had to remind me and
said, “Hey, don’t forget your glasses. Put them back over your eyes.”
Supporting safety theories. Safety climate research states that workers’ attitudes
and performance, specifically toward safety protocols are influenced by a coworker’s
positive or negative work behaviors (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016; Zohar, 1980; Zohar &
Luria, 2004). There is a similar understanding within TPB. According to TPB, decisionmaking by an individual is influenced by learned behaviors and the behavioral
expectations of others (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000; Ajzen & Sheikh, 2013). Ajzen (1991)
asserted that in combination with social norms, learned behaviors and behavioral
expectations of others motivate workers and their peers in workplace decision-making
processes.
Finding 4: Refinery contract workers make use of peer stop work authority
for improper or no use of PPE. Nine of the 16 refinery contractor participants stopped
work for unsafe working behaviors related to not wearing PPE or using improper PPE for
a task. Participant 15 indicated that coworkers will use peer stop work authority for
improper use of PPE; he said, “They’ll stop work if you’re not wearing the right gloves.
They’ll stop you from working in that sense and make sure you put on the right gloves.”
Similarly, refinery contractor workers will stop work when others are not wearing PPE.
According to Participant 2, “One time at the yard, grabbing material from one rack to
another, I didn’t have my gloves. My coworker stopped me and told me that I needed to
have my gloves, in case of a pinch point.”
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Supporting safety theories. Safety climate research described that people behave
or act according to their work culture. How people think at work is greatly influenced by
their social support and information offered by their peers (Sollitto & Myers, 2015).
Similarly, the TPB emphasizes that social pressures to engage or not to engage in work
weighs heavily on a person’s motivation to comply with a working group’s norm (Ajzen,
1991).
Subresearch Question 3
How does task risk influence a refinery worker’s use of PPE in an industrial
environment?
Finding 5: Refinery contractor workers’ use of safety field documents that
address task risk positively influence their use of PPE. Participants were positively
influenced by safety field documents. Refinery contractor workers’ use of safety field
documents that address task risk positively influence their use of PPE. Documents
included the Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) form Artifact 2 (see Appendix M) and Site
Safety Plan Documents Artifact 3 (see Appendix N), which are included in the list of
artifacts (Table 11) found in Chapter IV. Participant 13 stated, “The most important
document is a job hazard analysis. It breaks down the job into steps, to identify all the
hazards, to minimize all the hazards before the job is performed so we can work safely
using protective measures.” Participant 12 added, “To identify hazards like a chemical
spill you go by checking the safety data sheet (SDS) for safety and PPE use.”
Supporting safety theories. Organizational policies and working procedures that
positively influence workers’ safety behavior and the organizational safety climate are
consistent with Zohar’s (2003) study. According to Zohar (2003, 2008), the more
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consistently safety policies are communicated, the greater their perceived commitment to
worker safety, which links safety climate to culture as values employees share in relation
to risks.
Finding 6: Refinery contractor workers need to adhere to refinery task risk
policies and procedures to positively influence their use of PPE. This finding was
supported by 15 of the 16 refinery contractor participants who had an understanding of
basic PPE needed for entry into a refinery and were mindful of when it was necessary to
upgrade PPE for a task. Refinery contractor participants mentioned staying in
compliance with refinery PPE policies and procedures when moving from one task to
another inside a refinery. Participant 15 briefly illustrated how he adheres to refinery
PPE procedures, policies, and identifying hazards before a task:
So, for every task that we’re going to do, there is a list of different things that we
have to go down and make sure that they’re all in compliance before we continue
that task. Also, if it changes throughout the day or if we go to another task, then
we have to make note of it and adjust our PPE.
Supporting safety theories. Safety climate research has demonstrated that
workers perceive risk related to the tasks they perform and follow an organization’s
safety policies, procedures, and practices consistent with their personal values (Zohar,
2003, 2008, 2010). Similarly, TPB asserts that individuals will perform a behavior when
motivated by a group. When the person thinks a certain behavior is accepted by a group,
they will then perform such behavior (Ajzen, 1991).
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Unexpected Findings
As addressed in the major findings above and methodically in the body of
literature, the researcher found one unexpected result in this study. These findings were
the result of the unexpected variables that in one way or another influenced the study
(Roberts, 2010).
Unexpected Finding 1: Refinery contractor workers have several kinds of
supervision that enforce PPE use in a refinery. An unexpected finding was that all
refinery contractor participants experienced various forms of supervision that enforced
PPE use in refineries. For example, Participant 1 asserted, “So like as far as supervisors.
We have so much different levels of supervisors. I have a direct supervisor, but then
operators would be considered our supervisors as well. All enforce PPE use.” In
addition, 14 of the 16 refinery contractor participants mentioned being supervised by a
foreperson or project inspector in charge (PIC) who enforced PPE use. Participant 1 said,
“We typically have a PIC working with us. Before work we will identify hazards, have a
tailgate safety meeting, and talk about the PPE we are going to be using that day for the
job.” Another type of supervision that enforced PPE use in a refinery was safety
professionals. Participant 6 said, “The safety department enforces PPE use. They will
come out and verbally correct you if your PPE is not in compliance, give you a written
notice if you continue to not comply with PPE policies, or they will remove you from the
job.”
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Conclusions
The following conclusions were derived from the findings of this study.
Conclusion 1
Based on the findings of this study, as supported by the literature, it is concluded
high levels of supervisor influence will result in lower levels of task risk for refinery
contractor workers. According to participant interviews and consistent with safety
climate researchers Su et al. (2019), supervisors who encourage their workers to follow
safety requirements have fewer safety violations among their personnel.
Conclusion 2
Based on the findings of this study, as supported by the literature, it is concluded
that task risk is not increased for workers who are not directly trained by their supervisors
due to the effectiveness of contractor and refinery training programs. According to
participant interviews and consistent with Mearns et al. (2003), training developed and
conducted by others such as safety professionals resulted in improved safety
performance.
Conclusion 3
Based on the findings of this study, as supported by the literature, it is concluded
that contractor workers’ higher level of behavior expectation for their peers will increase
compliance with refinery PPE requirements. According to participants and consistent
with TPB (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000; Ajzen & Sheikh, 2013), safety related decisionmaking by an individual influences the behavioral expectations of others.
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Conclusion 4
Based on the findings of this study as supported by the literature, it is concluded
that refinery contractor workers who are positively influenced by supervisors and peers
will exercise PPE stop work authority more frequently compared to other less influenced
groups. According to participants and consistent with safety climate researchers (Griffin
& Curcuruto, 2016; Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2003), when groups have similar
concepts on how to work safer, it positively influences workers’ attitudes and safety
performance toward the use of safety protocols at work.
Conclusion 5
Based on the findings of this study, as supported by the literature, it is concluded
that the daily use of the refinery Job Hazard Analysis form will improve worker
commitment to use PPE. According to participants and consistent with Zohar (2003), the
more policies and procedures are communicated to workers, the greater their commitment
to safe practices and understanding of task risk.
Conclusion 6
Based on the findings of this study, as supported by the literature, it is concluded
that refinery zero tolerance PPE safety rules will improve use by workers. According to
participants and consistent with safety climate research by Keren et al. (2009), workers
demonstrate higher competency skills and safety performance when they follow an
organization’s policies and procedures.
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Implications for Action
The following section addresses the implications of this study about refinery
contractors. Based on the following literature and the findings, and conclusions of the
study, the following are recommended.
Implication 1
Based on the qualitative data reported in this study, refineries write into contracts
with contractors that they develop schedules for their supervisors to be present at
worksites. The use of virtual tools presently used in some refineries should be adopted
by OSHA and the refining industry. This will enable supervisors to be involved in
remote task risk assessments when they cannot be at worksites.
Implication 2
Based on the qualitative data reported in this study, refineries and contractor
companies develop training programs for supervisors to function in the role of a safety
coach: motivating, providing feedback, and enforcement of the use of PPE and other
safety requirements. This training can be given as a supervisor’s version of the state of
California 20-hour safety training course offered by the existing network of regional
refinery-contractor councils.
Implication 3
Based on the qualitative data reported in this study, OSHA, refineries, contractors,
and unions develop incentive, reward, and recognition programs where workers can
nominate and recognize their peers for providing positive influence for their use of PPE
or other aspects of refinery safety. The approach can recognize individuals much in the
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same way that the OSHA Voluntary Protection Program recognizes companies by having
a positive recognition section for workers on the OSHA website.
Implication 4
Based on the qualitative data reported in this study, OSHA and the American
Petroleum Institute conduct local, regional, or national benchmarking studies to gather
information on the frequency and type of situations where workers have invoked stop
work authority. Results from these studies can be made available to the public for use as
training or tailgate safety discussion tools to demonstrate to workers the benefits and
ways to perform a stop work involving coworkers.
Implication 5
Based on the qualitative data reported in this research study, contractor companies
enhance already existing task risk assessment tools to be sensitive to measuring the
impact of contractor workers not only working with coworkers but with extended peers to
include other companies and trades. It is recommended that the task risk assessment
tools focus on PPE use by workers, contractor commitment to safety practices, and their
understanding of refinery risks.
Implication 6
Based on the qualitative data reported in this study, OSHA collects data on best
practices such as orientation requirements, standard use of basic PPE, and use of task risk
assessment tools when they conduct refinery inspections. These best practices could then
be applied by OSHA to other industries in the form of regulations, Voluntary Protection
Program requirements, or other outreach communication such as websites, training
programs, or special topic reports issued by the agency.
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Recommendations for Further Research
There is limited to no study about the refinery contractor worker’s use of PPE
phenomenon, and this situation requires further research. The following are suggested
recommendations for future research.
Recommendation 1
It is recommended that this qualitative study be replicated with the refinery
noncontractor workforce to understand supervisor, peer, and task risk influences on their
use of PPE. The study can be expanded to consider how refinery personnel perceive their
influence on contractor workers’ use of PPE.
Recommendation 2
It is recommended that a mixed methods study be conducted on the degree to
which workers’ use of PPE is influenced by senior refinery managers leading by example
when inspecting worksites. The study can be expanded to consider other methods leaders
use to gain worker acceptance of PPE such as positive feedback or disciplinary action.
Recommendation 3
It is recommended that a qualitative study be conducted on safety professionals’
use of influence strategies such as inspirational appeals, assertiveness, and others to
address situations where workers resist or fail to use PPE.
Recommendation 4
It is recommended that a qualitative study be conducted on female refinery
contractor workers’ PPE use and perceptions of supervisor and peer influence as this
study was limited to male workers working in refinery environments.
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Recommendation 5
It is recommended that a replication study be conducted among extended peers
from other trades and crafts to understand their influence on PPE use by refinery
contractor workers. Further, it is recommended that the study be conducted during a
refinery maintenance turnaround as it is an extended period in which contractors work
together in large numbers.
Recommendation 6
It is recommended that a mixed methods study be conducted on refinery zero
tolerance policies to determine if workers’ PPE use is based on fear or behaviors based
on positive safety culture and climate factors.
Recommendation 7
It is recommended that a mixed methods study be conducted among union and
nonunion refinery contractor workers to determine if there are significant differences
between the two groups regarding supervisor, peer, and task risk influences on PPE use.
It is recommended that a mixed methods study be conducted on refinery zero tolerance
policies to determine if workers’ PPE use is based on fear or behaviors based on positive
safety culture and climate factors.
Concluding Remarks and Reflections
A wise man said, “Don’t be afraid to start over again. This time, you’re not
starting from scratch, you’re starting from experience.”
—Unknown
The goal of this study was to identify and describe refinery contractor workers’
lived experiences in an industrial environment that impact their use of PPE. The
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researcher hoped to identify the impact a refinery’s safety climate has on supervisor
influences, peer influences, and the influence of task risks on PPE use for refinery
contractor workers. The information gained in this study revealed that refinery contractor
workers are not the same as other high-risk contractors working in various industries.
The results of this study showed that the 16 refinery contractor participants interviewed
demonstrated safe working behaviors by adhering to policies, procedures, and safety
protocols with PPE use. Also, refinery contractor participants experienced a positive
safety climate in the refineries in which they worked.
To explain, this subculture of refinery contractor participants is different from that
of their counterparts in construction (Conchie et al., 2013; Su et al., 2019; Xia et al.,
2017) and offshore oil extraction (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Dahl, 2013; Mearns et al., 2003;
Rundmo, 1996). In addition, refinery contractor participants in this study experienced
positive working relationships with their working peers and supervisors. In safety
climate studies, contractors in other high-risk industries as mentioned above were labeled
as a group of employees that are most normally involved in and exposed to accidents
within an industry (Hofmann et al., 1995), are a group considered by supervisors to have
less control over their working attitudes (Conchie et al., 2013), and have a challenging
time developing working relationships (Higgins & Kram, 2001).
Lastly, this study found that refinery contractor workers are positively influenced
by their peers and supervisors on PPE use. In addition, when considered as a work
group, refinery contractor workers’ encouraging a relationship with their peers and
supervisors was seen to influence positive safety climate at a refinery.
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In closing this chapter and my doctoral journey, I have found this study to be
inspirational and fulfilling. I will forever appreciate the dialogue and stories these 16
refinery contractor participants shared with me on their lived experiences in an industrial
environment that impacted their use of PPE. Their experiences have given me a better
understanding of PPE use. To comprehend the importance of PPE use in industrial
settings is to understand more than the dangers of the job. Safety in the working
environment is just one reason PPE should be used. Conducting this study has changed
the way I think about PPE use. I understand now that PPE is used universally and in so
many more ways that it was originally intended. PPE use is a blanket that provides
comfort, and it is a way to express how you feel about those around you. Supporting the
use of PPE shows how much respect you have for those you work with, their families,
and yourself.
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APPENDIX B
Letter of Invitation for Safety Professionals
Study: Safety Climate and the use of Personal Protective Equipment by Petroleum
Refinery Workers.
Date: ______, 2020
Dear Safety Professional:
Your company is invited in a qualitative methods research study about the lived
experiences of refinery workers in an industrial environment that impact their use of
personal protective equipment. The main investigator of this study is Mark A. Zapp Sr,
Doctoral Candidate in Brandman University’s Doctor of Education in Organizational
Leadership program.
I like to request the participation of two employees to participate in this study, because
your workers identify as professional petroleum refinery contractors employed in Los
Angeles County, CA. I will appreciate the safety professional to provide examples of
documents such as PPE training outline, PPE matrix, and job hazard analysis for task
performed by your employees.
In Southern California 13 petroleum refineries exist from the Los Angeles County area
totaling 16 petroleum refinery workers (contractors) will participate in this study.
Participation should require about thirty minutes of your employee’s time and is entirely
voluntary. Your employees may withdraw from the study at any time without any
consequences.
PURPOSE: The study is being conducted for a dissertation for the Doctor of Education
in Organizational Leadership program at Brandman University. The purpose of this
qualitative phenomenological study is to identify and describe the variables of peer
influences, supervisor influences, and influences of task risks on a petroleum refinery
worker (contractor) lived experiences in an industrial setting that impact the use of
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personal protective equipment. The goal of this study is to reduce the gap in safety
climate studies in petroleum refining.
PROCEDURES: If you decide to participate in the study, the researcher will interview
you. During the interview you, will be asked a series of questions designed to allow me
to share your experiences as a petroleum refining worker.
RISKS, AND INCONVENIENCES: Their minimal risks to your participation in this
research study. It may be inconvenient for you to arrange time for the interview
questions.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS: There are no major benefits to you for participation, but
your feedback could find alternative strategies for working safely with personal
protective equipment. The information from this study is intended to inform researchers,
policymakers, and safety professionals.
ANONYMITY: Records of information that you provide for the research study and any
personal information you provide will not be connected in any way. It will not be
possible to identify you as the person who provided any specific information for the
study.
You are encouraged to ask questions, at any time, which will help you understand how
this study will be performed and/or how it will affect you. You may contact me at [xxxxxx-xxxx] or by email at zapp1301@brandman.mail.edu. You can also contact Dr.
Carlos Rodriguez by email at crodrig6@brandman.edu. If you have any further questions
or concerns about this study or your rights as a study participant, you may write or call
the Office of the Executive Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs, Brandman University,
16355 Laguna Canyon Road, Irvine, CA 92617, (949) 341-7641.
Respectfully,
Mark A. Zapp Sr.
Doctoral Candidate, Brandman University
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APPENDIX C
Letter of Invitation
Study: Safety Climate and the use of Personal Protective Equipment by Petroleum
Refinery Workers.
Date: ______, 2020
Dear Prospective Study Participant:
You are invited in a qualitative methods research study about the lived experiences of
refinery workers in an industrial environment that impact their use of personal protective
equipment. The main investigator of this study is Mark A. Zapp Sr, Doctoral Candidate
in Brandman University’s Doctor of Education in Organizational Leadership program.
You were chosen to participate in this study, because you are identified as a professional
petroleum refinery worker (contractor) that contracts out who are employed by a
contractor’s office and are working in Los Angeles County, CA.
In Southern California 13 petroleum refineries exist from the Los Angeles County area
totaling 16 petroleum refinery workers will participate in this study. Participation should
require about thirty minutes of your time and is entirely voluntary. You may withdraw
from the study at any time without any consequences.

PURPOSE: The study is being conducted for a dissertation for the Doctor of Education
in Organizational Leadership program at Brandman University. The purpose of this
qualitative phenomenological study is to identify and describe the variables of peer
influences, supervisor influences, and influences of task risks on a petroleum refinery
worker (contractor) lived experiences in an industrial setting that impact the use of
personal protective equipment. The goal of this study is to reduce the gap in safety
climate studies in petroleum refining.
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PROCEDURES: If you decide to participate in the study, the researcher will interview
you. During the interview you, will be asked a series of questions designed to allow me
to share your experiences as a petroleum refining worker.

RISKS, AND INCONVENIENCES: Their minimal risks to your participation in this
research study. It may be inconvenient for you to arrange time for the interview
questions.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS: There are no major benefits to you for participation, but
your feedback could find alternative strategies for working safely with personal
protective equipment. The information from this study is intended to inform researchers,
policymakers, and safety professionals.

ANONYMITY: Records of information that you provide for the research study and any
personal information you provide will not be connected in any way. It will not be
possible to identify you as the person who provided any specific information for the
study.
You are encouraged to ask questions, at any time, which will help you understand how
this study will be performed and/or how it will affect you. You may contact me at [760578-3858] or by email at zapp1301@brandmand.mail.edu. You can also contact Dr.
Carlos Rodriguez by email at crodrig6@brandman.edu. If you have any further questions
or concerns about this study or your rights as a study participant, you may write or call
the Office of the Executive Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs, Brandman University,
16355 Laguna Canyon Road, Irvine, CA 92617, (949) 341-7641.

Respectfully,
Mark A. Zapp Sr.
Doctoral Candidate, Brandman University
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APPENDIX D
Informed Consent Form
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
INFORMATION ABOUT: Safety Climate and the Use of Personal Protective
Equipment by Petroleum Refinery Workers.
RESPONSIBLE INVESTIGATOR: Mark A. Zapp Sr, Doctoral Candidate
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY: The study is being conducted for a dissertation for the
Doctor of Education in Organizational Leadership program at Brandman University. The
purpose of this qualitative phenomenological study is to identify and describe the
variables of peer influences, supervisor influences, and influences of task risks on a
petroleum refinery worker’s lived experiences in the petroleum industry that impact the
use of personal protective equipment. The goal of this study is to reduce the gap in safety
climate studies in petroleum refining.
In taking part in this research study, I agree to participate in an audio-recorded semistructured interview. The interview will be by phone and lasts about thirty minutes.
During the interview, I will be asked a series of questions designed to allow me to share
your experiences as a petroleum refining worker.

I understand that:
a) The possible risks or discomforts associated with this research are minimal. It
may be inconvenient to spend up to thirty minutes in the interview. However, the
interview session will be held over the phone to minimize this inconvenience.
b) I will not be compensated for my participation in this study. The possible benefit
of this study is to determine the lived experiences of a petroleum refinery workers
impact on the use of personal protective equipment in an industrial setting.
c) Any questions I have concerning my participation in this study will be answered
by Mark A. Zapp, Brandman University Doctoral Candidate. I understand that
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Mr. Zapp may be contacted by phone at [xxx-xxx-xxxx] or email at
zapp1301@mail.brandman.edu. The dissertation chairperson may also answer
questions: Dr. Carlos Rodriguez at crodrig6@brandman.edu.
d) I may refuse to participate or withdraw from this study at any time without any
negative consequences. Also, the investigator may stop the study at any time.
e) The study will be audio-recorded, and the recordings will not be used beyond the
scope of this project. Audio recordings will be used to transcribe the interviews.
Once the interviews are transcribed, the audio and interview transcripts will be
kept for a minimum of two years by the investigator in a secure location.
f) No information that identifies me will be released without my separate consent
and that all identifiable information will be protected to the limits allowed by law.
If the study design or the use of data is to be changed, I will be informed, and my
consent re-obtained. If I have any questions, comments, or concerns about the
study of the informed consent process, I may write or call the Office of the
Executive Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs, Brandman University, 16355
Laguna Canyon Road, Irvine, CA 92617, (949) 341-7641. I acknowledge that I
have received a copy of this form and the Research Participant’s Bill of Rights.

I have read the above and understand it and hereby voluntarily consent to the
procedure(s) set forth.

______________________________________

____________________

Signature of Participant or Responsible Party

Date

______________________________________

____________________

Signature of Witness (if appropriate)

Date

______________________________________

____________________

Signature of Principal Investigator

Date

Brandman University IRB 07/17/2020
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APPENDIX E
Interview Protocol
Interview Protocol
Research Questions:
What are the lived experiences of refinery workers in an industrial environment
that impact their use of personal protective equipment?
Research Questions
1. What influence do supervisors have on a refinery worker use of personal protective
equipment while working in an industrial environment?
2. What influence do peers influences have on a refinery worker use of personal
protective equipment while working in an industrial environment?
3. How does task risk influence refinery workers use of personal protective
equipment in an industrial setting?

Interview Script
Researcher: Mark Zapp
Participant #:_________
Date:_______________
Hello, I am __________________and I am currently a student at Brandman
University in the doctoral program of Organizational Leadership. I want to thank you
very much for taking a moment to participate in this research study. I appreciate your
help.
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Before we start, I am going to review the Informed Consent Form with you. This
form was provided to you before this meeting. Please take a moment to ask any
questions before you sign the form. If for any reason you need to take a break or stop
during the interview you may do so at any time. You also have the right to terminate this
interview at any time. Before we continue, do I have your permission to record this
interview as described in the Informed Consent? Thank you, let’s get started. I am going
to start with some demographic questions.
Demographic Questions
Probing questions are written in parenthesis.
1. What is your job classification (electrician, mechanic, instrumentation, or
operator?
(Probing question: Do you have membership in a union?)
2. How many years of experience do you have in your trade?
3. How many years of experience do you have with your present company?
4. What type of hazards are you exposed to that require the use of PPE?
(Probing question: What type of PPE do you use or wear?)
Interview Questions
Probing questions are written in parenthesis.
Supervisor Influence Questions
1. Describe what your supervisor does to audit your use of PPE when working?
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(Probing question: What type of feedback does your supervisor provide you
regarding your use of PPE?)
2. Describe a situation where your supervisor helped you select the proper PPE for a
task?
(Probing question: Can you describe if the supervisor used any references such as
procedures, manuals, or support from your safety department in selecting the
PPE?)
3. Explain the training on the use of PPE your supervisor has provided you?
(Probing question: What does the training consist of?)
4. Describe your supervisor’s use of PPE?
(Probing question: Does his/or her example motivate your use of PPE?)
Peer Influence Questions
5. Describe a time when a co-worker encouraged your use of PPE to perform a task?
(Probing question: What type of PPE were you using and were coworkers
wearing the same type PPE?)
6. Describe a time when a co-worker discouraged your use of PPE to perform task?
(Probing question: What type of PPE were you using and were coworkers
wearing the same type of PPE?)
7. Tell me a time when a co-worker called a Stop Work on a task when you were
using PPE?
(Probing question: What was the reason for the Stop Work?
What was your reaction to the Stop Work?)
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Influence of Perceived Risk Questions
8. Describe how procedures for PPE use for hazardous task like confined space entry
differs from the use of PPE just to enter the refinery?
(Probing question: Does the use of basic PPE differ from one refinery to another?)
9. Describe how the use of PPE is enforced at a refinery worksite?
(Probing question: Does enforcement of PPE use differ from one refinery to
another, explain?)
10. Describe how you identify hazards for the task and determine the safeguards to
perform it?
(Probing question: Does hazard identification differ from one refinery to another?)
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APPENDIX F
Audio Release Form
RESEARCH STUDY TITLE: Safety Climate and the Use of Personal Protective
Equipment by Petroleum Refinery Workers.
BRANDMAN UNIVERSITY
16355 LAGUNA CANYON ROAD
IRVINE, CA 92618
I authorize Mark A. Zapp Sr, Brandman Doctoral Candidate, to record my voice. I give
Brandman University and all persons or entities associated with this research study
permission or authority to use this recording for activities associated with this research.
I understand that the recording will be used for transcription purposes and the
information obtained during the interview may be published in a journal/dissertation or
presented at meetings/presentations.
I will be consulted about the use of the audio recordings for any purpose other than those
listed above. Additionally, I waive any right to royalties or other compensation arising
correlated to the use of information obtained from the recording.
By signing this form, I acknowledge that I have completely read and fully understand the
above release and agree to the outlined terms. I hereby release all claims against any
person or organization utilizing this material.

______________________________________
Signature of Participant or Responsible Party
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____________________
Date

APPENDIX G
Interview Questions Matrix
Research Questions

Present Study

Safety Climate

Safety Climate

Questions

Questions from

Questions from

Another Study

Another
Study’s
References

Supervisor Influences:
1. What influence

1. Describe what

Workers are told

Glendon &

do supervisors

your

when changes are

Litherland

have on a

supervisor

made to the

(2001)

refinery

does to audit

working

worker’s use of

your use of

environment on a

personal

PPE when

jobsite?

protective

working?

equipment

(Probing

while working

question: What

in an industrial

type of

environment?

feedback does
your
supervisor
provide you
regarding your
use of PPE?)
2. Describe a

Workers are

Glendon &

situation

encouraged to

Litherland

where your

support and look

(2001)

supervisor

out for each other?

helped you
select the
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proper PPE for
a task?
(Probing
question: Can
you describe if
the supervisor
used any
references
such as
procedures,
manuals, or
support from
your safety
department in
selecting the
PPE?)
3. Explain the

My direct

training on the

supervisor teaches

use of PPE

us to identify

your

safety problems

supervisor has

before they arise?

provided you?
(Probing
question: What
does the
training
consist of?)
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Fugas (2012)

4. Describe your

My direct

supervisor’s

supervisor teaches

use of PPE?

us to identify

(Probing

safety problems

question: Does

before they arise?

Fugas (2012)

his/ or her
example
motivate your
use of PPE?)

Peer Influences:
2. What influence

5. Describe a

Members of my

do peers have

time when a

teamwork say a

on a refinery

co-worker

“good word” to

worker’s use of

encouraged

coworkers who

personal

your use of

pay special

protective

PPE to

attention to safety?

equipment

perform a

while working

task?

in an industrial

(Probing

environment?

question: What
type of PPE
were you using
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Fugas (2012)

and were
coworkers
wearing the
same type
PPE?)
6. Describe a

Members of my

time when a

work team think

co-worker

that problems

discouraged

should be detected

your use of

before they arise?

Fugas (2012)

PPE to
perform task?
(Probing
question: What
type of PPE
were you using
and were
coworkers
wearing the
same type of
PPE?)
7. Tell me a time

Members of my

when a co-

work team think

worker called

that explain (and

a Stop Work

not only demand)

on a task when

why we should

you were using work in a safe
PPE?

way?

(Probing
question: What
was the reason
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Fugas (2012)

for the Stop
Work?
What was your
reaction to the
Stop Work?)
Influences of
Perceived Risk:
3. How does task

8. Describe how

Safety procedures

Wills, Biggs, &

risk influence

procedures for

relating to the use

Watson (2005)

refinery

PPE use for

of motor vehicles

worker’s use of

hazardous task

are complete and

personal

like confined

comprehensive?

protective

space entry

equipment in

differs from

an industrial

the use of PPE

setting?

just to enter
the refinery?
(Probing
question: Does
the use of
basic PPE
differ from one
refinery to
another?)
9. Describe how
the use of PPE

PPE use is

Glendon &

systematically

Litherland

is enforced at a enforced?
refinery
worksite?
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(2001)

(probing
question: Does
enforcement of
PPE use differ
from one
refinery to
another,
explain?
10. Describe how

Written procedures

Glendon &

you identify

match the way

Litherland

hazards for the

tasks are done in

(2001)

task and

practice?

determine the
safeguards to
perform it?
(Probing
question:
Does hazard
identification
differ from one
refinery to
another?)
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APPENDIX H
Field Test Interviewee Feedback Questions
(Participant’s Perspective)
1. How did you feel about the interview? Do you think you had ample opportunities to
describe your experiences as a petroleum refinery worker (contractor)? Please explain?
2. Did you feel the amount of time for the interview was ok? Please explain?
3. Were the questions clear or were there places where you were
uncertain what was being asked? If the interviewee indicates some uncertainty,
be sure to find out where in the interview it occurred.
4. Can you recall any words or terms being asked about during the interview that
were confusing?
5. And finally, did I appear comfortable during the interview… (I am pretty
new at this)?

226

APPENDIX I
Interview Feedback Reflection Questions
(Researcher and Observer Perspective)
1. How long did the interview take? _____ Did the time seem to be appropriate?
2. How did you feel during the interview? Comfortable? Nervous?
3. Going into it, did you feel prepared to conduct the interview? Is there something
you could have done to be better prepared?
4. What parts of the interview went the most smoothly and why do you think that
was the case?
5. What parts of the interview seemed to struggle and why do you think that was the
case?
6. If you were to change any part of the interview, what would that part be and how
would you change it?
7. What suggestions do you have for improving the overall process?
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APPENDIX J
Brandman University Institutional Review Board
When Received Will Enter Here
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APPENDIX K
National Institutes of Health
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APPENDIX L
COVID- 19 Precaution
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APPENDIX M
Job Hazard Analysis Form
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APPENDIX N
Site Safety Plan
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233

234
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APPENDIX O
Safety Data Sheet
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APPENDIX P
Training for Contractors Form
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